外文翻譯---服務(wù)業(yè)fdi的開(kāi)放性一個(gè)國(guó)際比較分析

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Openness to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: An International Comparative Analysis</p><p>　　Stephen S. Golub</

2、p><p>　　National policies towards FDI typically feature measures aimed at both attracting and discouraging in ?ows. Policies to attract FDI such as tax breaks, favourable regulatory treatment and subsidies of v

3、arious sorts are usually focused on manufacturing. Policies towards services are far more ambivalent. Laws and regulatory practices frequently discriminate against foreign investors in services such as public utilities (

4、electricity distribution and telecommunications in particular), transport (not</p><p>　　The ambiguous attitudes towards FDI in services are amply illustrated in recent policy actions and debates. The Committ

5、ee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency group that screens foreign direct investment for national security concerns, has recently been in the limelight with several high-profile cases, nota

6、bly one involving the acquisition of a US port by investors in Dubai. A recent ‘open skies’ aviation agreement between the United States and the European Union w</p><p>　　?nancial services industry to foreig

7、n investors. Likewise, India is also gradually opening wholesale and distribution services to large foreign ?rms such as Wal-Mart despite strong local opposition. Venezuela and other Latin American countries with left-wi

8、ng governments, on the other hand, have recently increased restrictions on foreign investment in telecommunications. Thailand has also recently moved to reduce control by foreign investors in its telecommunications indus

9、try.</p><p>　　As in the case of manufacturing, countries bene?t from FDI in services through employment creation, capital accumulation, transfer of technology, improved service and increased competition. Mor

10、eover, liberalisation of FDI in services can contribute to manufacturing productivity by increasing availability of quality of production-related services (Arnold et al., 2006, 2007; Golub et al.,2007). Critics argue tha

11、t FDI can also impose economic costs such as displacement of local ?rms and reduced com</p><p>　　The cross-border provision of services, unlike goods, often can only be delivered through ‘commercial presence

12、’, i.e. setting up of foreign operations, rather than international trade in the item itself. It is therefore to be expected that FDI plays a prominent role in the globalisation of the service sector, fostered in part by

13、 partial opening of service industries to FDI.</p><p>　　Formal international agreements on FDI and on trade in services have been far less extensive than on international trade in goods, although various glo

14、bal negotiations and regional free-trade agreements often cover some aspects of international investment in services, notably the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provisions on commercial presence. To the ex

15、tent that it has occurred, opening to FDI in services has primarily been unilateral.</p><p>　　FDI in services has been increasing rapidly, raising the stakes in the debates about policies. In 2005, services

16、constituted the majority of inward FDI stocks, at almost two-thirds for developed countries, and about 50 per cent for developing countries, up considerably from 1990 (Table 1). Within services, ?nance, trade and busines

17、s services are the three largest categories, but transport, communications and electricity have also been increasing rapidly. It should be noted, however, that the sha</p><p>　　Despite the increasing promine

18、nce and controversies surrounding FDI in services, very little systematic information is available on policies towards FDI in services. Unlike international trade where international comparisons of tariff and non-tariff

19、barriers are widely available, there have been few previous efforts to quantify and systematically compare national policies towards FDI. Yet, indicators of the policy stance towards FDI are just as important as measure

20、s of trade barriers, given the</p><p>　　Case studies of the environment for FDI in various economies have been conducted through investors surveys and country reports (e.g. Economist Intelligence</p>

21、<p>　　Unit reports and Country Commercial Guides), but these cover a wide variety of issues and are not easily compared.</p><p>　　Given the dif?culties in classifying and ranking the various restriction

22、s, some studies (e.g. Hoekman, 1995) are limited to counting the number of restrictions. Kobrin (2005) used an annual UNCTAD report on national policy changes to show that liberalisation measures greatly outnumber increa

23、sed restrictions in the 1992–2001 period. However, UNCTAD’s database provides no information about the level of restrictions, only the number and nature of changes that are observed in different years.</p><p&g

24、t;　　A number of studies of restrictions on FDI (Hoekman, 1995; Paci?c Economic</p><p>　　Cooperation Council, 1995) use the WTO’s GATS commitments related to mode 3 (commercial presence) as their primary data

25、 source. GATS commitments are made in the form of ‘positive’ lists, i.e. they represent of?cial commitments to open markets. This is in contrast to ‘negative’ lists of exceptions to liberalisation. A problem with the GAT

26、S positive lists is that the absence of a positive commitment in some sector does not necessarily imply a restriction. A country may simply have chosen not to li</p><p>　　The Australian Productivity Commissi

27、on and af?liated researchers carried out a number of sectoral studies of impediments to trade in services: telecommunications (Warren, 2001), banking (McGuire and Schuele, 2001), maritime transport (McGuire et al., 2001)

28、, distribution (Kalirajan, 2000) and professional services (Nguyen-Hong, 2000). These studies focus on all modes of service delivery rather than FDI per se, however, and many of them rely primarily on the GATS, with the

29、related limitations note</p><p>　　The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) rates the openness</p><p>　　of countries to FDI on a scale of 1 to 5. The IEF methodology is not clearly

30、 articulated on their website and covers broader aspects of the climate for FDI, such as foreign exchange convertibility and access to arbitration that differ from the narrower focus here on discrimination between foreig

31、n and domestic investors. The World Competitiveness Report also ranks countries on their openness to FDI. These reports, however, are not based on a transparent and veri?able method and openness to FDI is</p><

32、p>　　Hardin and Holmes (1997, 2002) provide a comprehensive approach to barriers</p><p>　　to inward FDI but cover only a limited number of countries. Golub (2003), Koyama and Golub (2006) and UNCTAD (2006)

33、 adopt a variant of Hardin and Holmes’s approach in a study of restrictions on inward FDI for various samples of developed and developing countries. This article extends and synthesises the results from these three studi

34、es.</p><p>　　There are a number of limitations of the present study. First, policies towards</p><p>　　FDI are diverse and complex, and therefore not easily quanti?ed even when they are known. Se

35、cond, descriptions of these policies are not readily available and must be sought in a variety of sources, which sometimes provide con?icting or incomplete information. Third, policies are not static; on the contrary, go

36、vernments have frequently altered policies. Fourth, the focus here is on policies that discriminate between foreign and domestic investors, i.e. deviations from‘national treatment’. Regula</p><p>　　The remai

37、nder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the method of computing FDI restrictions, Section 3 presents the results for all countries, Section 4 examines the correlations of FDI restrictions with FDI p

38、atterns, and Section 5 concludes.</p><p>　　This section explains how measures of policies discriminating between foreign and domestic investors are computed. There are several issues involved in computing th

39、e restriction scores. A classi?cation of various types of restrictions, a choice of industries and a system of weighting are needed.</p><p>　　外文題目： Openness to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: An In

40、ternational Comparative Analysis </p><p>　　出 處： The World Economy (2009) </p><p>　　doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2009.01201.x

41、 </p><p>　　作 者： Stephen S. Golub </p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　服務(wù)業(yè)FDI的開(kāi)

42、放性：一個(gè)國(guó)際比較分析</p><p>　　國(guó)家政策對(duì)于外商直接投資的典型特征措施旨在吸引和阻止資本流入。吸引外國(guó)直接投資的政策，如稅收減免，有利的監(jiān)督管理和各類(lèi)補(bǔ)貼通常是以制造業(yè)為重點(diǎn)。對(duì)于服務(wù)的政策，更是矛盾。法律和監(jiān)管措施對(duì)服務(wù)的外國(guó)投資者的經(jīng)常歧視，如公用事業(yè)（尤其是電力分配和電信），運(yùn)輸（尤其是空中和海上運(yùn)輸），金融服務(wù)，甚至是建筑和批發(fā)/零售分銷(xiāo)行業(yè)。</p><p>　　最近

43、的政策行動(dòng)和辯論充分說(shuō)明了對(duì)外國(guó)直接在服務(wù)業(yè)投資的不明確態(tài)度。美國(guó)對(duì)外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)（CFIUS），一個(gè)的機(jī)構(gòu)間小組篩查的最近引起人們注意的幾個(gè)典型外國(guó)直接在國(guó)家安全問(wèn)題上投資的案例，特別是其中的涉及美國(guó)港口被迪拜投資者收購(gòu)的案例。最近的一個(gè)美國(guó)和歐盟的“開(kāi)放天空”的航空協(xié)議在某種程度上失敗是因?yàn)槊绹?guó)拒絕放寬所有美國(guó)的航空公司必須至少擁有75%的美國(guó)公民的限制。日本拒絕了位于英國(guó)的以?xún)和顿Y基金為基礎(chǔ)的能源公司J-Powerd的收購(gòu)要約。

44、中國(guó)在受到來(lái)自美國(guó)的壓力下逐漸對(duì)外國(guó)投資者開(kāi)放金融服務(wù)業(yè)。同樣，印度也逐漸對(duì)國(guó)外大公司如沃爾瑪開(kāi)放批發(fā)及分銷(xiāo)服務(wù)，盡管本地的反對(duì)意見(jiàn)很強(qiáng)烈。委內(nèi)瑞拉和其他拉美國(guó)家的左翼政府，另一方面，最近增加了對(duì)外資在電信投資的限制。泰國(guó)最近也提出，以減少外國(guó)投資者在電信行業(yè)的控制。</p><p>　　由于在制造的情況下，國(guó)家通過(guò)外國(guó)在服務(wù)業(yè)直接投資中創(chuàng)造的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)，資本積累，技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移，改進(jìn)服務(wù)和增加競(jìng)爭(zhēng)受益。此外，外國(guó)直接在

45、服務(wù)投資的開(kāi)放能夠促進(jìn)生產(chǎn)效率的提高，通過(guò)增加與生產(chǎn)相關(guān)的服務(wù)的可用性(Arnold et al., 2006, 2007; Golub et al., 2007)。批評(píng)者認(rèn)為外國(guó)直接投資也可以征收經(jīng)濟(jì)損失比如當(dāng)?shù)仄髽I(yè)的置換和減少競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。嬰兒‘企業(yè)家精神'論點(diǎn)可以被引證為對(duì)外國(guó)投資者的歧視的支持。服務(wù)部門(mén)通常也受到經(jīng)濟(jì)或?qū)徤鞅O(jiān)管，因?yàn)閷?duì)自然壟斷或其他市場(chǎng)失靈的傾向，雖然這種市場(chǎng)失靈本身并不能為本地和外國(guó)投資者直接的歧視提供明確的理

46、由。限制在非經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域的外資服務(wù)所有權(quán)的主要原因在于國(guó)家安全和經(jīng)濟(jì)民主主義。行業(yè)如電信，銀行，交通和電力供應(yīng)往往是被東道國(guó)國(guó)家視為“戰(zhàn)略”或“敏感”。因此，服務(wù)業(yè)普遍受到比制造業(yè)甚至自然資源更為嚴(yán)格的限制（Hoekman，1995）。</p><p>　　該服務(wù)的跨境提供，不像商品，往往只能通過(guò)“商業(yè)存在”交付，即設(shè)立海外業(yè)務(wù)，而不是項(xiàng)目本身的國(guó)際貿(mào)易。因此，可以預(yù)期，外國(guó)直接投資在全球化的服務(wù)部門(mén)中有著很重要的地

47、位，在某種程度上推動(dòng)了服務(wù)業(yè)的外國(guó)直接投資的部分開(kāi)放。</p><p>　　利用外商直接投資的正式的國(guó)際協(xié)議和服務(wù)貿(mào)易范圍比在國(guó)際貿(mào)易的貨物少得多，雖然不同的全球貿(mào)易談判和區(qū)域自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定經(jīng)常會(huì)涉及國(guó)際投資服務(wù)的一些方面，特別是在服務(wù)貿(mào)易總協(xié)定（GATS）對(duì)商業(yè)存在的規(guī)定。在某種程度上外國(guó)直接投資在服務(wù)業(yè)的開(kāi)放已單向的初步發(fā)生。</p><p>　　服務(wù)業(yè)外國(guó)直接投資迅速增加，提高有關(guān)政策

48、的辯論中的利害關(guān)系。2005年，服務(wù)構(gòu)成了大部分的外來(lái)直接投資股票，與1990年比較發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家?guī)缀跤腥种拇蠓壬仙l(fā)展國(guó)家大約有百分之五十(表 1)。在服務(wù)業(yè)，金融，貿(mào)易和商業(yè)服務(wù)構(gòu)成三大類(lèi)別，但交通，通訊和電力也迅速增加。應(yīng)當(dāng)指出，在外國(guó)直接投資總額中服務(wù)所占的份額仍然低于世界GDP的服務(wù)份額，部分反映了外國(guó)直接投資在服務(wù)業(yè)仍然相對(duì)有限的事實(shí)。如下證據(jù)表明限制條件減少了外國(guó)直接投資。</p><p>　　

49、盡管?chē)@服務(wù)業(yè)外商直接投資的爭(zhēng)論日益突出，很少有系統(tǒng)的資料可用于服務(wù)業(yè)外國(guó)直接投資政策。不像國(guó)際貿(mào)易的關(guān)稅和非關(guān)稅貿(mào)易壁壘在國(guó)際上比較廣泛的使用，很少有過(guò)量化和比較系統(tǒng)地研究對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的國(guó)家政策。然而，對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的政策指標(biāo)的立場(chǎng)是與貿(mào)易壁壘措施一樣重要的，考慮到圍繞外國(guó)直接投資在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)和外國(guó)直接投資政策的突出辯論。政策制定者和研究者都從這里展示的指標(biāo)受益。有關(guān)外國(guó)直接投資在任何國(guó)際談判的第一步是改進(jìn)對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的政策信息。頗

50、具影響力的外國(guó)直接投資的知識(shí)資本的模型表明，外國(guó)直接投資的限制條件是經(jīng)驗(yàn)性分析中需列入的一個(gè)重要變量。外商直接投資的計(jì)量測(cè)試中，研究人員有時(shí)會(huì)采取對(duì)投資者的民意調(diào)查，而不是客觀的測(cè)量對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的開(kāi)放性，但是這些主觀測(cè)試的可靠性值得商榷。</p><p>　　通過(guò)投資者和國(guó)家報(bào)告（如經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家情報(bào)組的報(bào)告和我國(guó)商業(yè)指南），對(duì)各經(jīng)濟(jì)體的外國(guó)直接投資環(huán)境案例研究進(jìn)行了調(diào)查，但這些涵蓋了各種各樣的問(wèn)題，不容易比較。&l

51、t;/p><p>　　鑒于分類(lèi)和排序各種限制的困難，一些研究（如Hoekman，1995）受限于計(jì)數(shù)數(shù)量的限制。Kobrin (2005) 使用年度的聯(lián)合國(guó)貿(mào)易和發(fā)展會(huì)議報(bào)告的國(guó)家政策變化顯示，自由化措施，極大地超過(guò)在1992-2001年期間增加的限制。但是，貿(mào)發(fā)會(huì)議的數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)沒(méi)有提供有關(guān)的限制級(jí)別的信息，只有不同年份的數(shù)量和性質(zhì)的變化。</p><p>　　對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的限制（Hoekman

52、，1995;太平洋經(jīng)濟(jì)合作理事會(huì)，1995年）的研究報(bào)告,利用世貿(mào)組織的服務(wù)貿(mào)易總協(xié)定的承諾，將源模式3（商業(yè)存在）作為其原始數(shù)據(jù)，服務(wù)貿(mào)易總協(xié)定作出的承諾是“積極的”清單的形式，也就是說(shuō)，它們代表官方承諾開(kāi)放市場(chǎng)。這是相對(duì)于“負(fù)面的”例外的自由化清單。服務(wù)貿(mào)易總協(xié)定列出積極的清單的問(wèn)題是一些部門(mén)的積極承諾，并不一定意味著沒(méi)有限制。一個(gè)國(guó)家可能干脆選擇不列出時(shí)間表，保留本部門(mén)政策的靈活性?；蛘撸绻摬块T(mén)限制，服務(wù)貿(mào)易總協(xié)定可能會(huì)對(duì)該限

53、制的性質(zhì)保持沉默。此外，目前2000年左右的服務(wù)貿(mào)易總協(xié)定的時(shí)間表，可能無(wú)法充分反映國(guó)家最近的變化。此外，澳大利亞生產(chǎn)力委員會(huì)及其所屬的研究人員開(kāi)展了一系列阻礙服務(wù)貿(mào)易的部門(mén)研究，電信業(yè)(Warren, 2001)，銀行業(yè)(McGuire and Schuele, 2001)，海運(yùn)(McGuire et al., 2001)，配送(Kalirajan, 2000)和專(zhuān)業(yè)服務(wù)(Nguyen-Hong, 2000)。這些研究側(cè)重于所有提供服

54、務(wù)的模式，而不是外國(guó)直接投資本身，然而，其中許多主要依賴(lài)于服務(wù)貿(mào)易總協(xié)定與上面提到的</p><p>　　美國(guó)傳統(tǒng)基金會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)自由度指數(shù)（國(guó)際盛事基金）將國(guó)家的外國(guó)直接投資的開(kāi)放性的規(guī)模評(píng)為1至5。國(guó)際盛事基金的方法在他們的網(wǎng)站沒(méi)有明確闡述，涵蓋了外國(guó)直接投資更廣的面，如外匯兌換和存取的仲裁的不同較窄的集中在國(guó)內(nèi)外投資者之間的歧視這里。世界競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力報(bào)告還對(duì)他們國(guó)家的外國(guó)直接投資的開(kāi)放性排名。但是這些報(bào)告并非基于一個(gè)透

55、明和可核查的方法，對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資開(kāi)放性沒(méi)有明確的界定。</p><p>　　Hardin和Holmes (1997, 2002) 提供全面的方法來(lái)解除外國(guó)直接投資流入的障礙，但只涉及有限的幾個(gè)國(guó)家。Golub (2003)，Koyama 和Golub (2006)采用Hardin和Holmes對(duì)外商直接投資流入發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家的各種樣品的限制的研究的一種做法。本文從這三個(gè)研究結(jié)果進(jìn)行擴(kuò)展和綜合處理。</

56、p><p>　　當(dāng)前的研究有許多限制。首先，對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的政策是多樣和復(fù)雜的，因此不容易量化，即使它們是已知的。其次，這些政策信息是不容易獲得，必須尋求各種各樣的來(lái)源，有時(shí)提供相互矛盾的或不完全的信息。第三，政策不是一成不變的，相反，政府經(jīng)常改變政策。第四，這里的重點(diǎn)是在外國(guó)和國(guó)內(nèi)投資者的政策，即偏離“國(guó)民待遇'”。勞動(dòng)力和產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)和其他政策條例同樣適用于外國(guó)和國(guó)內(nèi)投資者在這里不予考慮，除了政府壟斷者以外。

57、例如，國(guó)內(nèi)含量要求，價(jià)格上限，審慎監(jiān)管和其他進(jìn)入障礙得不到解決。第五，本研究?jī)H限于公開(kāi)限制的外國(guó)直接投資，幾乎忽略任何非正式的私人或政府努力傾斜外國(guó)公司競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境使有利于國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)。第六，執(zhí)法的廣度和程度可能并不總是很容易從法律的說(shuō)明推斷出來(lái)。第七，這個(gè)研究并沒(méi)有考慮對(duì)外國(guó)投資者正面的歧視，諸如減稅。</p><p>　　本文的其余部分組織如下。第2節(jié)說(shuō)明了外國(guó)直接投資的限制的計(jì)算方法，第3節(jié)顯示了所有國(guó)家的結(jié)果，第