外文翻譯--股票期權(quán)重新定價(jià)正面我贏，反面你輸

1、<p><b>　　中文3900字</b></p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Stock Option Repricing: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose</p><p>　　Introduc

2、tion</p><p>　　In most publicly traded companies, stock options are a big part of executive compensation, favored as a way to bind the financial interests of executives with shareholders. Although the exercis

3、e price of these options is fixed at the time of grant, some companies reprice stock options when stock price drops below the exercise price. The recent downturn in stock markets has prompted many companies to jump on th

4、e repricing bandwagon ( Business Week, December11, 2000). Repricing occurs in two ways:</p><p>　　Critics oppose repricing because managers stand to gain whether stock price goes up or down. This undermines t

5、he incentive effects of stock options by eliminating the financial punishment to executives whose mismanagement perhaps led to stock price decline in the first place. The ultimate irony is that repricing increases manage

6、rial compensation when managers ought to be fired for poor performance.</p><p>　　Institutional investors view repricing as a symptom of managerial entrenchment caused by ineffective corporate governance and

7、routinely use their voting power to block repricing proposals. They are opposed to repricing because each new share granted to employees dilutes the control and returns of existing stockholders.</p><p>　　Boa

8、rd of directors of repricing firms defend the practice by arguing that options far out-of-money are devoid of any motivational power, and repricing can restore managerial incentives. Another explanation, prevalent in Sil

9、icon Valley, is that repricing is necessary to retain talented employees who would be otherwise lured by rival firms. These firms grant employees stock options to conserve cash and view repricing as necessary to preserve

10、 their most valuable asset – human capital. An implicit a</p><p>　　Suggestions</p><p>　　Theoretical literature suggests that repricing can be an effective antidote to the problems of low employ

11、ee morale and high turnover especially in firms where intellectual capital is the most important asset. However, due to weaknesses in corporate governance and dysfunctional incentives under the current regulatory regime,

12、 repricing has lost its purpose and resulted in undesirable outcomes. To mitigate the side-effects of repricing, we offer the following suggestions: (1) educate public about </p><p>　　1. Educate public about

13、 the true economic costs of stock options</p><p>　　Many corporate boards perceive repricing as a low cost option because repricing does not require companies to record an accounting charge and there is no ca

14、sh outflow. The only cost is equity dilution when options are exercised. The dilution effect can be easily offset by share repurchases. It is little wonder that the boards tend to reprice when stock prices fall.</p>

15、;<p>　　Some politicians have repeatedly made statements that employee stock options have no value if the strike price is equal to the market price on the grant date. Their statements reflect either a tremendous la

16、ck of knowledge about accounting or considerable intent to deceive. Yet, the claim that stock options have no value at the grant date seems to be widely held both within the business community and the general public.<

17、/p><p>　　Ex ante economic cost of an option is the amount of money an outside investor would pay if the company decides to sell such options rather than giving them to executives. Ex post economic cost of the o

18、ption is the difference between strike price and the market price on the date options are exercised. Accounting and finance academics can play a useful role in educating executives, directors, politicians, and the genera

19、l public about the true economic costs of options. They can help corporate boar</p><p>　　2. Promote regulatory changes</p><p>　　Two most critical regulatory reforms needed are (1) to ensure that

20、 the cost of options is recognized explicitly in the financial statements, and (2) that there is symmetry between accounting and tax treatments. Financial economists agree that stock options are costly. In a recent testi

21、mony to U.S. Senate Finance Committee, Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan described the severe market distortions from not showing the cost of options in financial statements. In the same hearings, Nobel </p

22、><p>　　The distinction between fixed and variable price options is absurd and so is the perpetuation of repricing by the “six and one” tactic allowed under I44. Changes in the tax code are also needed to ensure

23、 symmetry between accounting and tax treatments. Specifically, if companies deduct NQOs from taxable income, they should also be required to charge it against reported income.</p><p>　　3. Strengthen corporat

24、e governance</p><p>　　One obvious way to curb abusive repricing is to strengthen corporate governance. In principle, it involves implementing the model of separation of duties. Based on the discussion , some

25、 of the action steps that can be taken are: (1) appoint a non-executive director as chairman of board, (2) appoint outside and independent directors on board compensation committees, (3) seek shareholder approval for any

26、 repricing, (4) encourage institutional ownership or block ownership to monitor manager’s decis</p><p>　　4. Revise CEO compensation plans</p><p>　　Even though routine repricing has become more p

27、ainful under the new accounting rule, the continuing slide in stock market requires that boards respond with appropriate compensation tools. We recommend the following changes in compensation plan to retain and motivate

28、key employees.</p><p>　　Increase equity grants. If making managers owners aligns their incentives with stockholders and mitigates agency problems, firms can grant stocks rather than options to CEOs to achiev

29、e the same purpose. A steep decline in stock price can make options go underwater. Since top managers place little value on such options, they do not provide much incentive to them (Halland Murphy, 2000). On the other ha

30、nd, stocks continue to be valuable even in down market. Moreover, whereas stock options enable ma</p><p>　　Index stock options. One important drawback of traditional fixed-price options is that the executive

31、 is punished (rewarded) when stock price declines (rises) due to exogenous market or industry factors. This violates an important doctrine of contracting theory that managers should be shielded from the uncertainty gener

32、ated by factors outside their control. Repricing makes it worse because it weakens incentives to increase stock price while strengthening the incentives to increase volatility.</p><p>　　Index options can be

33、used to mute the undesirable effects of fixed-price option plans while preserving the incentives to increase shareholder wealth. This is achieved by replacing the fixed strike price with a moving benchmark, typically an

34、industry or market index. Index options pay off only if the firm’s stock price exceeds the benchmark. They can still result in a positive payoff even when fixed-price options go underwater in a bear market. Thus, the use

35、 of index options renders repricing unn</p><p>　　Johnson and Tian (2000a, b) analytically compare five variations of traditional fixed stock options, all of which have been used in practice: performance opti

36、ons, premium options, purchased options, reload options and indexed options. They find that compared to all other options, indexed options have a higher incentive intensity (measured by the sensitivity of option pay-off

37、to stock price movements) and encourage risk- averse executives to take on risky projects. They have a low sensitivity to </p><p>　　The idea of indexed options is not new. As far back as seven years, Akhigbe

38、 et al. (1996) advocated use of indexed options. Although some companies like Level 3, a telecom company, have used them, indexed options are not used widely despite their overwhelming theoretical superiority. One deterr

39、ent is current accounting rules that require variable accounting for stock options, which forces companies to expense changes in their value each quarter and face the prospect of increased earnings volatil</p><

40、;p>　　Reprice value-for-value. Simply lowering the strike price of existing options to the prevailing market price substantially increases the probability of finishing in-the-money and hence the value of options. The r

41、esult is a windfall gain to the executive who perhaps ought to be fired for poor performance. An alternative is to cancel old options and replace them with fewer options of lower strike price and/or shorter maturity so s

42、uch that the value of new options equals the value of cancelled opti</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　A rigorous look at the current repricing practices leads us to believe that it is more of a wind

43、fall gain to executives of poorly performing firms than a reincentivization mechanism aimed at retaining and motivating key managerial talent as suggested in the theoretical literature. Weaknesses in the corporate govern

44、ance structure, lax accounting regulations, and loopholes in tax laws enable executives to reprice options to favorably influence their own pay packages, and they do so in a way that c</p><p>　　There is no q

45、uestion in our minds that current accounting and tax rules are the driving force behind the grant of mega-size options and the wave of repricings witnessed in the last decade. The fiction that fixed-price options have no

46、 cost for GAAP financial statements, even though they form a central feature of executive compensation plans, should end. It is simply incredible that the same companies that say that no reasonable estimate of option val

47、ue is available for financial statements turn a</p><p>　　Source: Avinash Arya, Huey-Lian Sun .2004.“Stock Option Repricing: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose”. Journal of Business Ethics.50.pp.297-312.</p>

48、<p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　股票期權(quán)重新定價(jià)：正面我贏，反面你輸</p><p><b>　　簡(jiǎn)介</b></p><p>　　在大多數(shù)上市公司，股票期權(quán)已占據(jù)了經(jīng)理層薪酬中的大部分，它作為一種約束高管與股東經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的方式，深受公司青睞。雖然這些期權(quán)的行使價(jià)在授出時(shí)是固定的，但是當(dāng)股票

49、價(jià)格下降到低于行使價(jià)時(shí)，一些公司會(huì)對(duì)股票期權(quán)進(jìn)行重新定價(jià)。近期低迷的股市就促使了許多公司選擇重新定價(jià)（商業(yè)周刊，12月11日，2000）。重新定價(jià)在兩種情況下發(fā)生：（1）或者是行權(quán)價(jià)降低了（2）或者是現(xiàn)有的股票期權(quán)被取消了，并發(fā)行了較低行權(quán)價(jià)的新期權(quán)。</p><p>　　批評(píng)者反對(duì)重新定價(jià)，因?yàn)楣善眱r(jià)格不管上漲或下跌，管理者都會(huì)得益。通過(guò)消除對(duì)管理人員因管理不善而導(dǎo)致股票價(jià)格下跌的財(cái)務(wù)處罰，這樣會(huì)破壞股票期權(quán)的

50、激勵(lì)效應(yīng)。具有諷刺意味的是，當(dāng)管理者因表現(xiàn)不佳被解雇時(shí)，重新定價(jià)會(huì)最終提高企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者報(bào)酬。</p><p>　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者認(rèn)為重新定價(jià)是由于公司無(wú)效的治理，管理者經(jīng)常使用他們的投票權(quán)以阻止重新定價(jià)的建議等原因而引起的一種公司為鞏固其管治不力從而采取措施的的現(xiàn)象。他們反對(duì)重新定價(jià)，因?yàn)槊恳皇谟鑶T工的新股都會(huì)稀釋現(xiàn)有股東的控制權(quán)和回報(bào)。</p><p>　　支持重新定價(jià)的公司董事會(huì)認(rèn)為期權(quán)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)

51、超出預(yù)期一大筆錢(qián)，使任何激勵(lì)都缺乏了動(dòng)力，而重新定價(jià)可以恢復(fù)管理層獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的做法。另一種在硅谷很流行的解釋是重新定價(jià)對(duì)留住人才是必要的，否則優(yōu)秀員工會(huì)被你的對(duì)手公司所挖掘。這些公司給予員工股票期權(quán)，以節(jié)省現(xiàn)金和留住其最寶貴的資產(chǎn)——人力資本。當(dāng)然，其中一個(gè)隱含的假設(shè)是，留住的這些管理人員對(duì)公司生存和業(yè)績(jī)改善是必不可少的。</p><p><b>　　建議</b></p><p

52、>　　理論文獻(xiàn)表明重新定價(jià)能有效解除員工士氣低落和高營(yíng)業(yè)額的問(wèn)題，尤其是那些智力資本是公司最重要的資產(chǎn)的企業(yè)。然而，由于目前監(jiān)管制度，公司治理和激勵(lì)功能失調(diào)等方面的不利影響，重新定價(jià)已失去其意義并會(huì)產(chǎn)生不良后果。為減輕重新定價(jià)的副作用和影響，我們提出了以下建議：（1）教育公眾了解關(guān)于股票期權(quán)的真實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)成本（2）推動(dòng)監(jiān)管改革（3）加強(qiáng)公司治理（4）修訂CEO薪酬計(jì)劃</p><p>　　1、教育公眾了解關(guān)于股

53、票期權(quán)的真實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)成本</p><p>　　許多公司的董事會(huì)認(rèn)為重新定價(jià)是一種低成本的期權(quán)，因?yàn)橹匦露▋r(jià)并不要求記錄會(huì)計(jì)變更，也沒(méi)有現(xiàn)金流出。唯一的成本是期權(quán)行使時(shí)股權(quán)被稀釋。稀釋效應(yīng)可以通過(guò)購(gòu)回股份很容易地抵消掉。這也就難怪當(dāng)股價(jià)下跌時(shí)議會(huì)傾向于重新定價(jià)。</p><p>　　一些政界人士一再聲明，如果執(zhí)行價(jià)格等于授予日時(shí)的市價(jià)，員工股票期權(quán)會(huì)沒(méi)有價(jià)值。他們的聲明反映了他們要么是會(huì)計(jì)知識(shí)的

54、匱乏，要么是意圖去欺騙大眾。然而，關(guān)于股票期權(quán)在授予日沒(méi)有價(jià)值的說(shuō)法，似乎商界和大眾市民都已普遍認(rèn)同了。</p><p>　　如果公司決定出售期權(quán)，而不執(zhí)行期權(quán)，這樣事前期權(quán)的經(jīng)濟(jì)成本將是外部投資者支付的一大筆錢(qián)。事后期權(quán)的經(jīng)濟(jì)成本是執(zhí)行價(jià)格與股權(quán)行使日的市場(chǎng)價(jià)格之間的差額。會(huì)計(jì)和金融領(lǐng)域的學(xué)者能夠在教育管理人員，董事，政治家，以及有關(guān)廣大市民了解期權(quán)的真實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)成本中發(fā)揮有效的作用。他們可以幫助公司的董事會(huì)，人力

55、資源管理人員和高級(jí)管理人員理解布萊克斯科爾斯模型或二項(xiàng)式期權(quán)定價(jià)模型中期權(quán)估價(jià)公式如何運(yùn)用，以便使那些參與設(shè)計(jì)薪酬的人意識(shí)到了股票期權(quán)授予和現(xiàn)有期權(quán)的重新定價(jià)的費(fèi)用對(duì)公司而言是昂貴的。關(guān)于了解期權(quán)真實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)成本的意識(shí)的提高也會(huì)給決策者施加壓力，從而改變會(huì)計(jì)或稅務(wù)條例使成本費(fèi)用更清晰明確，并確保重新定價(jià)的公司能承擔(dān)這些費(fèi)用。</p><p><b>　　2、推動(dòng)監(jiān)管改革</b></p>

56、;<p>　　監(jiān)管改革中最關(guān)鍵的兩個(gè)需要的是：（1）確保方案的成本在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中能明確識(shí)別（2）會(huì)計(jì)處理與稅務(wù)處理有對(duì)稱(chēng)性。金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家都認(rèn)為股票期權(quán)是昂貴的。聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行主席格林斯潘最近向美國(guó)參議院財(cái)政委員會(huì)的聲明中描述，期權(quán)成本并沒(méi)有顯示在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中這會(huì)引起了市場(chǎng)嚴(yán)重的失真。在同一聽(tīng)證會(huì)上，諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)獲得者約瑟夫斯蒂格利茨教授談到，市場(chǎng)是誤傳的，并主張股票期權(quán)成本應(yīng)確認(rèn)為一項(xiàng)能合理估價(jià)的費(fèi)用。當(dāng)未來(lái)期權(quán)行使時(shí)，它的實(shí)

57、際成本是市場(chǎng)價(jià)與行使價(jià)之間的差額，可以確定出授予時(shí)的估計(jì)成本和真實(shí)成本之間的差異，以此來(lái)調(diào)整收入。如果該期權(quán)不行使，估計(jì)的股票期權(quán)成本是可以逆轉(zhuǎn)的。這可以阻止過(guò)多地給予期權(quán)，同時(shí)可以鼓勵(lì)公司提供管理理論上更優(yōu)的指數(shù)期權(quán)等激勵(lì)權(quán)利。</p><p>　　期權(quán)的固定價(jià)格和可變價(jià)格之間的區(qū)別是荒謬的，所以由I44允許的“六一”策略中，重新定價(jià)是永存的。稅法的變化也需要確保會(huì)計(jì)與稅務(wù)處理的對(duì)稱(chēng)性。具體來(lái)說(shuō)，如果公司從應(yīng)納

58、稅所得中扣除不合格股票期權(quán)，它們也應(yīng)該被計(jì)入費(fèi)用，從而減少了報(bào)表收入。</p><p><b>　　3、加強(qiáng)公司治理</b></p><p>　　加強(qiáng)企業(yè)管治是一種遏制濫用重新定價(jià)方案的顯著措施。原則上，它涉及實(shí)施職責(zé)分離模型?；谝恍┯懻摰慕Y(jié)果，可以采取以下行動(dòng)步驟：（1）委任一個(gè)非執(zhí)行董事作為董事會(huì)主席（2）在董事會(huì)的薪酬委員會(huì)里委任外面的獨(dú)立董事（3）重新定價(jià)的

59、一些意見(jiàn)要經(jīng)過(guò)股東的批準(zhǔn)（4）鼓勵(lì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資人或交易單位所有者持續(xù)監(jiān)測(cè)管理者的決定。</p><p>　　4、修訂CEO薪酬計(jì)劃</p><p>　　雖然在新的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則下，常規(guī)的重新定價(jià)變得更困難，在股市持續(xù)下滑時(shí)，要求議會(huì)以薪酬形式做出適當(dāng)?shù)男匠昊貞?yīng)。我們建議薪酬計(jì)劃做出如下的改變，以此來(lái)留住和激勵(lì)關(guān)鍵員工。</p><p>　　a、增加股本補(bǔ)助。如果能使管理者的激

60、勵(lì)效應(yīng)與股東利益一致，這就可以相應(yīng)緩解代理問(wèn)題，公司可以授予首席執(zhí)行官股票而不是期權(quán)，一樣能達(dá)到同一目的。 股票價(jià)格急劇下降使期權(quán)也貼水。由于高層管理者認(rèn)為這樣的期權(quán)沒(méi)有什么價(jià)值，所以公司不向他們提供任何獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)補(bǔ)助（哈蘭墨菲，2000）。另一方面，在股市下跌時(shí)，股票仍然可能是珍貴的。此外，股市上升時(shí)股票期權(quán)能使管理者與股東都獲益，同時(shí)也抵免了股市下滑時(shí)帶來(lái)的財(cái)富損失。所以無(wú)論是股市上升還是下滑時(shí)，股權(quán)關(guān)系與管理者和股東的財(cái)富都緊密相連。因

61、此，授予股票似乎是一個(gè)比授予股票期權(quán)更好的選擇。</p><p>　　b、指數(shù)股票期權(quán)。當(dāng)股票價(jià)格因外部的市場(chǎng)或行業(yè)因素下跌（上漲）時(shí)，傳統(tǒng)的固定價(jià)格期權(quán)的重要缺點(diǎn)是管理者會(huì)被處罰（獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)）。這違反了契約理論學(xué)說(shuō)，因?yàn)楣芾碚邞?yīng)該免除由外部控制產(chǎn)生的不確定性因素的影響。而重新定價(jià)會(huì)使這種情況變得更糟，因?yàn)槿绻魅跫?lì)機(jī)制會(huì)提高股票價(jià)格，而強(qiáng)化激勵(lì)機(jī)制，會(huì)增加股票波動(dòng)性。</p><p>　　指

62、數(shù)期權(quán)可用來(lái)減弱固定價(jià)格期權(quán)計(jì)劃帶來(lái)的不利影響，同時(shí)保持激勵(lì)機(jī)制效果，并增加股東財(cái)富。這主要通過(guò)用一個(gè)變動(dòng)的基準(zhǔn)替代固定的行使價(jià)來(lái)達(dá)到目的，通常它是一個(gè)行業(yè)或市場(chǎng)的指數(shù)。當(dāng)公司的股票價(jià)格超過(guò)該基準(zhǔn)時(shí)，指數(shù)期權(quán)取得成功。即使在熊市固定期權(quán)價(jià)格貼水時(shí)，他們?nèi)匀豢梢援a(chǎn)生有利回報(bào)。因此，指數(shù)期權(quán)使得重新定價(jià)是不必要的。相反，如果股票價(jià)格上漲完全是因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)因素，指數(shù)期權(quán)可能沒(méi)有回報(bào)。這能解決牛市時(shí)期權(quán)給管理者帶來(lái)的不公平獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)這一批判性問(wèn)題（商業(yè)周

63、刊，1998年4月20日）。理論上，通過(guò)過(guò)濾出基準(zhǔn)產(chǎn)生的業(yè)績(jī)影響，指數(shù)期權(quán)能提供更有效的激勵(lì)。管理者要確保脫離外部控制常見(jiàn)的不確定性因素的影響。因此，他們會(huì)要求較低的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)，這樣公司也能節(jié)省賠償費(fèi)用。</p><p>　　約翰遜和天（2000a，b）分析比較了五種已在實(shí)踐中使用過(guò)的傳統(tǒng)固定股票期權(quán)（業(yè)績(jī)期權(quán)，溢價(jià)期權(quán)，已購(gòu)買(mǎi)選項(xiàng)，再裝期權(quán)和指數(shù)期權(quán)）之間的差異。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，相對(duì)于其他期權(quán)，指數(shù)期權(quán)有一個(gè)較高的激勵(lì)

64、強(qiáng)度（由股價(jià)變動(dòng)引起期權(quán)變動(dòng)的靈敏度測(cè)量得知），而且它鼓勵(lì)規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的管理者承擔(dān)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的項(xiàng)目。他們有一個(gè)低靈敏度的到期時(shí)間。既然主要的目是給予管理者期權(quán)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，所以它不會(huì)在不久的未來(lái)轉(zhuǎn)化為公司價(jià)值的增長(zhǎng)，指數(shù)期權(quán)能使公司在出售遠(yuǎn)期到期期權(quán)時(shí)不會(huì)增加薪酬費(fèi)用。指數(shù)期權(quán)唯一的缺點(diǎn)是，相對(duì)于固定價(jià)格期權(quán)，它們有更低的貨幣整理率，會(huì)相應(yīng)降低執(zhí)行價(jià)。因此，如果一個(gè)公司需要替代傳統(tǒng)期權(quán)，它必須發(fā)行更大量的指數(shù)期權(quán)以保留現(xiàn)有的薪酬水平。</p>

65、;<p>　　指數(shù)期權(quán)的想法并不新鮮。早在七年前，艾克海貝（1996）已經(jīng)開(kāi)始倡導(dǎo)指數(shù)期權(quán)的使用。有些3級(jí)類(lèi)公司，如一家電信公司，已經(jīng)使用指數(shù)期權(quán)了。盡管指數(shù)期權(quán)在理論上有絕對(duì)壓倒性?xún)?yōu)勢(shì)，但還是未被廣泛使用。其中一種制止其廣泛使用的因素是當(dāng)前會(huì)計(jì)規(guī)則要求股票期權(quán)是可變的會(huì)計(jì)，這就迫使其計(jì)算每季度支出的變化并要面臨盈利增加時(shí)會(huì)發(fā)生波動(dòng)的現(xiàn)象。</p><p>　　c、重新定價(jià)的價(jià)值轉(zhuǎn)換。降低現(xiàn)有股權(quán)的

66、行使價(jià)至當(dāng)時(shí)的市價(jià)，這樣會(huì)大幅提高貨幣整理率和股票期權(quán)的價(jià)值。這會(huì)導(dǎo)致可能因表現(xiàn)欠佳本應(yīng)被解雇的管理者獲得暴利。另一種方法是取消舊的期權(quán)，取而代之的是更低執(zhí)行價(jià)或更短到期日的期權(quán)，同時(shí)使新期權(quán)的價(jià)值等于已取消期權(quán)的價(jià)值。薪酬方面有關(guān)的咨詢(xún)?nèi)耸糠Q(chēng)之為重新定價(jià)的價(jià)值轉(zhuǎn)換。從股東的角度看，這不涉及任何薪酬變化，因?yàn)閳?bào)酬總額保持不變?；魻柡湍疲?000）表明，規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的管理者會(huì)喜歡少數(shù)低執(zhí)行價(jià)的期權(quán)而不是大量高執(zhí)行價(jià)的期權(quán)。因此，價(jià)值轉(zhuǎn)變對(duì)管

67、理者仍是有利的，并能無(wú)代價(jià)地為股東幫助恢復(fù)激勵(lì)效果。龍星，希林克，新光和勝騰是那些采取了重新定價(jià)價(jià)值轉(zhuǎn)換的領(lǐng)頭公司。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　當(dāng)前重新定價(jià)的嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)做法使我們相信，這對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)不佳公司的管理者而言更是一個(gè)取得暴利的時(shí)機(jī)，而不是留住和激勵(lì)關(guān)鍵管理人才。公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)薄弱，會(huì)計(jì)法規(guī)不嚴(yán)和稅法漏洞會(huì)使管理者對(duì)期權(quán)重新定價(jià)，以有利于

68、自己的薪酬，他們這樣做是為了偽裝他們的真實(shí)動(dòng)機(jī)。其結(jié)果是大量財(cái)富從股東轉(zhuǎn)移到管理者。</p><p>　　毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，目前的會(huì)計(jì)和稅務(wù)規(guī)則是授予超大型期權(quán)和過(guò)去十年重新定價(jià)風(fēng)靡的推動(dòng)力。在公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則要求的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中，固定價(jià)格期權(quán)沒(méi)有成本，這是錯(cuò)誤的，即使他們形成了管理者薪酬計(jì)劃的核心功能，所以這種觀念應(yīng)該改變。令人難以置信的是，同一家公司說(shuō)沒(méi)有財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表可取的合理的期權(quán)估價(jià)，而要將其成本作為一項(xiàng)費(fèi)用在納稅申報(bào)中顯示