外文翻譯--外商直接投資模式的解釋基于土耳其汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)的分析

1、<p><b>　　中文3265字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目：Understanding patterns of FDI: the case of Turkey and its auto industry

2、 </p><p>　　出 處：European Business Journal, 15 (2), 2003, pages 61-69 </p><p>　　作 者： M. John Foster Ipek Alkan. Ipek 原 文：</p><p>　　Patterns of FDI for

3、 Turkey: actuality and expectation</p><p>　　The starting point arguably for any aspirant developing economy in its search for inward foreign investment – FDI from the perspective of the investors – is the ge

4、neral upswing in aggregate global FDI trends from source economies, which occurs for a variety of well-rehearsed reasons, see e.g. Porter (1990), Buckley (1992) and Dunning (1993). These reasons include: market extension

5、 (perhaps because the home market is near saturation); accessing scarce primary products (primarily oil and minerals)</p><p>　　Table 1 summarises global patterns of FDI in recent years. It shows a 238% incre

6、ase in aggregate FDI over the period 1994 to 1999. This comprised a 338% increase in FDI into developed countries and a 98% rise in the inflows to developing economies. In short, while there has been significant growth i

7、n developing economies, for the developed economies the growth has been much more dramatic. Even China, the much vaunted star of foreign investment, has only performed ‘steadily’ when benchmarked agai</p><p>

8、;　　This simple aggregate pattern is further elaborated by considering the FDI per capita figures shown in Table 2. This clearly suggests that Turkey is missing out in that its per capita performance over the decade shown

9、 has been flat while the picture has been one of sharp growth within the other developing economies. The comparison with Vietnam is very stark; Vietnam is a country which had to re-launch its economy from a very low base

10、 after the US removed its block on US companies’ investment, in</p><p>　　Indeed the flat performance of the 1990s at a time of aggregate global increase is even more notable when compared with the 1980s. Dat

11、a for that period show that the liberalisation-oriented change in regime of the period did indeed produce a positive increase albeit from a low base. Hence the fairly modest average performance around the change of decad

12、e (see Table 1) nevertheless marked a five-fold increase on the first couple of years. A corner was turned, so to speak, but was not followed by t</p><p>　　At an aggregate level, the ratio FDIt/GDPt,，where t

13、 is the year or period chosen, is sometimes used as an indicator of how well a country is doing in attracting FDI. Is a country ‘getting its share’? The unreliability of source data can be a problem but the ratio is like

14、ly to be fairly robust certainly to an order of magnitude. Based on data from the UN Statistical Yearbook (UN, 2001) and the data in Table 1, in 1999, Turkey’s ratio was 0.4, compared with Thailand 5.5, Vietnam 5.8, Chin

15、a 3.8, UK</p><p>　　Until recently, manufacturing was very important within the pattern of FDI into Turkey, and the biggest subsector therein was the auto and transport parts industry. Hence the auto industry

16、 might be expected to be a particular target for FDI. But actual realised FDI in that sector has been muted in absolute if not internal, comparative terms, as we explain in more detail in the next section: why?</p>

17、<p>　　We have already stated that Turkey’s aggregate FDI performance has been weaker than might be expected based on simple benchmarking around the size of the country’s population and GDP. An examination of some

18、of the key elements of the country’s business environment would tend to suggest that the expectation might well be for a stronger performance than that found.</p><p>　　First of all there is its favourable ge

19、ographical position. Turkey sits at the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. As such, it:</p><p>　　? abuts the EU via its current most easterly element, Greece (and has its customs union with the EU),</

20、p><p>　　? has borders with oil rich Iran and Iraq and moregenerally can be seen as well placed to serve the growing Middle East market, and ? has immediate access to a number of ex-Comecon economies either via

21、direct land borders or by sea via Black Sea ports – it controls the Bosphorus, which is the gateway to the Black Sea.</p><p>　　Three more positive factors can be readily identified, all of which might be tho

22、ught to be sources of comparative advantage:</p><p>　　1. competitive labour rates, certainly compared with EU rates, if not with those of other developing economies in other regions (e.g. the benchmark used

23、before, Vietnam);</p><p>　　2. a well-developed infrastructure, in the west of the country at least, which is also the industrialized area; and</p><p>　　3. a large privatisation programme, over t

24、he past decade.</p><p>　　We conclude this section by noting the major sources of FDI into Turkey. Recently the main sources have been: France, Germany, US, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, Italy and Japan, see

25、e.g. Loewendahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2000, Table 1). In other words the EU and the US lead such inward investment as is occurring, not for example its oil-rich Arab neighbours.</p><p>　　The auto sector wi

26、thin the Turkish economy</p><p>　　At the time of the research in 2001, there were 15 auto-makers in Turkey (TAMs), of which 10 have at least some element of FDI. The pattern of production and imports is show

27、n in Table 3. It shows a growing share of the Turkish market for auto units being taken by imports even as the market itself grew.</p><p>　　The industry is the third largest industrial segment in the economy

28、 and employs 500 000 people. Vehicle ownership rates currently are around 62 per thousand persons, compared with a global average of 82 per thousand, indicating high potential demand if the economy can grow generally. Ho

29、wever, there are major perceived impediments to auto sales, as we discuss in the next section. These include low income per capita and high levels of final sales tax.</p><p>　　The 15 producer companies have

30、a capacity to build 667 000 passenger cars per annum (in five companies) and a further 223 000 vehicles of other types, making 890 000 in total. </p><p>　　Table 4 shows the recent export performance of the T

31、AMs. While they show an upward trend they are still not sufficient to enable the TAMs to achieve acceptable levels of plant utilisation, no more than the order of 50% over a number of years.</p><p>　　Survey

32、of foreign-invested TAMs</p><p>　　Given the twin facts of Turkey’s general underperformance in the FDI stakes, including the auto sector, and, apparently, the potentially favourable conditions for FDI in Tur

33、key, the question of its relatively poor level of FDI remained. In order to explore this issue, a survey was conducted of the 10 auto-makers in Turkey which have at least some element of foreign investment (the FITAMs –

34、see Appendix 1 for a list). Five of the ten responded and supplied some considerable detail, including answ</p><p>　　Perceived barriers to FDI in the auto industry</p><p>　　It was found that the

35、 main factors believed to impede the development of the auto industry and hence act as barriers to further FDI into it were as follows:</p><p>　　? political instability, including corruption;</p><

36、p>　　? recurring economic crises, with attendant high inflation, interest rates and stagnation;</p><p>　　? low income levels – these are believed to be holding back latent domestic demand;</p><p

37、>　　? heavy reliance on imported components (inputs) – this can also be seen as the industry not achieving sufficient mass to allow local vertical integration; and</p><p>　　? high taxes on final vehicle sa

38、les, from 37 to 64%.</p><p>　　One consequence of these factors, in combination, was low utilisation rates within Turkish auto plants (of the order of 50%, as already noted). A consequence of this in turn is

39、that unit costs are higher than would be the case were something close to full capacity use to be achieved. This in turn has made Turkish exports less competitive, in the EU for example, than might have been expected. In

40、 the case of the EU market this lack of competitiveness occurs in spite of markedly higher EU labour ra</p><p>　　The sense of Turkey being in an apparently strong competitive position vis-à-vis inward F

41、DI but failing to realise its potential because of concerns regarding political and economic stability is supported by the conclusions of a recent paper by Loewandahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2000).</p><p>　　

42、Prognosis for the future of FITAMs</p><p>　　The responding auto companies were also asked for their prognosis for the future. Those foreign manufacturers already committed to Turkey, as were our respondents,

43、 are cautiously bullish. Conclusions, in brief, were:</p><p>　　? none of the responding FITAMs had plans to withdraw nor expected competitors to do so; indeed</p><p>　　? three of the five respon

44、dents had further immediate investment plans in hand and a fourth had recently completed a significant investment;</p><p>　　? the consensus was nevertheless that moves into Turkey by Volkswagen and Nissan we

45、re not expected;</p><p>　　? political stability was seen as the key to significant expansion of the FITAMs;</p><p>　　? Turkey is perceived to possess country-specific advantages (CSAs): these CS

46、As could underpin future FDI if the question of political stability could be resolved.</p><p>　　CSAs commonly included:</p><p>　　? quality of labour;</p><p>　　? managerial ability;&

47、lt;/p><p>　　? an ‘industrial mentality’ – a mindset able to cope with an industrial environment;</p><p>　　? an already well-constructed industry base in autos.</p><p>　　The issue of ma

48、nagerial ability is of particular interest for Turkey’s future. In a study of UK firms engaged in FDI, it was notable that companies were more worried by lack of competent local management than lack of trained shop-floor

49、 labour (Foster, 2002).</p><p>　　As for the threat of other emerging economies being alternative destinations for auto inward FDI, the responses showed that Turkey’s own CSAs would enable it to compete. In a

50、ddition, the EU customs union agreement gives Turkey a direct advantage, even if all other factors are equal. However, perhaps the major competitor destination in simple aggregate investment terms is China and its auto i

51、ndustry is currently inwardly focused, i.e. seeking to develop and meet growing domestic demand as its eco</p><p>　　The major change in Turkish life in late 2002 was the election in November of a new governm

52、ent. The two important factors concerning the new government are its Islamic roots and the fact that it has an overall majority in the parliament. The latter certainly offers the potential to deliver stable government an

53、d initiate necessary economic reforms which may have been infeasible for preceding coalitions because of the inherent fragility of those coalitions. The fact that the party has, as stated, </p><p>　　A comple

54、mentary assessment approach</p><p>　　Having looked at the actual situation and the industry’s own perceptions of future prospects, we apply an evaluative framework for FDIs (Foster, 2002) to the Turkish auto

55、 industry context. The results were found to be highly compatible with those from the questionnaire data. This is both further evidence for the validity of the framework and interesting in that its outcomes are consonant

56、 with the preceding discussion.</p><p>　　The Foster FDI-Evaluation framework (2002) comprises six factors which are seen to be important, contextual aspects of the overall FDI decision as a complement to the

57、 usual financial appraisals. Each factor has an attached (subjective), Likertbased scoring scale. Four of the six factors have positive or affirmative scales, while the other two, F4 and F6, have negatively inclined scal

58、es (i.e. a high score denotes potential hazard). For this application we have adopted two conventions. First, we h</p><p>　　Finally, note that here we apply the framework to the Turkish auto industry (TAI) a

59、s an entity rather than using it as a complement to the financial assessment of an individual investment proposal. The factors and their scores or the scores of the complements are shown in Figure 1. (Brief details of th

60、e nature of the factors in the Foster model can be found in Appendix 2.)</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　外商直接投資模式的解釋：基于土耳其汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)的分析</p><p>　　土耳其的FDI模式：現(xiàn)狀和展望</p>&l

61、t;p>　　從投資者的角度研究對(duì)內(nèi)外商投資時(shí)，可以認(rèn)為FDI是個(gè)正普遍上升的經(jīng)濟(jì)來(lái)源。FDI的產(chǎn)生原因包括很多，如波特（1990）、巴克利（1992）、鄧寧（1993）的研究理論。這些原因包括：市場(chǎng)擴(kuò)展（可能國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)幾近飽和）；獲得稀缺的初級(jí)產(chǎn)品（主要為石油和煤礦）；在下沉經(jīng)濟(jì)過(guò)程中從某個(gè)特定的成本優(yōu)勢(shì)中獲得生產(chǎn)效率戰(zhàn)略；其他原因或者以上原因的組合。處于發(fā)展中的經(jīng)濟(jì)體理所當(dāng)然會(huì)疑問(wèn)：“我們能從這種資金的流動(dòng)中受益嗎？”</p

62、><p>　　表1概況了近幾年FDI在全球的分布規(guī)模。該表顯示從1994-1999年總FDI流量增長(zhǎng)了238%。發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家相應(yīng)的增長(zhǎng)了338%，而發(fā)展中國(guó)家增長(zhǎng)了98%。簡(jiǎn)單的說(shuō)，當(dāng)發(fā)展中國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)生了較大的增長(zhǎng)，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)就要巨大的多。即使對(duì)外商投資的贊美很多，但跟全球的總量比，中國(guó)只是表現(xiàn)的很穩(wěn)定。圖表顯示，拿越南作為參照，過(guò)去10年與一些新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體比，土耳其在總體上看表現(xiàn)的并不好。</p>

63、<p>　　在考慮了人均FDI后，簡(jiǎn)單的綜合模式在表2中體現(xiàn)。從表中可以明顯看出，土耳其在過(guò)去的10年里，其人均FDI落后而其他發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體是快速增長(zhǎng)的，表現(xiàn)為土耳其的曲線平緩。土耳其與越南的之間比較是非常明顯的；自從美國(guó)取消了他對(duì)美國(guó)公司投資的股份后，越南在經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)極低的情況下開始重新開發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)，即從1975年越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的撤退后直接開始建立。</p><p>　　確實(shí)，19世紀(jì)90年代在與80年代的全球總

64、增長(zhǎng)表現(xiàn)比較中，其平坦表現(xiàn)更為顯著。那段時(shí)間的數(shù)據(jù)顯示即使基數(shù)小，但政權(quán)自由化的改變確實(shí)產(chǎn)生了積極的增長(zhǎng)。因此，10年來(lái)這種相當(dāng)平均的表現(xiàn)仍然在最初幾年有了5倍的增長(zhǎng)。可以說(shuō)原先的表現(xiàn)不好的觀點(diǎn)被否定了，只是這還不及預(yù)期。</p><p>　　在總和的水平上，選定的單位年或特定期間的FDI/GDP比例，有時(shí)可以很好地表示一個(gè)國(guó)家在吸引FDI上做的有多少出色。一個(gè)國(guó)家能“得到份額”嗎？數(shù)據(jù)資料或許存在不可靠的問(wèn)題，

65、但對(duì)于一個(gè)數(shù)量集，比率是相當(dāng)合理的?；诼?lián)合國(guó)統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)（2001）和表1的數(shù)據(jù)，土耳其的比率為0.4，臺(tái)灣為5.5，中國(guó)3.8，英國(guó)5.7，美國(guó)3.1。這些數(shù)據(jù)顯示無(wú)論是與發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家還是發(fā)展中國(guó)家比較，土耳其未能得到相應(yīng)的市場(chǎng)份額。</p><p>　　到現(xiàn)在為止，制造業(yè)是非常重要的FDI進(jìn)入土耳其的模式，其中占絕大部分的是汽車和運(yùn)輸零部件產(chǎn)業(yè)。因此，汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)可能是研究FDI最理想的對(duì)象。但是我們觀察到FDI對(duì)汽車

66、產(chǎn)業(yè)并非如此，我們將在下一部分詳細(xì)解釋：為什么？</p><p>　　以國(guó)家的人口和GDP為尺標(biāo)，我們已經(jīng)證明土耳其的FDI總額比預(yù)期的要差很多。一個(gè)針對(duì)該國(guó)商業(yè)環(huán)境中的關(guān)鍵因素開展的檢驗(yàn)，將提出預(yù)期的表現(xiàn)可能要比以發(fā)現(xiàn)的要更好。</p><p>　　首先，是它有利的地理位置。土耳其坐落在地中海的東北角。照這樣說(shuō)來(lái)：</p><p>　　土耳其緊靠著歐盟，經(jīng)過(guò)他最東

67、邊的鄰國(guó)-希臘（并與歐盟建立了海關(guān)聯(lián)盟）；</p><p>　　與石油國(guó)家伊朗、伊拉克和被普遍看好且日益增長(zhǎng)的中東市場(chǎng)有市場(chǎng)交涉；</p><p>　　土耳其通過(guò)直接的土地邊界和黑海的港口與許多的經(jīng)濟(jì)互助經(jīng)濟(jì)體取得聯(lián)系，他控制了博斯普魯斯海峽，即黑海的入口。</p><p>　　三個(gè)積極因素應(yīng)該確定，這三個(gè)都可能成為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)：</p><p>

68、;　　1．有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的勞動(dòng)價(jià)格，這自然是指與歐盟的價(jià)格對(duì)比，而不是與其他地區(qū)的發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體（如之前用過(guò)的越南的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)）；</p><p>　　2．良好的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，起碼在該國(guó)的西部-同樣也是個(gè)工業(yè)區(qū)擁有這優(yōu)勢(shì)；</p><p>　　3．過(guò)去幾十年以來(lái)的巨大的私有化體系。</p><p>　　我們以對(duì)土耳其的FDI來(lái)源的關(guān)注來(lái)結(jié)束該節(jié)。近年來(lái)主要的來(lái)源有：法國(guó)、美國(guó)、荷蘭、

69、瑞士、英國(guó)、意大利和日本，如見Loewendahl和Ertugal-Loewendahl（2000，表1）。換句話說(shuō)，當(dāng)下發(fā)生的外來(lái)投資都是受制于歐盟和美國(guó)，而不是如它的石油儲(chǔ)量豐富的阿拉伯鄰國(guó)。</p><p>　　外商投資土耳其汽車制造商的研究</p><p>　　土耳其在FDI股份中表現(xiàn)不佳的兩個(gè)原因之一是在于汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)部分。汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)作為土耳其有潛力吸引FDI的有利條件，存在著FDI水

70、平相對(duì)較低的問(wèn)題。為了開展本項(xiàng)研究，我們對(duì)10家具有外商投資因素的土耳其汽車制造商開展了調(diào)查（即FITAMs，外商投資的土耳其汽車制造商，見附錄1），10家中的5家已經(jīng)給予了回復(fù)并提供了足夠的信息，包括通過(guò)后續(xù)的電話回訪答的不是很清楚的問(wèn)題。問(wèn)題的設(shè)置為結(jié)合封閉式和開放式的問(wèn)題。</p><p>　　FDI在汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)中的壁壘的假設(shè)</p><p>　　被認(rèn)為阻礙了汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展而因此成為后續(xù)

71、的FDI進(jìn)入該產(chǎn)業(yè)的主要因素包括以下幾點(diǎn)：</p><p>　　政局不穩(wěn)定，包括腐?。?lt;/p><p>　　經(jīng)常性的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)，伴隨高通脹，高利率和經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯；</p><p>　　低收入水平—被認(rèn)為會(huì)消退潛在的國(guó)內(nèi)需求；</p><p>　　對(duì)進(jìn)口零部件（投入）的高度依賴—也可以從產(chǎn)業(yè)無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)足夠的量以保證當(dāng)?shù)氐拇怪币惑w化看出；</p&g

72、t;<p>　　對(duì)最終汽車銷售的高稅收，從37%到64%。</p><p>　　結(jié)合以上因素得出的一個(gè)結(jié)論是：土耳其汽車企業(yè)的利用率低（報(bào)道說(shuō)是50%）。這個(gè)結(jié)論反過(guò)來(lái)是說(shuō)單位成本比那些效益得到充分使用的企業(yè)要高。這最終導(dǎo)致土耳其的出口，比如在英國(guó)市場(chǎng)上的出口情況，比預(yù)期的欠競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。如在英國(guó)的市場(chǎng)中，即使英國(guó)的勞動(dòng)力價(jià)格要更高，這種缺乏競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的現(xiàn)象仍會(huì)發(fā)生。這突出了由東南亞其他地區(qū)證明的一個(gè)要點(diǎn)，即僅僅

73、依靠低工資率來(lái)吸引FDI是不充足的。這點(diǎn)看起來(lái)很明顯但實(shí)際操作中卻常常被掩蓋，因?yàn)榈凸べY作為FDI的理由是最容易被意識(shí)到的。</p><p>　　土耳其給人的感覺(jué)是站在與對(duì)內(nèi)FDI接壤的明顯強(qiáng)有力的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性位置，卻由于政局和經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)定性而無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)他的潛力，該觀點(diǎn)由Loewandahl和Ertugal-Loewendahl（2000）在近期的論文的結(jié)論中證實(shí)。</p><p>　　預(yù)計(jì)未來(lái)外商

74、對(duì)土耳其汽車制造商的投資</p><p>　　做出回復(fù)的汽車制造商同時(shí)也被要求預(yù)測(cè)他們的將來(lái)。這些致力于土耳其的外國(guó)制造商，作為我們的回復(fù)方，他們表現(xiàn)的謹(jǐn)慎樂(lè)觀。簡(jiǎn)單的說(shuō)，結(jié)論如下：</p><p>　　沒(méi)有一個(gè)外商投資的土耳其汽車制造商計(jì)劃撤離也不希望競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手這么做；</p><p>　　五個(gè)回復(fù)者中的三個(gè)近期有直接投資的計(jì)劃，一個(gè)回復(fù)者最近完成了一項(xiàng)大的投資；&

75、lt;/p><p>　　然而一直認(rèn)為大眾和日產(chǎn)不可能進(jìn)入土耳其；</p><p>　　政局的穩(wěn)定性被認(rèn)為是FITAMs擴(kuò)展的關(guān)鍵；</p><p>　　土耳其將獲得國(guó)家特定優(yōu)勢(shì)（CSAs）：這些優(yōu)勢(shì)將支撐FDI的將來(lái)，如果政局穩(wěn)定性的問(wèn)題能被解決。</p><p>　　國(guó)家特定優(yōu)勢(shì)一般包括：</p><p><b&g

76、t;　　勞動(dòng)力質(zhì)量；</b></p><p><b>　　管理能力；</b></p><p>　　‘工業(yè)思維’-一種能應(yīng)對(duì)工業(yè)環(huán)境的心態(tài)；</p><p>　　一個(gè)已經(jīng)建造好的汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)的基礎(chǔ)。</p><p>　　管理能力特別有利于土耳其的發(fā)展前景。在研究英國(guó)成功開展FDI的企業(yè)時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)更擔(dān)心的是缺少地方主

77、管能力，而不是擔(dān)心缺乏訓(xùn)練的基層勞動(dòng)力（福斯特，2002）。</p><p>　　至于來(lái)自于其他新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體的威脅，即他們可能成為對(duì)內(nèi)FDI的最終選擇，企業(yè)家們的反應(yīng)顯示土耳其自有的國(guó)家特有優(yōu)勢(shì)可以抵御這種威脅。另外，歐盟的海關(guān)聯(lián)盟協(xié)議給與了土耳其一種直接的優(yōu)勢(shì)，即使其他的國(guó)家也享有。然而，在對(duì)投資進(jìn)行簡(jiǎn)單的加總計(jì)算時(shí)看出，中國(guó)可能是最大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者，中國(guó)的汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)當(dāng)下專注于國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)，以實(shí)現(xiàn)在其經(jīng)濟(jì)不斷快速增長(zhǎng)的情緒下

78、發(fā)展和滿足日益增長(zhǎng)的國(guó)內(nèi)需求（到2002為止從7%增長(zhǎng)到8%）。</p><p>　　土耳其在2002年末期最主要的變動(dòng)就是11月份的新政府的選舉?？紤]這個(gè)新政府時(shí)有兩個(gè)主要要素，即伊斯蘭根和新政府占了議會(huì)的絕大多數(shù)。后者自然保證了穩(wěn)定運(yùn)行政府和初期必不可少的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革，這些對(duì)內(nèi)部帶有固有的脆弱性的前政府來(lái)講是不可實(shí)施的。上述帶有伊斯蘭根的黨派，在這個(gè)幾個(gè)80年以前就已經(jīng)被阿塔圖爾克世俗化的國(guó)家里提出了不同問(wèn)題。到

79、目前為止，這個(gè)新政府還沒(méi)有表示對(duì)未來(lái)投資者過(guò)度的擔(dān)心，同樣對(duì)與歐盟簽訂的關(guān)于土耳其一定時(shí)期內(nèi)的市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入性的協(xié)議也抱以這樣的態(tài)度。</p><p><b>　　評(píng)估方法的補(bǔ)充</b></p><p>　　通過(guò)了解了土耳其汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)的實(shí)際情況和該產(chǎn)業(yè)自身對(duì)將來(lái)的預(yù)期后，我們提供了FDI的評(píng)估結(jié)構(gòu)。該評(píng)估結(jié)果顯示與不確定數(shù)據(jù)的結(jié)果高度相符。這證明了結(jié)構(gòu)的可行性，也證明了結(jié)論與

80、之前的討論是一致的。</p><p>　　福斯特的FDI評(píng)估結(jié)構(gòu)（2002）包含了6個(gè)重要因素，F(xiàn)DI決定的內(nèi)部因素，作為一般財(cái)政評(píng)估的補(bǔ)充。每一個(gè)因素都放在Likertbased評(píng)分量表上。六個(gè)中的四個(gè)有積極的改革性的作用，而其他兩個(gè)F4和F6具有消極的抑制作用（高的分?jǐn)?shù)表示了潛在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)）。為了應(yīng)用這個(gè)，我們采取了兩項(xiàng)調(diào)整。首先，我們對(duì)每一個(gè)因素使用了七點(diǎn)法。第二，我們對(duì)兩個(gè)消極的因素給與了補(bǔ)充，即如果F4的分值