經(jīng)貿(mào)外文翻譯--與大猩猩共舞背后的故事跨國(guó)合作策略

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4、</p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師（簽字） </p><p><b>　　年 月 日</b></p><p>　　本英文原文來(lái)自：Ivey Business Journal; Strategic Direction, July/ August 2011, Vol. 28 Iss: 2, p1, 4p</p>

5、<p>　　與大猩猩共舞背后的故事：跨國(guó)合作策略</p><p><b>　　普瑞遜塞姆·薩滿恩</b></p><p>　　來(lái)源：Ivey Business Journal; Strategic Direction, July/ August 2011, Vol. 28 Iss: 2, p1,4p</p><p>　　摘要

6、：一個(gè)小型企業(yè)如果要成功地尋找跨國(guó)公司作為合作伙伴，必須確立一些獨(dú)特的觀念。不對(duì)稱和其他障礙是可以克服的。本文作者提出一些策略，能夠使小型公司參與跨國(guó)合作關(guān)系中去。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：跨國(guó)公司，伙伴合作，小公司，創(chuàng)業(yè)，策略。</p><p>　　諾基亞的首席執(zhí)行官埃洛普·史蒂芬宣布在2011年他的公司與微軟公司建立戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟，并強(qiáng)調(diào)：“戰(zhàn)斗設(shè)備已成為戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的生態(tài)系統(tǒng)?！笔聦?shí)

7、上，大型跨國(guó)公司（跨國(guó)公司）像微軟，諾基亞和其他幾個(gè)來(lái)建立大型生態(tài)系統(tǒng)包括數(shù)以千計(jì)的參與者，從事各種活動(dòng)點(diǎn)基于價(jià)值鏈。但不同于微軟和諾基亞之間的關(guān)系，它匯集了兩家強(qiáng)大的、大型的跨國(guó)公司，其中的許多生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的參與者，是?。ㄍǔＪ悄贻p人）的企業(yè)，在生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的中心方面是大大不同的大型跨國(guó)公司。對(duì)于這樣的參與者，和跨國(guó)公司生態(tài)系統(tǒng)提供了一個(gè)極好的機(jī)會(huì)，但它也提出了巨大的挑戰(zhàn)。在倫敦商學(xué)院教授布瑞肯遜·朱利安和我稱之為“與大猩猩共舞”—

8、—利用這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)同時(shí)克服挑戰(zhàn)要求。鑒于小型企業(yè)和跨國(guó)公司之間的絕對(duì)不對(duì)稱，我們反對(duì)墨守成規(guī)。相反，企業(yè)通過(guò)不正統(tǒng)的合作策略的運(yùn)用，形成，鞏固和擴(kuò)大跨國(guó)公司關(guān)系。本文介紹了這些戰(zhàn)略，并建議小型企業(yè)如何克服一些跨國(guó)合作固有的障礙。</p><p>　　小型企業(yè)可以在跨國(guó)合作中可以采用的3種合作戰(zhàn)略。</p><p>　　1.形成與跨國(guó)公司的關(guān)系：</p><p>　　大多

9、數(shù)跨國(guó)公司希望與類(lèi)似規(guī)模的伙伴采取直接正面的方法，或者通過(guò)一個(gè)專(zhuān)門(mén)的聯(lián)盟關(guān)系，或通過(guò)在對(duì)應(yīng)的前瞻性伙伴公司有相當(dāng)?shù)匚坏年P(guān)鍵個(gè)人來(lái)建立關(guān)系。然而，對(duì)于一個(gè)尋求跨國(guó)公司合作伙伴的較小的公司，缺乏渠道和被重視，加上不對(duì)稱的資源，這意味著一個(gè)直接的正面的方法將會(huì)失敗。相反，一個(gè)小型公司最好使用間接手段。就是說(shuō)，它可能是溝通兩個(gè)獨(dú)立的組織的必要的橋梁。利用與當(dāng)?shù)氐拿擞呀⒌目鐕?guó)公司關(guān)系可以幫助獲得更大的合作伙伴。所以，例如，一些公共政策倡議為小型

10、公司提供“牽頭”。舉一個(gè)例子，一個(gè)英國(guó)的小公司，肺透明膜病臨床，利用在一個(gè)地區(qū)很有影響力的名叫蘇格蘭技術(shù)合作的關(guān)系，來(lái)建立與有關(guān)的美國(guó)跨國(guó)公司在當(dāng)?shù)氐淖庸镜臎Q策者建立聯(lián)系。</p><p>　　2.鞏固與跨國(guó)公司的關(guān)系：</p><p>　　已形成了與跨國(guó)公司的關(guān)系，小型公司必須通過(guò)明確、重視最大價(jià)值的方式來(lái)確立自己的資格從而強(qiáng)化與跨國(guó)公司的關(guān)系。它可以利用跨國(guó)公司的互補(bǔ)能力。例如，如果

11、小型公司的貢獻(xiàn)主要涉及專(zhuān)業(yè)技術(shù)，它可以通過(guò)跨國(guó)公司的營(yíng)銷(xiāo)能力達(dá)到更大的國(guó)際知名度。然而，由于固有的不穩(wěn)定的關(guān)系，小型公司也應(yīng)考慮戰(zhàn)術(shù)，例如來(lái)自跨國(guó)公司合作伙伴的“模塊化”的知識(shí)轉(zhuǎn)移。由于知識(shí)離散的傳輸，即使項(xiàng)目被擱置或出軌，不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)至少部分的成功。例如，上述的肺透明膜病臨床的一個(gè)案例，卓有成效的協(xié)會(huì)與美國(guó)跨國(guó)公司開(kāi)發(fā)，但由于后者的改變優(yōu)先級(jí)，最終比原計(jì)劃提前。即便如此，有價(jià)值的成果包括建立一個(gè)產(chǎn)品原型已經(jīng)取得的成功——這意味著小型公司

12、的努力并沒(méi)有白費(fèi)。</p><p>　　3.擴(kuò)大與跨國(guó)公司的關(guān)系：</p><p>　　由于不對(duì)稱的資源差異和長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)的不同，小型公司的跨國(guó)關(guān)系必將呈現(xiàn)出一個(gè)不可預(yù)知的模式。多數(shù)小型公司在很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間能夠成功的與跨國(guó)公司有效合作，往往是通過(guò)那些有能力跨越組織界限的個(gè)人來(lái)建立關(guān)系，因此，在開(kāi)發(fā)資源和知識(shí)方面，小型公司也應(yīng)該尋求與跨國(guó)公司聯(lián)合進(jìn)行推導(dǎo)來(lái)擴(kuò)大的價(jià)值鏈活動(dòng)，在可行的情況下，擴(kuò)大上游

13、和下游效益，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)范圍經(jīng)濟(jì)——越來(lái)越熱乎的關(guān)系。舉個(gè)實(shí)例來(lái)證明，肺透明膜病臨床協(xié)會(huì)與美國(guó)跨國(guó)公司實(shí)現(xiàn)更有效的合作是因?yàn)閭€(gè)人及他在全球技術(shù)中的重要作用。他是能夠在在歐洲其他地方甚至北美國(guó)利用有技術(shù)專(zhuān)長(zhǎng)的同事。</p><p>　　在印度、英國(guó)和美國(guó)隨后的研究活動(dòng)中，我發(fā)現(xiàn)，往往能夠成功的與大猩猩共舞的年輕的公司存在著一些“背后”的故事。特別地，我觀察了 “隱藏的故事”的三方面，在下文討論，這可以為與大猩猩相關(guān)的挑

14、戰(zhàn)與機(jī)遇中提供有益的見(jiàn)解，和可能的解決方法。</p><p>　　與大猩猩共舞：“背后”的故事</p><p>　　1.經(jīng)常是“很久以前”。</p><p>　　當(dāng)一開(kāi)始是能夠形成一個(gè)與跨國(guó)公司有意義的關(guān)系時(shí)，它經(jīng)常變成一個(gè)或一個(gè)以上的高層管理團(tuán)隊(duì)，已有密切關(guān)聯(lián)的跨國(guó)公司或者很像它。在跨國(guó)公司的結(jié)構(gòu)和規(guī)模上這之前的協(xié)會(huì)提供了寶貴的見(jiàn)解，將其分成不同構(gòu)成因素，其中關(guān)鍵

15、的可能是決策者和組織的規(guī)則變化。當(dāng)一個(gè)小型公司深入了解這些因素，更能夠在有關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)單位的跨國(guó)公司針對(duì)適當(dāng)?shù)膫€(gè)人，拋出有說(shuō)服力的合作和時(shí)間方法來(lái)最大限度的接受積極的回應(yīng)。這一切，當(dāng)然，說(shuō)比做容易，因?yàn)樯虡I(yè)環(huán)境的復(fù)雜性和活力，在一個(gè)跨國(guó)公司里可以是一個(gè)移動(dòng)的圖片。</p><p>　　然而，主要的一點(diǎn)是，知道跨國(guó)公司的管理的小型公司的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人更比那些不知道來(lái)建立關(guān)系的人要好建立關(guān)系。例如，軟件的公司麥頭肯很有信心地與摩托

16、羅拉建立關(guān)系，因?yàn)閯?chuàng)建的團(tuán)隊(duì)先前在另一家大型跨國(guó)公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。這方面的經(jīng)驗(yàn)幫助了解，作為一個(gè)小型公司，通過(guò)引入自己的新技術(shù)并達(dá)到跨國(guó)公司無(wú)法達(dá)到的地方，他們?nèi)绾蝸?lái)增加給一個(gè)看似自給自足的跨國(guó)公司增加價(jià)值。</p><p>　　考慮斯佩德沃克斯軟件服務(wù)的情況，在印度浦那一家小型公司，能夠迅速與微軟建立一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的關(guān)系。比多數(shù)同行，這家公司似乎非常擅長(zhǎng)知道誰(shuí)的做法，以及如何產(chǎn)生牽引力的建議。在進(jìn)一步的調(diào)查中，作為創(chuàng)始人

17、之一的r巴格瓦特·姆納達(dá)，曾在休利特帕卡德的一個(gè)團(tuán)隊(duì)工作，在西澳雷德蒙完全與微軟工作。在這個(gè)過(guò)程中，巴格瓦特密切關(guān)注微軟內(nèi)部以及與聯(lián)盟伙伴密切關(guān)注。巴格瓦特曾從他早期的工作中獲得這方面的知識(shí)和接觸，事實(shí)證明是非常寶貴的。當(dāng)小型公司試圖與微軟建立聯(lián)系的創(chuàng)始團(tuán)隊(duì)本身缺乏第一手的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，它卻可以很好地使管理者具有。</p><p>　　2.有可能是“一個(gè)曲折的故事”。</p><p>　

18、　舉一個(gè)有趣的例子，一家小型公司與一家總部位于班加羅爾芒果技術(shù)的跨國(guó)公司是合作伙伴關(guān)系。它與美國(guó)公司通是合作伙伴關(guān)系。然而，通不是它第一個(gè)接觸到的跨國(guó)公司。事實(shí)上，它更像是一場(chǎng)“第三次機(jī)會(huì)”。第一個(gè)它所接觸到的跨國(guó)公司表示跟它一起工作有極大的興趣。雖然短期創(chuàng)收是可行的和具有吸引力的，但沒(méi)有真正進(jìn)入公司的核心專(zhuān)長(zhǎng)，它明確成為芒果的創(chuàng)始人的標(biāo)志性活動(dòng)是跨國(guó)公司的青睞的追求。</p><p>　　此后，芒果退出協(xié)會(huì)并尋

19、求與另一個(gè)跨國(guó)公司的關(guān)系。這標(biāo)志性活動(dòng)在適當(dāng)?shù)臅r(shí)間將芒果技術(shù)知識(shí)展示出來(lái)。但是，三個(gè)月后，它開(kāi)始意識(shí)到，走這條路將有損它實(shí)現(xiàn)其終極目標(biāo)。再次地，它放棄了那家跨國(guó)公司關(guān)系——而這一次，因?yàn)闄C(jī)會(huì)很好，幾乎沒(méi)提什么要求。然而，為了決心堅(jiān)持他們的計(jì)劃，小型公司的創(chuàng)始人繼續(xù)探索其他的可能性，這致使了與通的合作關(guān)系，這證明了合作伙伴關(guān)系是互惠（見(jiàn)方框）。</p><p>　　芒果技術(shù)：建立一個(gè)深入的跨國(guó)公司的關(guān)系。</

20、p><p>　　舉一個(gè)關(guān)于小型公司如何能有效地保障與跨國(guó)公司的關(guān)系的例子，具體地是，總部位于班加羅爾的芒果技術(shù)與通的跨國(guó)合作關(guān)系。芒果創(chuàng)建于2006，當(dāng)時(shí)是一家專(zhuān)注于移動(dòng)電話的細(xì)分市場(chǎng)的底部結(jié)構(gòu)的軟件產(chǎn)品的小型公司。在一年之內(nèi)，局部地提高了其知名度和信譽(yù)，芒果試圖進(jìn)一個(gè)著名的地方商業(yè)學(xué)校，班加羅爾的印度金屬學(xué)會(huì)。經(jīng)過(guò)嚴(yán)格的選拔程序，公司付諸的努力收獲了回報(bào)。</p><p>　　從一開(kāi)始，芒果

21、的首席執(zhí)行官梅何森瓦瑞·蘇尼爾從跨國(guó)公司的規(guī)模和技術(shù)市場(chǎng)兩個(gè)方面來(lái)觀察與跨國(guó)公司合作的前進(jìn)方向。經(jīng)過(guò)多種選擇這樣做（平行）探索，芒果成功地在合作伙伴人際網(wǎng)中向通的技術(shù)訪問(wèn)經(jīng)理展示了它的技術(shù)。由于它迅速向他證明了芒果的技術(shù)是直接關(guān)系到他自己的在通的前程，該技術(shù)得到了經(jīng)理的直接關(guān)注。這次一連串的對(duì)抗使芒果和通在出售知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)（簡(jiǎn)稱IP）達(dá)到了一個(gè)利潤(rùn)豐厚的高潮，這被稱為印度商業(yè)媒體作為一個(gè)獨(dú)特的“數(shù)百萬(wàn)美元的交易”。</p&g

22、t;<p>　　從一個(gè)相當(dāng)隨意的碰面到一個(gè)高額利潤(rùn)的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)銷(xiāo)售的一個(gè)成功的旅程可以作為一個(gè)“深入”的關(guān)系漸進(jìn)的過(guò)程來(lái)描述。就是說(shuō)，經(jīng)過(guò)一段時(shí)間，合作關(guān)系通過(guò)細(xì)粒度的信息交流，共同解決問(wèn)題來(lái)體現(xiàn)信賴，這又反過(guò)來(lái)促進(jìn)了小型公司的學(xué)習(xí)成果。這個(gè)漸進(jìn)的步驟包括以下內(nèi)容：一個(gè)過(guò)程開(kāi)始讓芒果體現(xiàn)它的技術(shù)在通的技術(shù)平臺(tái)技術(shù)更加精心。當(dāng)這圓滿實(shí)現(xiàn)，盡職盡責(zé)后，下一步是準(zhǔn)備研發(fā)協(xié)議允許通展出但非市場(chǎng)化的芒果產(chǎn)品。它也使通在產(chǎn)品接觸前的全球

23、客戶優(yōu)先內(nèi)部評(píng)價(jià)芒果產(chǎn)品。 然后，一個(gè)允許通上市芒果軟件連同自己的芯片組的商業(yè)協(xié)議簽署了。最后，簡(jiǎn)而易見(jiàn)，通過(guò)獲得，能利用最有效芒果的技術(shù)，最終導(dǎo)致一個(gè)如上所述的網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷(xiāo)售。</p><p>　　除了兩個(gè)相當(dāng)不同的組織明顯的匹配性，成功的關(guān)系進(jìn)展的關(guān)鍵有兩個(gè)因素。第一，芒果一心一意致力于提供靈活有效的技術(shù)。其次，通巧妙地談判取得了內(nèi)部官僚機(jī)構(gòu)在芒果的技術(shù)開(kāi)發(fā)工作中提供支持。無(wú)論是在通的圣迭戈的總部還是其在印度的行動(dòng)

24、，特別的努力的關(guān)鍵人物，是“內(nèi)部冠軍“芒果。在這個(gè)例子中，這些努力包括，不干涉從而使芒果能夠瞄準(zhǔn)一家小型公司。此后他們提供設(shè)備和人力援助技術(shù)和商業(yè)發(fā)展。他們還促成與其他生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的成員包括一個(gè)在中國(guó)設(shè)計(jì)公司的合作關(guān)系。并且他們?cè)谝恍┱降年P(guān)系商業(yè)方面引導(dǎo)芒果，這是一個(gè)給小型公司的新的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。</p><p>　　顯然，構(gòu)建一個(gè)小型公司與跨國(guó)公司之間深入的關(guān)系不是懦弱者的選擇：這當(dāng)然需要在雙方的部分做一些努力，一旦成功

25、完成，收入的回饋和學(xué)習(xí)成果可相當(dāng)可觀的。（我承認(rèn)研究教授庫(kù)馬爾和蘇雷什巴加萬(wàn)圖拉在印度邦加羅爾管理學(xué)院合作研究芒果和通的關(guān)系。）</p><p>　　因此，主要的一點(diǎn)事，與一家具有吸引力的跨國(guó)公司的關(guān)系最初的出現(xiàn)可能是不理想的。在某些情況下，一家小型公司在這個(gè)過(guò)程中可能會(huì)堅(jiān)持它擁有的并放棄一些它原有的意圖。戰(zhàn)略學(xué)者將這種做法作為緊急戰(zhàn)略，就其本身而言這可能是一個(gè)合理的途徑。在其他情況下（例如芒果），那家小型公司能

26、堅(jiān)持它的目標(biāo)并放棄某些關(guān)系直到它找到一個(gè)適合的公司。這是一個(gè)深思熟慮的策略。然而，無(wú)論戰(zhàn)略是深思熟慮還是緊急，它都一個(gè)能改變故事情節(jié)的明顯的可能。這需要小型公司各部門(mén)具有靈活性和敏捷性。</p><p>　　3.有并非總是“永遠(yuǎn)快樂(lè)”。 </p><p>　　在某些情況下，盡管跟跨國(guó)公司有了密切關(guān)系，小型公司可能發(fā)現(xiàn)勢(shì)頭受到了阻礙，局勢(shì)緊張的進(jìn)行，中斷的前景的想法才是真實(shí)的。盡管這可能發(fā)生

27、的原因有多種，奇怪的是經(jīng)過(guò)一段時(shí)間后這可能導(dǎo)致小型公司和跨國(guó)公司解除親密的聯(lián)盟關(guān)系。雖然在技術(shù)和商業(yè)策略上高度一致是是與一個(gè)跨國(guó)公司有密切關(guān)系的先決條件，可想而知，隨著時(shí)間的推移和提供的產(chǎn)品共同的演變，可能出現(xiàn)重疊的特點(diǎn)和功能，導(dǎo)致摩擦。也就是說(shuō)，最初的互補(bǔ)性產(chǎn)品可能相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。</p><p>　　這個(gè)關(guān)鍵是：與跨國(guó)公司在一段關(guān)系中很順利并不能確保是一個(gè)永久的事態(tài)，小型企業(yè)應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到與跨國(guó)公司結(jié)成聯(lián)盟，隨著時(shí)間的

28、流逝，它與跨國(guó)公司的沖突將越來(lái)越多的可能性。也就是說(shuō)，初創(chuàng)企業(yè)和其他小型公司能從跨國(guó)公司越來(lái)越重視他們的事實(shí)得到安慰，不僅因?yàn)椤鳛槊黠@的觀測(cè)指出——他們認(rèn)識(shí)到他們從事戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的生態(tài)系統(tǒng)。因此，一些跨國(guó)公司已經(jīng)想出與小型公司的合作經(jīng)營(yíng)，反過(guò)來(lái)，經(jīng)過(guò)巧妙的杠桿。要實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)，這是尤其的小型公司在互惠的基礎(chǔ)上主動(dòng)培養(yǎng)關(guān)系。舉一個(gè)在Linxter與微軟的關(guān)系的興旺案例（見(jiàn)方框）。雖然這種積極主動(dòng)的行為并不排除在路途上有沖突的可能，這讓深思熟慮

29、的企業(yè)家在急流中的與跨國(guó)公司有了一個(gè)相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間的接觸。</p><p>　　Linxter：積極利用跨國(guó)公司合作倡議。</p><p>　　跨國(guó)公司（MNCs）也開(kāi)始認(rèn)識(shí)到與較小的公司包括創(chuàng)業(yè)公司合作的好處。在某些情況下，創(chuàng)新的安排已經(jīng)到位，通常地形成了一個(gè)合作計(jì)劃。這樣的舉措提供了一個(gè)很好的進(jìn)入跨國(guó)公司生態(tài)系統(tǒng)和年輕的公司和跨國(guó)公司之間相互作用的結(jié)構(gòu)的切入點(diǎn)。</p>&

30、lt;p>　　BizSpark One，一個(gè)在微軟的硅谷校園中運(yùn)行的合作計(jì)劃，是一個(gè)一些大型公司積極參與創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)業(yè)的各方面越來(lái)越成熟的顯著的例子。雖然許多跨國(guó)公司的合作計(jì)劃涵蓋廣泛的參與者（包括微軟自己的來(lái)自世界各地超過(guò)3500名成員的“定期”BizSpark One計(jì)劃），BizSpark One具有高度選擇性。擁有全球范圍內(nèi)100個(gè)有實(shí)力的成員，該計(jì)劃的目標(biāo)是確定（通過(guò)一個(gè)嚴(yán)格的挑選程序）和邀請(qǐng)最具創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)業(yè)的可能產(chǎn)生重大影響并且

31、技術(shù)能夠和微軟聯(lián)盟的小型公司。實(shí)際上，微軟正在尋求在未來(lái)可稱為其重要合作伙伴的發(fā)展中的公司，這成為成千上萬(wàn)的與微軟合作的其他小型公司可以學(xué)習(xí)的例子。</p><p>　　該計(jì)劃提供創(chuàng)始成員一個(gè)在一對(duì)一的基礎(chǔ)上（而不是最典型的合作伙伴項(xiàng)目中的一對(duì)多的方式）與微軟建立關(guān)系的機(jī)會(huì)，因?yàn)樾⌒推髽I(yè)可指定一個(gè)經(jīng)常扮演者良師益友并且連接公司與在需要的領(lǐng)域提供經(jīng)驗(yàn)的外部導(dǎo)師的客戶經(jīng)理。這個(gè)計(jì)劃是有時(shí)間限制的，通常是12個(gè)月的運(yùn)行

32、時(shí)間并且要求在一定的地域范圍內(nèi)要覆蓋先進(jìn)的和其他新興的經(jīng)濟(jì)。這個(gè)計(jì)劃在2009年底沒(méi)有大張旗鼓的提出。相反，它的目標(biāo)是去“證明”本身和展示幫助創(chuàng)業(yè)者成功的首要目標(biāo)。這個(gè)計(jì)劃最知名的網(wǎng)絡(luò)活動(dòng)的日期是在2010年10月硅谷的一個(gè)高峰，聚集了 BizSpark One的創(chuàng)始企業(yè)和其他網(wǎng)絡(luò)合作伙伴和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家。</p><p>　　佛羅里達(dá)州的Linxter，專(zhuān)門(mén)從事云端通訊技術(shù)，用積極主動(dòng)的方式中表明這是一個(gè)多么年輕的

33、公司，能使它趁機(jī)會(huì)提出一個(gè)創(chuàng)新的伙伴關(guān)系的倡議，如微軟Biz Spark計(jì)劃。這家公司的主動(dòng)證明了在不同階段的關(guān)系：關(guān)系的形成，關(guān)系的鞏固和關(guān)系的擴(kuò)大。</p><p>　　通過(guò)Biz Spark One計(jì)劃形成與微軟一對(duì)一的關(guān)系，Linxter的首席執(zhí)行官米爾格拉姆討·杰森通過(guò)他積極主動(dòng)地在當(dāng)?shù)剀浖鐓^(qū)的技術(shù)會(huì)議上的演講，他打出了知名度。在他很多次談話中，米爾格拉姆討論了微軟的云端技術(shù)。這意味著當(dāng)總部

34、設(shè)在佛羅里達(dá)州的微軟的經(jīng)理正在尋找能在將來(lái)被邀請(qǐng)進(jìn)入Biz Spark One計(jì)劃的人時(shí)，米爾格蘭姆已經(jīng)準(zhǔn)備好了他的雷達(dá)。</p><p>　　在關(guān)系的鞏固中，米爾格蘭姆繼續(xù)積極主動(dòng)，因?yàn)樗J(rèn)為，是他在利用責(zé)任。他以多種方式來(lái)這樣做。他通過(guò)運(yùn)用摘自關(guān)鍵的管理人員的發(fā)布定期新聞稿的引言來(lái)利用微軟關(guān)系。他也通過(guò)諸如邀請(qǐng)邀請(qǐng)微軟管理層討論他們?cè)趌inxter-run播客系列中關(guān)于小型企業(yè)的合作倡議的方式在公共的機(jī)會(huì)中宣

35、傳來(lái)回報(bào)。他提倡與微軟其他團(tuán)隊(duì)及其他公司進(jìn)行對(duì)話來(lái)探索合作機(jī)會(huì)?？梢?jiàn)，米爾格蘭姆有效地運(yùn)用的戰(zhàn)略是積極創(chuàng)建與微軟生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的多個(gè)接觸點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　因此，戰(zhàn)略，有效是，積極創(chuàng)建多個(gè)接觸點(diǎn)在微軟。</p><p>　　為擴(kuò)展關(guān)系，以下2011年2月份的BizSpark One計(jì)劃的Linxter“畢業(yè)”，米爾格蘭姆是再次堅(jiān)定地雷達(dá)有關(guān)微軟經(jīng)理。Linxter已經(jīng)并入另一個(gè)微軟倡議側(cè)重

36、于從事云技術(shù)平臺(tái)的高度創(chuàng)新的企業(yè)，以及被引入到技術(shù)采納計(jì)劃在同一個(gè)空間。米爾格拉姆也被邀請(qǐng)成為2011年微軟最有價(jià)值人員全球峰會(huì)的一個(gè)專(zhuān)家小組成員。</p><p>　　從Linxter的BizSpark One計(jì)劃中反映了一個(gè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，米爾格蘭姆觀察得出：“像這樣的程序不提供你一個(gè)菜單項(xiàng)，但它給你直接接觸反過(guò)來(lái)可以幫助你做出有價(jià)值的關(guān)系的人，這些關(guān)系可以幫助你來(lái)創(chuàng)造進(jìn)一步的相互作用。這完全取決于你自己創(chuàng)造的?！?l

37、t;/p><p>　　鑒于這其中包含的相當(dāng)大的挑戰(zhàn)，可想而知，一些新成立的公司想知道與跨國(guó)公司合作的關(guān)系是否有值得麻煩的代價(jià)。實(shí)際上，一些小公司，特別是是那些營(yíng)業(yè)范圍集中在相對(duì)較少密集和選擇低洼水果，從事跨國(guó)公司可能沒(méi)有真正有益的。然而，對(duì)于那些有尖端技術(shù)提供的前景，拒絕參與跨國(guó)公司可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致錯(cuò)失機(jī)會(huì)。并且在全球的野心下對(duì)創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)而言這真的可能沒(méi)有什么選擇只能學(xué)會(huì)與大猩猩共舞。</p><p&

38、gt;　　The Hidden Story behind Dancing With Gorillas:</p><p>　　Strategies for Partnering With a Multi National</p><p><b>　　By</b></p><p>　　Shameen Prashantham</p>&

39、lt;p>　　Abstract: A tiny start-up looking to partner with a colossal multinational must develop some original ideas if it is to be successful. Asymmetry and other obstacles can be overcome. This author advances several

40、 strategies that will enable a start-up to enjoy a productive partnership with a multi-national.</p><p>　　Keywords: Multinationals, Partnering, Small firms, Start-ups, Strategy</p><p>　　Announci

41、ng his company’s strategic alliance with Microsoft in 2001, Nakia’s CEO Stephen Elop observed:” The battle of devices has now become a war of ecosystem.” Indeed, large multinational corporations (MNCs) like Microsoft, No

42、kia and several others have come to build large ecosystems comprising thousands of participants that engage in various activities and points on the value chain. But unlike the relationship between Microsoft and Nokia, wh

43、ich brings together two formidable, large MNCs, many</p><p>　　There are 3 partnering strategies that start-ups can employ to work with large multi nationals.</p><p>　　1. Forming MNC relationship

44、s: </p><p>　　Most MNCs wishing to engage with a partner of similar size will take a direct frontal approach to that relationship, perhaps through a dedicated alliance department or through key individuals wh

45、o have direct counterparts in the prospective partner company. For a smaller firm seeking to partner with an MNC, however, the lack of access and attention coupled with the asymmetry in resources means that a direct fron

46、tal approach is likely to fail. Instead, a start-up would be better off using an indir</p><p>　　2. Consolidating MNC relationships:</p><p>　　Having formed a relationship with an MNC, a start-up

47、must establish its credentials by being clear about, and focusing on, the greatest value that it can add to the relationship. It can then leverage the MNC’s complementary capacities. For instance, if the start-up’s main

48、contribution pertains to specialized technology, then it can draw upon the MNC’s marketing capabilities to achieve greater international visibility. However, given the inherent instability in such relationship, the start

49、-up sho</p><p>　　3. Extending MNC relationships:</p><p>　　Given the asymmetry of resources and differences in long=tem objectives, a start-up’s MNC relationships are bound to unfold in an unpred

50、ictable pattern. Start-ups most successful at collaborating effectively with MNCs over a long period of time are often those that build links with individuals who span organizational boundaries and who can, therefore, ta

51、p into resources and knowledge terms, start-ups should also seek to broaden the value chain activities they undertake jointly with MNCs to deriv</p><p>　　In subsequent research on activities in India, Britai

52、n and the U.S., I have discovered that more often than not, there is something of a “hidden story” behind the successes of young firms that have been able to dance with gorillas. In particular, I observed three facets of

53、 the “hidden story” that are discussed below, and which can provide useful insight into the nature of the challenges associated with chancing with gorillas, and possible ways to overcome them.</p><p>　　Danci

54、ng with gorillas: The “Hidden Story”</p><p>　　There often is a “Once upon a Time”.</p><p>　　When a start up is able to forge a meaningful relationship with an MNC it quite often turns out that o

55、ne or more of the top management team has already had a close association with that MNC or one like it. This prior association provides valuable insight into the structure and scale of the MNC, what makes its different c

56、onstituents tick, which the key decision-makers are likely to be, and what the organization’s rhythms are. When there is a deep understanding of these factors the start-up is mor</p><p>　　Nevertheless, the m

57、ain point here is that start-up leaders who know the lay of the land in the MNC are better placed than those who are not so aware then it comes to establishing a relationship. For example, the software start-up Mitoken m

58、ade confident strides in establishing a link with Motorola because of the founding team’s prior experience in another large MNC. This experience helped them understand just how they, as a start-up, could add value to a s

59、eemingly self-sufficient MNC by introduci</p><p>　　Consider also the case of SpadeWorx Software Services, a start-up in Pune, India, which was able to rapidly develop a strong relationship with Microsoft. Co

60、mpared to most of its peers, this company seemed unusually adept in knowing whom to approach and how to generate traction for its proposal. Upon further investigation, it emerged that one of the co-founders, Mnadar Bhagw

61、at, had previously worked for Hewlett Packard, on a team that worked exclusively with Microsoft in Redmond, WA. In the proce</p><p>　　There may be “a twist in the tale”.</p><p>　　A fascinating e

62、xample of a start-up that partnered with an MNC is that of Bangalore-based Mango Technologies. It partnered with the American firm, Qualcomm. However, Qualcomm wasn’t the very first MNC it reached out to. In fact, it was

63、 more of a case of “third time lucky”. The first MNC that the start-up approached evinced interest in working with it. However, it became clear to Mango’s founders that the joint activity that the MNC favored pursing, al

64、though feasible and attractive in the short-t</p><p>　　Thereafter, Mango dropped that association and pursued a second MNC relationship. The joint activity embarked upon this time was suitably oriented towar

65、ds Mango’s technical expertise but, after about three months, the start-up realized that going down that route would detract it from reaching its ultimate goals. Once again, it dropped its MNC relationship- and this time

66、, raised a few eyebrow because the opportunity had been a good one. However, determined to stick to their plans, the start-up’s </p><p>　　Mango technologies: building an embedded MNC relationship</p>

67、<p>　　For an example of how a start-up can effectively engage with an MNC, consider the relationship that Bangalore-based Mango Technologies forged with Qualcomm. Mango was formed in 2006 as a start-up with a focus

68、on building a software product with a niche focus on mobile telephony for base-of-the-pyramid market segments. Within a year, partly to raise its visibility and credibility, Mango sought to enter the incubator of a prest

69、igious local business school, IIM Bangalore. Following a rigorous selec</p><p>　　From inception, Mango’s CEO Sunil Maheshwari viewed partnering with an MNC as the way forward for the company to scale up and

70、take its technology to market. Having explored multiple options to do so (in parallel), Mango succeeded in showcasing its technology to a visiting Qualcomm manager at a partner-networking event. The technology got the ma

71、nager’s immediate attention because it became rapidly evident to him that Mango’s technology was directly relevant to his own agenda at Qualcomm. This enc</p><p>　　The remarkable journey from a rather casual

72、 encounter to a high-profile IP sale can be a described as a progressive process of relationship “embedding”. That is, over time, the relationship came to be characterized by deep trust, fine-grained information exchange

73、, and joint problem solving, which in turn facilitated considerable learning outcomes for the start-up. The incremental steps included the following: A process was initiated to enable Mango to demonstrate its technology

74、more elaborately </p><p>　　Aside from the obvious fit between the two rather dissimilar organizations, two factors appear to have been the key to the successful progression of the relationship. First, Mango

75、single-mindedly devoted itself to being flexible and delivering effectively on the technology front. Second, Qualcomm deftly negotiated internal bureaucracy to provide support for Mango’s technology development efforts.

76、This was particularly down to the efforts of the key individuals, both at Qualcomm’s headquarters in</p><p>　　Clearly, building an embedded relationship between a start-up and an MNC is not for the faint-hea

77、rted: it certainly takes some doing on the part of</p><p>　　both parties, but when successfully accomplished, the payoff in terms of revenue and learning outcomes can be considerable. (I acknowledge the rese

78、arch collaboration of Professors K Kumar and Suresh Bhagavatula at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore in studying Mango’s relationship with Qualcomm.)</p><p>　　The main point here, therefore, is th

79、at what initially appears to be an attractive MNC relationship may turn out to be less than ideal. In some cases, a start-up may stick with what it has and sacrifice some of its original intentions in the process. Strate

80、gy scholars refer to such an approach as emergent strategy, and of itself this can be a legitimate way of progressing. In other cases (such as Mango), the start-up may stick to its guns and drop certain relationships unt

81、il it has arrived at a </p><p>　　There isn’t always a “happy ever after”.</p><p>　　In some cases, despite having developed a close relationship with an MNC, a start-up may discover that the mome

82、ntum has suffered, tensions have crept in and the prospect of discontinuing the association is a real one. While this could occur for a variety of reasons, paradoxically this may result from close alignment between a sta

83、rt-up and an MNC over time. Although a high degree of alignment, in terms of technology and business strategy, is a prerequisite for a close relationship with an MNC, it</p><p>　　The point here is that smoot

84、h sailing in a relationship with an MNC is not guaranteed to be a permanent state of affairs and that start-ups must be cognizant of the possibility that the more it aligns with an MNC over time, the more it could come i

85、nto conflict with it. That said, start-ups and other small firms could take heart from the fact MNCs appear to be taking them more and more seriously, not least because – as evident from the observation noted at the outs

86、et – they recognize that they ar</p><p>　　Linxter: Proactively leveraging an MNC partnering Initiative</p><p>　　Multinational corporations (MNCs) have themselves begun to recognize the benefits

87、of partnering with smaller firms, including start-ups. In some cases, innovative arrangements have been put in place, typically in the form a partnering program. Such initiatives provide a well-defined point of entry int

88、o the MNC’s ecosystem and structure to the interactions between the young firm and MNC.</p><p>　　BizSpark One, a partnering program run out of Microsoft’s Silicon Valley campus, is a striking example of the

89、growing sophistication on the part of some large MNCs to actively engage with innovative start-ups. While many MNCs have partnering programs that cover a broad range of participants (including Microsoft’s own “regular” B

90、izSpark program with over 35,000 members worldwide), the BizSpark One program is highly selective. With a worldwide capacity of 100 members, the goal of the program is to</p><p>　　The program provides start-

91、up members with the opportunity to forge a relationship with Microsoft on a one-to-one basis (as opposed to the one-to-many approach typical of most partnering programs) because start-ups get access to a named account ma

92、nager, who frequently doubles as a mentor and also connects the start-ups to outside mentors with explicit experience in areas of needs. The program is time bound, normally with a 12-month duration and operates in a rang

93、e of geographies covering both ad</p><p>　　Florida-based Linxter, which specializes in cloud-based messaging technology, illustrates how a young firm, by being proactive, could enable it to take advantage of

94、 the opportunity presented by an innovative partnering initiative such as Microsoft’s BizSpark One program. The proactiveness of this start-up is evidenced in different phases of the relationship: forming, consolidating

95、and extending.</p><p>　　In forming its one-to-one relationship with Microsoft via BizSpark One, Linxter’s CEO Jason Milgram was building upon the visibility he had proactively built within the local software

96、 community through speaking engagements at technology conferences. In many of his talks Milgram discussed Microsoft’s cloud-related technologies. This meant that when a Florida-based Microsoft manager was looking for pro

97、spective invitees to BizSpark One, Milgram was already on his radar.</p><p>　　In consolidating this relationship, Milgram continued to be proactive because he believed that the onus was on him to make the mo

98、st of it. He did so in multiple ways. He leveraged the Microsoft connection by using quotes from key managers in periodical press releases. He also reciprocated on publicity opportunities through, for instance, inviting

99、Microsoft managers to discuss their partnering initiatives for start-ups on a Linxter-run podcast series. And he initiated dialogues with other Microso</p><p>　　As for extending the relationship, following L

100、inxter’s “graduation” from the BizSparkOne program in February 2011, Milgram was once again firmly on the radar of relevant Microsoft managers. Linxter has since been absorbed into another Microsoft initiative that focus

101、es on highly innovative firms that work on its cloud technology platform, as well as being inducted into a technology adoption program in the same space. Milgram was also invited to be a panelist at a session of the Micr