[教育]銀行監(jiān)管的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析

1、Chapter 11. Economic Analysis of Bank Regulation,Asymmetric Information,In economics,,people respond to incentivesregulation needed to counteractsometimes, regulation creates the wrong incentives,I. Asymmetric Inform

2、ation,banks solve some asymmetric info problemsbut creates othersregulation deals with asymmetric info problemsbut creates others,A. Deposit Insurance,FDIC established 1934prevents depositors from panicking and with

3、drawing funds“run on the bank”,2 types of action,payoff methodFDIC closes down insolvent bankdepositors paid up to $100,000FDIC sells off assetsoften depositors with more than $100,000 often given full refund,purcha

4、se & assumption methodFDIC finds a healthy bank to buy failing bank-- FDIC offers incentivesno depositor lossesmore common method,before FDICbank panics1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1893, 1907, 1930-33after

5、FDICno national bank panics,Problems w/ deposit insurance,moral hazardinsurance gives less incentive to be carefuldepositors less careful in selecting bankbanks less careful with depositor money,adverse selectionif

6、depositors not policing banks,questionable people, knowing this, attracted to banking,FDIC policies make problems worse,“too big to fail”FDIC gives preferential treatment to larger bank failures-- covering deposits

7、> $100,000 -- prevent large lossesmoral hazard/adverse selection worse for larger banks,B. Capital Requirements,capital as % assetscounteract moral hazard problemscapital is lost if failurecapital reduces risk-

8、takingwell-capitalized banksless supervisionlower deposit insurance premiums,C. Bank Supervision,limiting ownershipbank examinationsasset riskbank loanscapital requirementmanaging risk,disclosurefinancial state

9、mentsconsumer protectionterms of creditfee disclosurediscrimination“redlining”,competitionrestricted until 1990s-- McFadden Act-- Glass Steagallincreases health of banks-- driving “bad” banks out-- increa

10、sing efficiency,II. Banking Crisis of the 1980s,1934-80less than 20 banks failure per year1983-1993200 per yearwhat happened?,A. Origins,declining profitability of traditional activitiesfinancial innovationsrising

11、 short-term interest rates in 1970sbanks borrow short & lend longespecially hard on S&Ls,Deregulation,banks lobby for change to reverse declining profits1980 DIDMCA1982 Garn-St. Germain,repealed Regulation Q

12、offer interest-bearing checkingS&Ls allowed more asset choiceslending, junk bonds, common stockincrease deposit insurance ceilings,result?,big increase in moral hazardgreat incentive/ability to take riskthrifts

13、lacked skills to manage riskregulators lacked resources to police thriftsdid not correct problem with short-term interest rates,economic events,very high short-term interest rates in 1979-80recession 1981-82falling f

14、arm, energy prices in early 1980shigher loan defaults,by 1982,50% of all S&Ls are insolvent,B. Failure of regulators,by 1982, regulators SHOULD HAVE shut down failed S&Lsbut, instead, regulatory forbearanceal

15、lowed insolvent S&Ls to keep operating,why?,FSLIC lacked the funds for depositor payoffregulators too friendly w/ industryregulators would be admitting to failure,zombie S&Ls,insolvent S&Ls, still operating

16、nothing to loseoffer very high deposit ratesoffer very low loan ratestaking business from healthy S&Ls,C. Politics of the crisis,economics caused the problemspolitics made the crisisprincipal-agent problemage

17、nts act on behalf of principalsagents have different incentives and do not act in best interest of principals,principals: voters/taxpayerselect politicians that appoint regulatorspay cost of bailoutagents: politicia

18、ns/regulators,principals benefit from dealing w/ crisis early to minimize costsagents benefit from re-election, careerpoliticians got huge campaign contributions from S&L industryregulators pressured to back off,D

19、. Bailout: FIRREA 1989,federal bonds to fund closure of S&Lschange in S&L regulationFSLIC, FHLB goneOTC created, FDIC for insuranceRTC to liquidate assetsdone in 1995,re-restricted S&L activitiesraise

20、d deposit insurance premiumsmore power to regulators in closing banks,E. Reform: FDICIA 1991,deal with moral hazard problems with deposit insurancelimited “too big to fail”risk-based premiumincreased capital requir