外文翻譯---美國的增值稅一種解決方案

1、<p><b>　　中文3413字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　外文出處 Brookings Institution and Tax Policy Center </p><p>　　外文作者 Wil

2、liam G. Gale，Benjamin H. Harris </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　A Value-Added Tax for the United States: Part of the Solution</p><p>　　Administrative Issues </p>

3、;<p>　　A broad-based VAT would cost less to administer than the current income tax. For example, in the United Kingdom, administrative costs of the VAT were less than half of those of the income tax, measured as a

4、 share of revenue. Similarly, the New Zealand revenue department was required to intervene in just 3 percent of VAT returns, compared to 25 percent of income tax returns (GAO 2008). </p><p>　　The VAT has com

5、pliance advantages over a retail sales tax, which aims to collect all revenue at the point of sale from a business to a household. Since revenue collection for the VAT is spread across stages of production, with producer

6、s receiving a credit against taxes paid as an incentive for compliance, the VAT in practice is less likely to be evaded.</p><p>　　Theory and evidence suggest that the compliance burden would likely fall more

7、 heavily – as a percentage of sales – on smaller businesses. Most countries address these concerns by exempting small businesses from collecting the VAT. In 2007, 24 out of the 29 OECD countries with a VAT exempted busin

8、esses with gross receipts beneath specified thresholds, varying from $2,159 to $93,558 (OECD 2008). </p><p>　　Finally, it is worth noting that, to the extent that administrative costs are fixed with respect

9、to the VAT standard rate, the presence of such costs suggest that the VAT should be set at a relatively higher rate rather than a lower one.</p><p>　　The States </p><p>　　Some analysts express c

10、oncern that a national VAT would impinge on states’ ability to administer their own sales taxes. In our view, a national VAT could help states significantly. State retail sales taxes are poorly designed – they exempt man

11、y goods and most services and collect more than 40 percent of their revenue from taxing business purchases, which should be exempt.</p><p>　　Converting their sales taxes to VATs and piggybacking on a broad-b

12、ased federal VAT would offer states several advantages. First, the states could raise substantial amounts of revenue in a less distortionary manner than current sales taxes. Second, administrative costs, which currently

13、exceed 3 percent of state sales tax revenue (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2006), would decline. Many states currently link their income tax to the federal income tax base, with obvious administrative and compliance advan</p

14、><p>　　In 2009, state and local sales tax revenue equaled 2.0 percent of GDP (authors’ calculations based on U.S. Census Bureau 2010). If the federal VAT had the broad base and demogrants described in Table 1,

15、and the states and localities piggy-backed on that structure, an average subnational VAT of about 6 percent would raise the same revenue as existing state and local sales taxes.Alternatively, states could maintain their

16、sales taxes or create their own VAT bases. Following the implementation of a </p><p>　　Anticipated VAT as Stimulus </p><p>　　While a major tax increase would not be a good idea while the economy

17、 is still recovering slowly from recession, it is worth noting that there is potential for the announcement of a future VAT to be stimulative in the current period. By raising the price of consumption goods in the future

18、, or by doing so gradually over time via a phased-in VAT, the announcement would encourage people to spend more now and in the near future, when the economy needs the stimulus. This effect may not be very big – </p>

19、;<p>　　Will the VAT fuel expanding government? </p><p>　　The VAT has been called a "money machine" in honor of its ability to raise substantial amounts of revenue. That is a helpful feature

20、if the revenues are used to close deficits, but poses a problem if the boost in revenue simply fuels further unsustainable growth in federal spending.</p><p>　　Some analysts reject any source of extra revenu

21、e – including a VAT – on the grounds that less government revenue leads to smaller government. In general, this “starve the beast” theory does not apply to most taxes, nor does it reflect recent experience. Romer and Rom

22、er (2009), for example, find that tax cuts designed to spur long-run growth do not in fact lead to lower government spending; if anything, they find that tax cuts lead to higher spending. This finding is consistent with

23、Gale and Orsz</p><p>　　Some observers argue that the VAT is such an efficient and invisible tax that it has been and would be used to fuel government spending increases through a gradually increasing VAT rat

24、e. Bartlett (2010a, 2010b) addresses this claim by noting that increased VAT rates in OECD countries were common among early adopters, who operated a VAT in the high-inflation environments in the 1970s, but far less comm

25、on among countries that adopted a VAT after 1975. Among the 17 countries that instituted a VAT d</p><p>　　Making the VAT transparent </p><p>　　A variant of the concern about spending growth is t

26、he notion that the VAT is "hidden" in overall prices. As a result, the argument goes, taxpayers won’t notice the VAT the way they do income, sales, or payroll taxes, enabling Congress to increase the VAT rate w

27、ithout much taxpayer resistance. </p><p>　　This issue is easily addressed. The VAT doesn’t have to be invisible: for example, Canada simply requires that businesses print the amount of VAT paid on a receipt

28、with every consumer purchase. This is essentially identical to the standard U.S. practice of printing sales taxes paid on each receipt.</p><p>　　Another way to make the VAT transparent is to link VAT rates a

29、nd revenues with spending on particular goods. Aaron (1991) and Burman (2009) propose a VAT related to health spending. Under such a system, the additional health insurance coverage would help offset the regressivity of

30、a VAT and make the costs of both the VAT and government spending more transparent. </p><p>　　Inflation </p><p>　　The creation of an add-on VAT will create pressure on prices. (If, instead, the V

31、AT were replacing a sales tax, there would be no pressure or need to adjust the price level.) In our view, the Fed should accommodate the one-time price rise inherent in the creation of an add-on VAT. Not doing so would

32、create significant and unnecessary adjustment costs in terms of lost jobs and wages. </p><p>　　But there is no theoretical or empirical reason to expect that the VAT would cause continuing inflation. Indeed,

33、 the presence of an additional revenue source would reduce the likelihood of the Fed having to monetize the debt. Research has found only a weak relationship between the VAT and continually increasing prices. In a survey

34、 of 35 countries that introduced the VAT, Tait (1991) finds that 63 percent exhibited no increase in the consumer price index (perhaps because they were replacing exist</p><p>　　The Canadian VAT</p>&

35、lt;p>　　In 1991, Canada implemented a 7 percent VAT at the national level to replace a tax on sales by manufacturers. Many of the concerns associated with the VAT in the United States can be assuaged by observing the C

36、anadian experience.</p><p>　　Canada addressed distributional concerns by applying a zero rate to certain necessities and adding a refundable tax credit in the income tax. As noted above, we prefer the latter

37、 method. The Canadian VAT is completely transparent: it is listed separately on receipts just like sales taxes in the U.S. Perhaps because of the transparency, the VAT has not led to significant growth of government spen

38、ding. Federal spending in Canada has in fact gradually declined from 22.6 percent of GDP in 1991—when </p><p>　　Coordinating provincial sales taxes with the VAT has proven to be challenging, but manageable.

39、After the VAT was introduced, provinces over time began to coordinate their sales taxes with the federal VAT. By July 2010, five of the 10 provinces will have “harmonized” VATs, making their provincial tax bases essentia

40、lly identical to the federal base. In these cases, the federal government administers the provincial tax on behalf of the province, and the provincial governments set their own VAT rate</p><p>　　An American

41、VAT </p><p>　　The structure of an American VAT should include: </p><p>　　o a very broad base; </p><p>　　o rebates or income tax credits (rather than product exemptions) to achieve p

42、rogressivity; </p><p>　　o efforts to raise transparency (for example, having VAT listed separately on receipts); and </p><p>　　o explicit links to spending discipline. </p><p>　　Whi

43、le we are not wedded to a particular rate, we do note that a 10 percent VAT with a broad base could raise about 2 percent of GDP in revenues, even after netting out the offsetting adjustments in other taxes and the costs

44、 of compensating households for VAT payments on a reasonable level of consumption. </p><p>　　Other than the resources used to provide the rebate, VAT revenues should be used largely, if not completely, for d

45、eficit reduction. While tax and spending reform require continued attention from policymakers, closing the fiscal gap is a top priority. To the extent that VAT revenues are used for other purposes, there will be fewer op

46、tions left for balancing the federal budget. </p><p>　　We believe the states would benefit from dropping their sales taxes and rapidly harmonizing with a federal VAT, but that is an issue they can decide for

47、 themselves. If all states did harmonize and if the federal VAT rate were 10 percent, the resulting combined VAT rate—including the state and federal rate—would be on the order of 15 to 17 percent. This would still be be

48、low the OECD average, but would be sufficient to significantly close the long-term gap and replace and improve upon state-level </p><p>　　Given current economic challenges, the timing of a VAT is important.

49、Instituting a significant tax on consumption during a recession would be counterproductive. The optimal time to implement a VAT is after the economy has returned to full employment. </p><p>　　The VAT is not

50、the only tax or spending policy that can constructively help solve the fiscal problem, nor will it solve the problem by itself. Nevertheless, to oppose the VAT is to argue either (a) there is no fiscal gap, (b) ignoring

51、the fiscal gap is better than imposing a VAT, or (c) there are better ways than the VAT to make policy sustainable. No one disputes the existence of a fiscal gap, though, and the economic costs of fiscal unsustainability

52、 are enormous. As to the notion that there ar</p><p>　　Source: William G. Gale and Benjamin H. Harris. A Value-Added Tax for the United States: Part of the Solution[R]. Brookings Institution and Tax Policy C

53、enter, 2010.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　美國的增值稅： 一種解決方案</p><p><b>　　行政問題</b></p><p>　　一個(gè)稅基廣泛的增值稅將比當(dāng)前所得稅花費(fèi)更少的管理成本。例如，在英國，增值稅的管理費(fèi)用少于所得稅一半的管理費(fèi)用。同樣

54、，新西蘭稅務(wù)部門宣布，增值稅的申報(bào)費(fèi)用為3%，而所得稅的申報(bào)費(fèi)用為25%（總審計(jì)局，2008）。</p><p>　　增值稅是在銷售商品時(shí)征收的一種流轉(zhuǎn)稅。由于增值稅的稅收征管是分散在生產(chǎn)階段，對(duì)于生產(chǎn)者來說，增值稅的征收是不可避免的。</p><p>　　有理論和證據(jù)表明，對(duì)于較小的企業(yè)征收增值稅，其合規(guī)負(fù)擔(dān)可能會(huì)更加嚴(yán)重。大多數(shù)國家決定免征小企業(yè)增值稅。2007年，29個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展

55、組織中的24個(gè)國家，決定對(duì)于收入總額在限額以內(nèi)的小企業(yè)免收增值稅，限額從2,159美元到93,558美元不等（經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織，2008）。</p><p>　　最后，值得注意的是，相對(duì)增值稅稅率來說，管理費(fèi)用在某種程度上是固定的，就目前而言，應(yīng)該設(shè)置一個(gè)相對(duì)較高的增值稅稅率。</p><p><b>　　美國</b></p><p>　　一

56、些分析家擔(dān)心，實(shí)行增值稅可能會(huì)影響到目前所實(shí)行的銷售稅的管理。我們認(rèn)為，增值稅能夠有效的幫助一個(gè)國家。一國的銷售稅設(shè)計(jì)不當(dāng)，就可能會(huì)免除許多商品、服務(wù)和超過40%的企業(yè)采購時(shí)產(chǎn)生的銷售稅。</p><p>　　將他們的銷售稅轉(zhuǎn)換成以增值稅和基礎(chǔ)廣泛的聯(lián)邦增值稅，會(huì)給國家?guī)韼状蠛锰?。第一，美國可以用一個(gè)比目前的銷售稅更不扭曲的方式提高稅收收入。第二，目前超過3%銷售稅收入的行政費(fèi)用將下降（普華永道，2006）。許

57、多州將他們的所得稅與聯(lián)邦所得稅相連接，具有明顯的行政和服從優(yōu)勢。聯(lián)邦增值稅和州增值稅相連接會(huì)增加儲(chǔ)蓄。第三，統(tǒng)一的增值稅可以允許以前各州和聯(lián)邦政府難以征稅的州際稅收交易，例如跨境郵購訂單和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)銷售。如果美國吸取了加拿大的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，那么聯(lián)邦政府可能會(huì)向各州征收增值稅，但免除一些消費(fèi)稅的費(fèi)用（鄧肯、西登，2010）。</p><p>　　2009年，州和地方銷售稅的收入相當(dāng)于GDP的2.0%（作者的計(jì)算以美國2010年

58、人口普查局為基礎(chǔ)）。如果聯(lián)邦增值稅有廣泛的基礎(chǔ)，如在表1所描述，對(duì)于這種結(jié)構(gòu)的州和地區(qū)，在當(dāng)?shù)劁N售收入相同的情況下，采用增值稅會(huì)比現(xiàn)行銷售稅增加6個(gè)百分點(diǎn)的稅收。另外，各個(gè)州可以創(chuàng)建他們自己的銷售稅或增值稅。在加拿大聯(lián)邦增值稅的實(shí)施后，多數(shù)省份在未來幾年時(shí)間里保持現(xiàn)有的稅收法規(guī)。一些省份還沒有完全統(tǒng)一的聯(lián)邦增值稅，如魁北克可以管理自己的增值稅（鄧肯、西登， 2010）。</p><p>　　預(yù)計(jì)增值稅作為一種刺激

59、</p><p>　　當(dāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)正在緩慢的從衰退中復(fù)蘇時(shí)，大幅度的增加稅收將不會(huì)是一個(gè)好主意，但值得注意的是，宣布在未來采用增值稅可能會(huì)對(duì)當(dāng)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生刺激。通過提高未來消費(fèi)品的價(jià)格，或通過分階段逐步執(zhí)行增值稅，在經(jīng)濟(jì)需要刺激時(shí)，將鼓勵(lì)人們更多的消費(fèi)。這種影響可能不會(huì)很大，但它在正確的方向走去。</p><p>　　增值稅能否給政府發(fā)展增加動(dòng)力？</p><p>　　增

60、值稅被稱為“賺錢機(jī)器”，可以大量的增加稅收。如果稅收被用于調(diào)節(jié)赤字，那么這是一個(gè)有用的功能，但有一個(gè)問題，如果在稅收的增加可能會(huì)引起更多聯(lián)邦開支不可持續(xù)的增長。</p><p>　　一些分析家拒絕任何額外的收入來源 ——包括增值稅——其理由是較少政府收入會(huì)導(dǎo)致小政府。一般來說，這種理論并不適用于大多數(shù)稅收，也沒有反映相應(yīng)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。羅默和羅默（2009），例如，發(fā)現(xiàn)減稅的目的是促進(jìn)長期增長，這么做實(shí)際上不會(huì)導(dǎo)致政府開

61、支的降低；減稅反而會(huì)導(dǎo)致更高的支出。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)與伽勒和奧斯?jié)筛瘢?004 b）的一個(gè)“協(xié)調(diào)的財(cái)政紀(jì)律”觀點(diǎn)是一致的，這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)是說，政府開支會(huì)隨著稅收的減少而增加（如20世紀(jì)80年代和21世紀(jì)），政府開支也會(huì)隨著稅收的增加而減少（如在20世紀(jì)90年代）。鑒于此觀點(diǎn)，人們普遍認(rèn)識(shí)到需要為開支和收入進(jìn)行平衡預(yù)算，任何新的收入來源都將伴隨著開支的削減。</p><p>　　一些觀察家認(rèn)為，增值稅是一個(gè)有效的無形的稅，通過逐

62、步增加的增值稅稅率會(huì)刺激政府支出的增加。巴特利特（2010a，2010b）指出，在 20世紀(jì)70年代高通貨膨脹的環(huán)境中，經(jīng)合組織中的國家增加增值稅率是非常普遍的，但在1975年以后這種做法就不普遍了。17個(gè)國家在1975年價(jià)格相對(duì)穩(wěn)定時(shí)期設(shè)立增值稅，其中有四個(gè)沒有改變?cè)鲋刀惵?，四個(gè)降低了增值稅稅率；所有在后期采用增值稅的國家增值稅率平均增加不到1個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。自1984年以來，經(jīng)合組織國家的平均增值稅一直基本保持不變或只降低了18%。<

63、;/p><p><b>　　使增值稅透明</b></p><p>　　一個(gè)關(guān)于消費(fèi)增長的觀點(diǎn)，增值稅“隱藏”在物價(jià)總水平中。論據(jù)是，納稅人不會(huì)像關(guān)注所得稅、銷售稅和工資稅那樣注意增值稅，這使得納稅人對(duì)于國會(huì)增加增值稅率沒有多少抵抗。</p><p>　　這個(gè)問題很容易解決。增值稅并不一定是無形的：例如，在加拿大，企業(yè)需要在每一位消費(fèi)者購買商品時(shí)打印

64、包含增值稅額的收據(jù)。這與美國對(duì)銷售稅打印收據(jù)的做法基本相同。</p><p>　　另一種使增值稅的透明的方法是將增值稅與某種特殊商品的收入聯(lián)系在一起。亞倫（1991）和緬（2009）提出有關(guān)健康支出的增值稅。在這種體制下，額外的醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)，將有助于抵消增值稅遞減，使增值稅和政府支出更加透明。</p><p>　　一個(gè)附加的增值稅將對(duì)價(jià)格產(chǎn)生壓力。（如果增值稅取代了銷售稅，將不會(huì)有壓力或需要調(diào)

65、整的價(jià)格。）我們認(rèn)為，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)應(yīng)在滿足一次性價(jià)格上漲的內(nèi)在條件的前提下，創(chuàng)造一個(gè)附加增值稅。不這樣做會(huì)造成就業(yè)和工資方面重大的損失和不必要的調(diào)整成本。</p><p>　　但是沒有理論或經(jīng)驗(yàn)認(rèn)為增值稅會(huì)造成持續(xù)的通貨膨脹。事實(shí)上，一個(gè)額外的收入來源的存在會(huì)降低，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的貨幣債務(wù)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，增值稅和不斷提高價(jià)格只有微弱關(guān)系。在35個(gè)國家引進(jìn)了增值稅后，大吉（1991）調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)，63%沒有表現(xiàn)出在消費(fèi)價(jià)格指數(shù)（也許是因

66、為他們?nèi)〈爽F(xiàn)有的銷售稅）的增加，20%只有一次性價(jià)格上漲。其余的17%，在引進(jìn)增值稅后消費(fèi)物價(jià)持續(xù)加速，大吉認(rèn)為這也不太可能是由增值稅造成的加速。</p><p><b>　　加拿大的增值稅</b></p><p>　　1991年，加拿大實(shí)施了7%的增值稅，以取代對(duì)制造商的銷售稅。美國許多關(guān)于增值稅的擔(dān)心，可以通過觀察加拿大的經(jīng)驗(yàn)得到安撫。</p>&

67、lt;p>　　加拿大對(duì)于某些生活必需品采用零稅率，并增加了所得稅的退稅。如上所述，我們更喜歡后一種方法。加拿大增值稅是完全透明的：它和美國的銷售稅一樣在收據(jù)上單獨(dú)列出，也許是因?yàn)橥该鞯年P(guān)系，增值稅并沒有導(dǎo)致政府開支大幅增長。加拿大聯(lián)邦開支其實(shí)已逐漸下降，1991年實(shí)施增值稅時(shí)，占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的22.6%，到2009年時(shí)，只占14.9%。增值稅稅率在2006年和2008年分別下降了6個(gè)百分點(diǎn)和5個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。加拿大聯(lián)邦稅收占GDP的比重

68、已從1991年的17.6%降到2007年的16.3%（在2009年近一步下降到14.6%）。自采用增值稅后，加拿大聯(lián)邦政府在收入和支出的規(guī)模方面明顯縮小。自1991年以來，加拿大出現(xiàn)了類似于美國的通貨膨脹和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率。</p><p>　　協(xié)調(diào)增值稅和銷售稅是具有挑戰(zhàn)性的，但是是可處理的。引入增值稅后，隨著時(shí)間的推移各省份開始協(xié)調(diào)銷售稅與聯(lián)邦增值稅。2010年7月，10個(gè)省份將有五個(gè)“統(tǒng)一”增值稅，使他們的省級(jí)稅

69、基基本上與聯(lián)邦稅基相同。在這些情況下，聯(lián)邦政府代表省執(zhí)行地方稅，并且地方政府可以設(shè)置他們自己的增值稅率?？笨藞?zhí)行自己的增值稅；三省將管理自己的銷售稅。一個(gè)省和三個(gè)地區(qū)都沒有消費(fèi)稅。美國可容納多種方式的消費(fèi)稅以供選擇。</p><p>　　美國增值稅的結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)該包括：</p><p>　　1、一個(gè)非常寬廣的稅基；</p><p>　　2、回扣或所得稅抵免（而不是產(chǎn)品免

70、稅），以實(shí)現(xiàn)累進(jìn)；</p><p>　　3、努力提高透明度（例如，有增值稅發(fā)票上單獨(dú)列出）</p><p>　　4、明確支出的規(guī)定。</p><p>　　雖然我們不拘泥于特定的稅率，我們也注意到，一個(gè)稅基廣泛的稅率為10%的增值稅，在剔除其他稅種的調(diào)整和合理水平內(nèi)增值稅補(bǔ)償費(fèi)用的支出之后，會(huì)使GDP增加2個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　除了用

71、于提供回扣之外，增值稅收入應(yīng)主要用于調(diào)節(jié)財(cái)政赤字。稅收和支出需要決策者繼續(xù)關(guān)注，縮小財(cái)政缺口是當(dāng)務(wù)之急。如果增值稅收入用于其他用途，將會(huì)給聯(lián)邦預(yù)算平衡留下更少的選項(xiàng)。</p><p>　　我們相信美國將在放棄銷售稅和迅速諧調(diào)聯(lián)邦增值稅中收益，但有一個(gè)問題，增值稅稅率由各州自己決定。如果各州沒有統(tǒng)一的稅率，而聯(lián)邦增值稅率為10%，那么由州稅率和聯(lián)邦利率相結(jié)合的稅率為15%至17%。這仍然低于經(jīng)合組織的平均水平，但將

72、足以更換和改進(jìn)銷售稅。這也對(duì)消費(fèi)者發(fā)出一個(gè)強(qiáng)烈的信號(hào)，政府決策者的目標(biāo)是降低消耗，提高儲(chǔ)蓄。</p><p>　　鑒于當(dāng)前的經(jīng)濟(jì)挑戰(zhàn)，增值稅的時(shí)機(jī)非常重要。在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退時(shí)期實(shí)行一種新的重要的稅將會(huì)起到反作用。實(shí)行增值稅的最佳時(shí)間是在經(jīng)濟(jì)已恢復(fù)到充分就業(yè)之后。</p><p>　　增值稅并不是唯一可以建設(shè)性地幫助解決財(cái)政問題的稅收政策，也不會(huì)單獨(dú)將解決問題。然而，反對(duì)增值稅是主張主要是（1）沒

73、有財(cái)政缺口；（2）忽視財(cái)政缺口；（3）有比增值稅更有效的辦法，使政策更好地發(fā)展。沒有人懷疑財(cái)政缺口的存在，雖然財(cái)政不可持續(xù)性的經(jīng)濟(jì)花費(fèi)是巨大的。如果有更好的方法把財(cái)政政策領(lǐng)向可持續(xù)發(fā)展道路，那么我們將高興地了解它們。在此期間，政策制定者不應(yīng)該讓假想的和迄今未被發(fā)現(xiàn)的理想的政策，阻擋了經(jīng)過時(shí)間考驗(yàn)的增值稅政策。</p><p>　　出處：威廉克.蓋爾，本杰明.哈里斯. 美國的增值稅： 一種解決方案[R].布魯金斯研