科學、技術和創(chuàng)新的政策【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Science, Technology and Innovation Policy</p><p>　　Material Source： Innovation Handbook. (Oxford: Oxford U

2、niversity Press). </p><p>　　Pages 599-631</p><p>　　Author： Jan, Mowery, David C. and Nelson, Richard R</p><p>　　….to technology policy</p><p>　　Technology policy refers

3、 to policies that focus on technologies and sectors. The era of technology policy is one where especially science-based technologies such as nuclear power, space technology, computers, drugs and genetic engineering are s

4、een as being at the very core of economic growth. These technologies get into focus for several reasons. On the one hand they stimulate imagination because they make it possible to do surprising things - they combine sci

5、ence with fiction. On the other hand</p><p>　　Technology policy means different things for catching up countries than it does for high-income countries and it might also mean different things for small and b

6、ig countries. In big high-income countries the focus will be on establishing a capacity in producing the most recent science-based technologies, as well as applying these innovations. In smaller countries it might be a q

7、uestion about being able to absorb and use these technologies as they come on the market. Catching-up countries may mak</p><p>　　Common for these strategies is that they tend to define ‘strategic technologie

8、s’ and sometimes the sectors producing them are also defined as strategic sectors. The idea of strategic sectors may be related to Perroux and to Hirschman, both students of Schumpeter. Perroux used concepts such as ‘ind

9、ustrializing industries’ and growth poles while Hirschman introduced unbalanced growth as a possible strategy for less developed countries (Perroux, 1969; Hirschman, 1969).</p><p>　　In the lead countries, go

10、vernment initiatives of the technology policy kind were triggered when national political or economic interests were threatened and the threats could be linked to the command of specific technologies. Sputnik gave extra

11、impetus to a focus on space technology and the cold war motivated the most ambitious technology policy effort ever in the US. In Europe, Servan Schreiber’s book ‘Le Defi Americain’ (Servan Schreiber 1967) gave a picture

12、of a growing dominance of the US mu</p><p>　　The motivation behind the technology policy in Japan – and later on in countries such as Taiwan and Korea - is different. It is driven by a national strategy aimi

13、ng at catching up and in the Japanese case it has roots back to the Meiji revolution when the first ideas of modernization based on imitating the technology of the West were formed.</p><p>　　One fundamental

14、question in technology policy is if it is at all legitimate and effective for the state to intervene for commercial reasons promoting specific sectors or technologies. Or is the only legitimate technology policy one wher

15、e national societal issues are at stake, including establishing national military power? It is a paradox that in the country having the most massive public intervention in terms of technology policy, the US, most of the

16、policy has been motivated by non-commercial </p><p>　　A second issue concerns what technologies should be supported. Is it always the case that high tech- and science-based sectors should be given first prio

17、rity? Again the Japanese government as well as governments in smaller countries has been more apt to think about the modernization of old industries than the US and the big European countries.</p><p>　　A thi

18、rd issue is at what stage the support should be given. Should it be given only to ‘pre-competitive’ stages or should it also be helpful in bringing the new products to the market? In the second case there might be a comb

19、ination of government support of new technology and more or less open protectionism.</p><p>　　A fourth issue is about the limits for public sector competence. Technology policy may be pursued with competence

20、 where government operates as a major user but when it comes to developing new technologies for the market, the role of governments must be more modest. To be more specific, there are several historical examples of how g

21、overnment ambitions to make technological choices that reduce diversity have ended in failure, for example, the ‘minitel’ experience in France, and the High Definition</p><p>　　A fifth issue concerns how pro

22、moting a technology or a sector can best be combined with competition. The period in the eighties of promoting single firms as national champions in the bigger European countries was not a great success while the Japanes

23、e public strategy to promote ‘controlled competition’ among a handful of firms was more successful</p><p>　　The objectives of technology policy are not very different from those of science policy but – at le

24、ast to begin with – it represented a shift from broader philosophical considerations to a more instrumental focus on national prestige and economic objectives. Technology policies were developed in an era of technology o

25、ptimism. But later on – in the wake of the 1968 student revolt – more critical and broader concerns relating to technology assessment and citizen participation came onto the agenda </p><p>　　The elements of

26、the innovation system in focus remain universities, research institutions, technological institutes and R&D laboratories. But the attention moves from universities toward engineering and from the internal organizatio

27、n of universities toward how they link to industry. Technology policy may go even further and include the commercialization of technologies, but then we approach what we will call innovation policy.</p><p>　

28、　In some countries such as the US, the main technology policy actors in the public sector are sector ministries promoting and sometimes procuring technology for purposes of telecommunications, defense, health, transport,

29、 energy etc. while in others, such as Japan, they are ministries in charge of industry and trade. Ministries of education and research are important since they organize the education and training of scientists and engine

30、ers. Authorities in charge of regulating competition as well </p><p>　　There are many possible instruments to be used in promoting specific technologies and sectors. Most efficient may be combinations of ins

31、truments in fields where public procurement is involved. When the government has the leading user competence, it is in a better position to judge what kind of instruments will work (Edquist et al. 2000). Besides public p

32、rocurement direct economic incentives in terms of subsidies and tax reductions may be offered to firms. Supporting research at universities in t</p><p>　　In areas where the main application of the new techno

33、logies is commercial, the set of instruments used may be a combination of sector or technology specific economic incentives with more or less protectionist trade policy. An example might be the high definition TV policy

34、of the EU in the early 1990s, where the attempt to define a compulsory analogical standard would have been a technical trade barrier to emerging digital standards, combined with specific economic incentives for European

35、produce</p><p>　　While the evaluation of research is important in science policy there are similar general policy tools that are useful when designing and redesigning technology policy. Technology forecastin

36、g is a way of capturing new technological trends. Asking leading expertise among scientists and among the most advanced producers and users about what technologies are rising on the horizon helps to scout the next genera

37、tion of ‘strategic technologies’. In order to limit the capturing of public interest by pr</p><p>　　As pointed out, science and technology policy are ideal types, which serve our broad analytical purposes. I

38、n the real world of advanced capitalist economies, however, the policy focus, instruments and actors involved in science and technology policy-making are not always easily grouped in one or the other of these categories.

39、 As we will examine now, innovation policy takes a step further by bringing in an even broader set of policy issues.</p><p>　　..and to innovation policy</p><p>　　Innovation policy appears in two

40、 different versions. One – the laissez faire-version - puts the emphasis on non-interventionism and signals that the focus should be on ‘framework conditions’ rather than specific sectors or technologies. This often goes

41、 with a vocabulary where any kind of specific measure gets grouped under the negative heading ‘picking the winners’. The extreme version of this type of innovation policy is one where basic research and general education

42、 are seen as the only legiti</p><p>　　The other version may be presented as the ‘systemic’ version and by referring to the concept of ‘innovation system’. This perspective implies that most major policy fiel

43、ds need to be considered in the light of how they contribute to innovation. A fundamental aspect of innovation policy becomes to review and redesign the linkages between the parts of the system. The first approach is bui

44、lt upon the standard assumption made in economics that firms always know what is best for them and that they no</p><p>　　Both of these approaches cover all aspects of the innovation process – including diffu

45、sion, use and marketing of new technologies and in a sense they may be seen as an important form of ‘economic policy’ where the focus is more on innovation than on allocation. Both tend to put stronger emphasis on ‘insti

46、tutions’ and ‘organizations’ than do science and technology policy. In the laissez faire-version, the predominance of the market and of competition becomes the most important prerequisite for in</p><p>　　In

47、the systemic approach the importance of competition is recognized but so is the need for closer co-operation vertically between users and producers and sometimes even horizontally among competitors when it comes to devel

48、op generic technologies. In the system’s approach it is recognized that the institutional set up differs across national economies and that this has implications for what types of technologies and sectors thrive in the n

49、ational context. To design a suitable innovation policy r</p><p>　　Innovation policy does not imply any a priori preference for high versus low technology. The systems approach introduces a vertical perspect

50、ive on the industrial system seeing it as a network and as value chains where certain stages might be more suitable for firms in a specific country.</p><p>　　The theoretical foundation of the two different v

51、ersions of innovation policy is respectively an application of standard neo-classical economics on innovation and, respectively, a long-term outcome of research on innovation and economic evolution (Metcalfe, 1995; Metca

52、lfe and Georghiou, 1998). The innovation system approach may be seen as bringing together the most important stylized facts of innovation. It makes use of empirical material and analytical models developed in innovation

53、research, a</p><p>　　The major reason for innovation policy becoming more broadly used as a concept was the slow down in economic growth around 1970 and the persistence of sluggish growth as compared to the

54、first post-war decades. The reasons for the slow down in the growth in ‘total factor productivity’ were, and still are, not well understood but there was a feeling that it had to do with the lacking capability to exploit

55、 technological opportunities. At the same time, the restrictions imposed on general economic p</p><p>　　This implies that the major objectives of innovation policy are economic growth and international compe

56、titiveness. In the European Union discourse these objectives are combined with ‘social cohesion’ and equality. Innovation might also be seen as a way to solve important problems relating to pollution, energy, urbanism an

57、d poverty. But the main focus is on the creation of economic wealth.</p><p>　　Among the instruments to be used are the regulation of intellectual property rights and access to venture capital. One fundamenta

58、l distinction in innovation policy goes between initiatives aiming at promoting innovation within the institutional context and, respectively, policies aiming at changing the institutional context in order to promote inn

59、ovation. The first category overlaps with instruments used in science and technology policy. The second may include reforms of universities, education,</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　科學

60、、技術和創(chuàng)新的政策</p><p>　　資料來源：《創(chuàng)新手冊》，牛津：牛津大學出版社，2005(599-631)．</p><p>　　作者：簡·莫薇爾, 大衛(wèi)C. 和尼爾森·理查德R.</p><p><b>　　技術政策</b></p><p>　　技術政策是指注重技術和部門的政策。當科學技術,如

61、核能、空間技術、電腦、藥物和基因工程被人們認為在經濟增長扮演重要核心角色時，說明技術政策時代已來臨。這些技術成為焦點的原因主要有以下幾點：一方面,因為它們能讓人們結合科學與虛構，使想象力不受束縛，可以做令人吃驚的事情。另一方面新的技術政策開辟了新的商業(yè)機會，能使人們高效率的創(chuàng)新和迅速占領市場。 </p><p>　　技術政策在不同的國家，具有不同的意義。在高收入國家將最新的科學技術重點應用在建立生產能力創(chuàng)新上

62、。在低收入國家，利用技術政策，進一步吸收和利用新技術，使產品得以在市場上生存。高增長國家或許只有當確定一個行業(yè)具有發(fā)展前途時，才會運用新的技術。</p><p>　　在我們常見的戰(zhàn)略中,人們傾向于運用“戰(zhàn)略技術”,有時他們將生產行業(yè)定義為戰(zhàn)略部門。戰(zhàn)略領域的想法可能與Perroux和Hirschman熊彼特的學生一樣,使用Perroux概念,例如“工業(yè)化產業(yè)”和“區(qū)域增長極”,然而Hirschman認為：戰(zhàn)略技術

63、的運用在欠發(fā)達國家中效果并不明顯, (Perroux,1969, Hirschman；1969)。</p><p>　　具有遠見的政府只有在國家的政治或經濟利益受到威脅和挑戰(zhàn)時，才會觸發(fā)技術類政策并指揮特定技術。人造地球衛(wèi)星的出現(xiàn)給了更多政府發(fā)展科學技術的動力,它同時也讓各國把焦點集中在空間技術上。冷戰(zhàn)時期最具雄心的技術政策發(fā)生在美國。在歐洲,Servan Schreiber的書《該挑戰(zhàn)的美國人》 (Servan

64、 Schreiber 1967)給我們描繪出越來越多的跨國公司在高技術領域占有主導地位的畫面。此書觀點的提出，帶動了歐洲國家,如法國、英國和德國出臺在特定的領域鼓勵發(fā)展促進民族冠軍的激勵政策,然而其中法國人和后來歐洲人一味靠禁止出口計算機技術的政策,也為他們帶來不小的損失，阻礙他們自身核能技術的發(fā)展便是其中一例。</p><p>　　日本的迅速發(fā)展離不開其技術政策的支持,這與后來追上的地區(qū)或國家,如臺灣和韓國是不

65、同的。日本的國家戰(zhàn)略目標只有一個,它的淵源可追溯到明治維新時期，即第一次基于模仿西方現(xiàn)代化技術的形成。</p><p>　　一個最基本的問題是如果一個國家同時擁有公民干預政策和技術政策并且兩者均是可行的，有時候通過公民干預商業(yè)來促進特定部門或技術的發(fā)展。或者是通過唯一合法技術政策來處理一個國家的社會事件,包括建立攸關國家軍事力量，這兩者會產生矛盾嗎？在美國正因有了這兩種政策，促使大部分政策對話已經激發(fā)了論點和非商

66、業(yè)性話題，這已經屬于一反常態(tài)范疇。而日本是明確最多的商業(yè)驅動技術政策國家,國家為此在這里干預曾非常有限,至少在足球的公共資金金額參與方面便有所體現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　第二個問題涉及到什么技術應當支持。以科學為基礎的產業(yè)高科技應當給予最先考慮嗎?在較小的國家日本政府比起美國和歐洲國家。更傾向于考慮傳統(tǒng)工業(yè)的現(xiàn)代化。</p><p>　　第三個問題是在什么階段應當給予支持。只給予“競爭領域

67、”或者更有助于將新產品推向市場階段的支持嗎?在第二種情形或多或少有有可能包含政府支持新技術的公開貿易保護主義。</p><p>　　第四個問題是關于公共部門的能力。只有當技術政策的用戶是政府時，才能發(fā)揮它的能力, 但是當它為開發(fā)新技術所用時,政府在市場中的境地就顯得更為尷尬了。有幾個歷史性的例子說明政府選擇用技術政策來促使本國產品與外國產品減小差異，然而到了市場中，政府的技術政策便顯得蒼白無力，最終以失敗而告終。

68、例如, 在上個世紀90年代早期。無論是“迷你電話”在法國的經歷,還是高清晰度電視在歐盟的經歷，均印證了這一點。</p><p>　　第五個問題是促進技術、部門相結合的競爭。在上世紀八十年代期間單一公司促進國家領先，而在當前大歐洲國家卻很難成功,但日本民眾通過技術策略競爭的控制少數(shù)公司，卻取得更大的成功。</p><p>　　從政策角度來說，技術政策的目標與科學技術的目標存在較大不同 ,這代

69、表了從用哲學關注國內信譽和經濟向儀器聚焦的轉變。技術政策的時代發(fā)展技術是樂觀的。但后來——沉浸在1968年的學生反抗——更重要和更廣闊的有關技術評估和公民參與都一起走到議程中(經濟合作與發(fā)展組織1970)。</p><p>　　創(chuàng)新體系的元素集中在高等院校、科研機構、科研機構和研發(fā)實驗室。但重視運用則來自大學工程系。技術政策可以進一步的使技術商業(yè)化,但后來則被稱為創(chuàng)新的政策。</p><p&g

70、t;　　在一些國家,如美國、主要技術政策以促進公共行業(yè)部門和采購部門技術為宗旨。在其他國家則以電信、國防、健康、交通、能源為主,如日本,他們則用技術政策來促進工業(yè)和貿易。由于技術政策的存在，多個國家很看重教育和研究,他們組織教育及培訓的科學家和工程師并調節(jié)競爭的主管部門和其他主管機關，從而對技術政策和技術的發(fā)展產生重大影響。公共機構,可以使技術政策，通過組織技術評估和其他的方式涉及到公民。</p><p>　　目

71、前，有多種儀器用于促進特定的技術和部門。最有效的是公共采購領域的組合儀器，但這些都是徒勞的。當政府運用領導能力,它讓用戶處于更好的位置來判斷什么樣的儀器工作(Edquist et al. 2000)。除了公共采購直接經濟方面的稅收減免補貼和條款，其余是不可獻給公司的。在大學，科學領域的研發(fā)配套是新技術得以在公共領域扎根的重要原因。某個領域，既得利益的公共用戶與部分缺乏透明度行業(yè)的出現(xiàn)，促使這些危險種類的政策是技術與“工業(yè)配合物”相結合，

72、此外一個更微妙的問題是一種收斂性和協(xié)議技術方向上的發(fā)展軌跡,正朝向于更有前途的行業(yè) (Lundvall,1985)。</p><p>　　主要地區(qū)應用新技術的前景是集商業(yè)與儀器測量為一體，這可能是一個部門或技術相結合的具體經濟動力，其中或多或少貿易保護主義政策。如20世紀90年代初,歐盟對高清晰度電視的政策 ,歐洲生產商嘗試定義一個新的技術標準來構建技術性貿易壁壘。更有希望可以成為不同公司組織和知識機構支持的項目

73、。過去的經驗表明,無論是從內容和時間，還是至于什么特定類型的技術解決方案，都應該對準負面影響，進行限制競爭。</p><p>　　而評價的研究是非常重要的，也有類似的技術政策工具,他們可以重新技術政策。技術預測是一種捕捉發(fā)展趨勢的新技術。在科學界和誘導性專業(yè)中最先進的生產者和使用者可以使用技術預測，從而有助于統(tǒng)治下一代“戰(zhàn)略技術”。并限制公眾和私人公司獲取獨立政策評估的利益。毫不奇怪,這樣的研究最后往往報道效果非

74、常好,有很多的相同之處,也會優(yōu)先考慮。在這種情況下,像在其他許多環(huán)境中合作伙伴之間太多的協(xié)議可能被鎖定,它應被視為是否給“外人”作為評判強大的角色。正如公共政策對以技術為基礎的公司促進“崗位輪換”和“職能兼顧”。</p><p>　　值得一提的是,科學和技術政策是理想類型,為研究分析目的，并存在于現(xiàn)實世界先進的資本主義經濟中。然而,這一政策重點是，當我們將檢查相關政策時,參與科技決策并不總能輕易分辨其中的一個或另

75、一個類別，現(xiàn)在需要進一步引進更寬的成套政策。</p><p><b>　　創(chuàng)新政策</b></p><p>　　創(chuàng)新政策出現(xiàn)在兩個不同的版本中?！侵铝τ谄骄怠獙⒅攸c放在不干涉主義和信號,“應該致力于條件”,而不是具體框架部門和技術。這往往伴隨著詞匯在任何具體類型中得到的負面航向，它聚集在選擇“優(yōu)勝者”方面。二是極端版本的這種類型的創(chuàng)新政策，當一個基礎研究和通識教

76、育被視為唯一合法的公共活動和知識產權保護領域的唯一合法政府相關法規(guī)時，在更為溫和的版本中，公共措施正在培養(yǎng)企業(yè)家的積極態(tài)度,促進科學技術的群體被關注。</p><p>　　“其他版本可提交系統(tǒng)版本,并參照創(chuàng)新體系的概念”。這個觀點暗示最重要政策字段可以被認為是針對他們如何創(chuàng)新。設計系統(tǒng)中各部分之間，一個基本的方面將成為創(chuàng)新政策的回顧和連結。第一種方法是在經濟公司總是知道對自己最好的情況是什么（他們沒有正常的市場失

77、敗),并建立標準假設，采取相應行動。第二個觀點在綜合考慮能力不平等分配給公司和良好實踐發(fā)展下而言的,汲取和使用的新技術沒有立即擴散在公司。 這種“失敗”可能會超越新古典主義的“市場失靈”。所以機構協(xié)調,鏈接,或者地址及各種系統(tǒng)的需求等。</p><p>　　兩種方法的各個方面,包括創(chuàng)新過程中擴散、使用和銷售新技術,而且在某種意義上他們可能被視為是一種重要的形式，有的“經濟政策”以創(chuàng)新為焦點，做事都傾向于 “機構組

78、織”。在利益平均優(yōu)勢方面,成為市場競爭的最重要前提創(chuàng)新——原則上說一個單一的制度設計建議對各國創(chuàng)新更有效。</p><p>　　在系統(tǒng)的方法上，競爭的重要性是被公認的，不過是垂直需要用戶之間和生產者競爭者加強合作,就開發(fā)普通技術而言，從系統(tǒng)的方法認識到,不同制度建立在國家經濟中,某些國家的技術和行業(yè)就會得到相應的發(fā)展。設計一個適合的，有特別見解的創(chuàng)新政策制度在全國系統(tǒng)中是非常有必要的。創(chuàng)新政策不含有任何偏好高、看

79、低技術的準則。在一個特定的國家，介紹了一種系統(tǒng)方法的垂直的角度來看待這個工業(yè)體系把它看作是一個網絡和價值鏈在某些階段可能更適合公司。</p><p>　　創(chuàng)新政策標準問題的理論基礎有兩部不同版本，分別為以“勇于創(chuàng)新”的新古典經濟學和長期研究經濟進步和發(fā)展結果的理論(Metcalfe, 1995; Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998)。創(chuàng)新的系統(tǒng)方法可能被視為最重要的聚集在一起的典型事實創(chuàng)新。

80、在創(chuàng)新研究和在制度與演化經濟學中。它利用了模型分析和實證材料。</p><p>　　相關政策的日益廣泛利用，使經濟增長放緩，戰(zhàn)后第一個幾十年，如1970年緩慢增長達到了一個臨界點。原因是 “全要素生產率”增長放緩,而且它的技術開發(fā)能力缺乏機會。與此同時,限制總體經濟政策,對通貨膨脹的恐懼使它錯誤的去理解，推動經濟增長需從需求方加以考慮。</p><p>　　這意味著相關政策的主要目標是經濟

81、增長和國際競爭力。用歐盟國家的話說這些目標結合社會內聚與社會平等。創(chuàng)新也可能被視為解決有關的重大問題如污染、能源、都市生活和貧窮的辦法。但最主要的焦點還是在經濟財富的創(chuàng)造。</p><p>　　知識產權保護和規(guī)定投資資金通路的測量儀器使用。一個最基本的創(chuàng)新政策措施是在促進創(chuàng)新制度在政策和框架上的運用。第一類重疊使用的測量儀器,在科學和技術政策上。第二個可能包括大學、教育改革、勞動力市場、資本市場、調節(jié)行業(yè)和競爭的