外文翻譯--經(jīng)濟增加值---普通透視

1、<p><b>　　原文二：</b></p><p>　　Economic Value Added - A General Perspective</p><p>　　This paper explains the concept of Economic Value Added (EVA) that is gaining popularity in Indi

2、a. The paper examines whether EVA is a superior performance measure both for corporate reporting and for internal governance. It relied on empirical studies in U.S.A. and other advance economies. It concluded that though

3、 EVA does not provide additional information to investors, it can be adapted as a corporate philosophy for motivating and educating employees to differentiate between value creating an</p><p>　　ECONOMIC VALU

4、E ADDED – the concept</p><p>　　EVA is the most misunderstood term among the practitioners of corporate finance. The proponents of EVA are presenting it as the wonder drug of the millennium in overcoming all

5、corporate ills at one stroke and ultimately help in increasing the wealth of the shareholder, which is synonymous with the maximization of the firm value. The attractiveness of the EVA lies in its use of cash flow and co

6、st of capital that are determinant of the value of the firm.</p><p>　　In the process, EVA is being bandied about with utmost impunity by all and sundry, which includes the popular press. The academic world i

7、n its turn has come up with various empirical studies which either supports the superiority of EVA or questions the claim of its proponents. Currently the empirical evidence is split almost half way.</p><p>

8、　　EVA is nothing but a new version of the age-old residual income concept recognized by economists since the 1770's. Both EVA and ‘residual income’ concepts are based on the principle that a firm creates wealth for i

9、ts owners only if it generates surplus over the cost of the total invested capital. So what is new? Perhaps EVA could bring back the lost focus on ‘economic surplus’ from the current emphasis on accounting profit. In a l

10、ighter vein it can be said that in an era where commercial sponsor</p><p>　　Technically speaking EVA is nothing but the residual income after factoring the cost of capital into net operating profit after tax

11、. But this is only the tip of the iceberg as will be seen in the next few sections. The paper examines EVA both as a measure of overall performance and a management philosophy that helps to improve the productivity of re

12、sources.</p><p>　　EVA= (ROI- WACC) x CAPITAL EMPLOYED</p><p>　　Capital being used in EVA calculation is not the book capital, capital is defined as an approximation of the economic book value of

13、 all cash invested in going-concern business activities, capital is essentially a company’s net assets (total assets less non-interest-bearing current liabilities), but with three adjustments: </p><p>　　Mark

14、etable securities and construction in progress are subtracted.</p><p>　　The present value of non capitalized leases is added to net property, plant, and equipment.</p><p>　　Certain equity equiva

15、lent reserves are added to assets:</p><p>　　Bad debt reserve is added to receivables.</p><p>　　LIFO reserve is added to inventories.</p><p>　　The cumulative amortization of goodwill

16、 is added back to goodwill.</p><p>　　R&D expense is capitalized as a long-term asset and smoothly depreciated over 5 years (a period chosen to approximate the economic life typical of an investment in R&

17、amp;D).</p><p>　　Cumulative unusual losses (gains) after taxes are considered to be a long-term investment.</p><p>　　A firm can motivate its managers to direct their effort towards maximizing th

18、e value of the firm only by, first measuring the firm value correctly and secondly by providing incentives to managers to create value. Both are interdependent and they complement each other. Therefore this paper examine

19、s the EVA concept from two perspectives, EVA as a performance measure and EVA as a corporate philosophy.</p><p>　　We shall examine EVA as a performance measure to assess whether it conveys any additional inf

20、ormation to investors over conventional performance measures. In other words, whether information on EVA leads to better decision by investors.</p><p>　　Examining EVA as a corporate philosophy we intend to l

21、ook at the efficacy of EVA when implemented at every level of managerial decision making process to encourage managers to deploy resources only on value enhancing activities and to align the interests of shareholders wit

22、h managers. This involves two things, one is linking managerial compensation package with EVA and second is to inculcate the culture of evaluating every action from the viewpoint that it should generate EVA. The ultimate

23、 outco</p><p>　　However with EVA culture, the firm as a whole focuses on the economic surplus and that definitely improves value enhancement process. Of course, this can be achieved even by implementing the

24、other practices but the simplicity of EVA in communicating the very fundamental principle, that generation of surplus over cost of capital can only enhance the firm value, makes it a management technique superior to othe

25、r planning and control techniques. We shall examine the appropriateness of this perceptio</p><p>　　EVA AS A PERFORMANCE MEASURE </p><p>　　Proponents of EVA argue that EVA is a superior measure a

26、s compared to other performance measures on four counts:</p><p>　　1. it is nearer to the real cash flows of the business entity;</p><p>　　2. it is easy to calculate and understand;</p>&l

27、t;p>　　3. it has a higher correlation to the market value of the firm and</p><p>　　4. its application to employee compensation leads to the alignment of managerial interests with those of the shareholders,

28、 thus minimizing the supposedly dysfunctional behavior of the management.</p><p>　　The last two merits can be considered as a reflection of the first two. If EVA truly represents the real cash flows of a bus

29、iness entity and it is easy to calculate and understand, then it automatically follows that it should be closely related to the market valuation and it should minimize the dysfunctional behavior of the management when us

30、ed as an incentive measure. In other words, close relation to market valuation and convergence of managerial interests with shareholders interests is a vind</p><p>　　EVA as a performance measure looks into t

31、he efficacy of EVA both as an absolute measure in comparison with net income, residual income and similar measures as well as a ratio in relation with performance measures like ROE, ROA and Operating Profit Margin, which

32、 are commonly used by both managers and equity analysts alike. These measures are normally used internally by the management to evaluate employee performance, incentive calculation and investment decisions and externally

33、 by equity analysts</p><p>　　EVA a superior performance measure? </p><p>　　First let us look into the claim of EVA being superior than the conventional measures such as ROI, ROE and ROA, which a

34、re based on the accounting figures. Most of these measures give us the rate of return earned by the firm with respect to capital invested in the firm. The most important limitation of these measures are derived from limi

35、tations inherent in the measurement of accounting profit. As per current accounting practices, while historical-cost-based accounting measures are being used to </p><p>　　The other important limitation of ac

36、counting measures is that they ignore the cost of equity and only consider the borrowing cost. As a result it ignores the risk inherent in the project and fails to highlight whether the return is commensurate with the ri

37、sk of the underlying assets. This might result in selecting projects that produce attractive rate of return but destroys firm value because their cost of capital is higher than the benchmark return established by the man

38、agement. On the other ha</p><p>　　EVA proponents claim that because of these imperfections, the accounting based measures are not good proxies for value creation. Managerial compensation based on these measu

39、res does not encourage value enhancement actions by managers. Value enhancement and earnings are two different things and might be at cross-purposes because short-term performance might be improved at the cost of long te

40、rm health of the firm. Activities involving enhancement of current earnings may be short term in nature, wh</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　The concept of EVA is based on the sound economic princip

41、le that firm value increases only if it is able to generate surplus over its cost of capital and therefore it is based on strong theoretical foundation. However its calculation involves significant subjectivity and this

42、reduces its informative value. Moreover it fails to provide better signals to the capital market as compared to conventional accounting measures like ROI, however hard selling of EVA has contributed positively in highlig

43、hti</p><p>　　Source: Asish K Bhattacharyya & B.V.Phani,2004. “Economic value added – a general perspective”. Working Paper Series.pp.1-20.</p><p><b>　　譯文二：</b></p><p&g

44、t;　　經(jīng)濟增加值---普通透視</p><p>　　本文解釋了在印度日漸流行的經(jīng)濟增加值（EVA）這個概念?？疾霦VA是否能作為一種衡量企業(yè)運營的內(nèi)在機制的標準。它依賴于在美國和其他先進經(jīng)濟體的實證研究。其結(jié)論是，雖然EVA不能向投資者提供更多的信息，但是它可以作為激勵制度和教育員工區(qū)分價值創(chuàng)造與價值毀滅活動的企業(yè)理念來發(fā)揮作用，促使管理人員進行有利于實現(xiàn)股東價值最大化的行動。提出了要注意報告EVA的危險趨勢，

45、此趨勢可能會誤導(dǎo)投資者。</p><p>　　經(jīng)濟增加值 - 概念</p><p>　　EVA是一個容易被企業(yè)的財務(wù)人員誤解的概念。EVA的提出者為克服企業(yè)弊病而引入這個概念，它最終能增加股東的財富，使之可成為公司價值最大化的代名詞。EVA的吸引力在于其考慮了現(xiàn)金流和資本成本，它們是公司價值的決定因素。</p><p>　　在這個過程中，包括大眾媒體都在不停地談?wù)揈

46、VA的優(yōu)勢和缺陷。在學(xué)術(shù)界，研究者通過實證研究提出了EVA的優(yōu)點和其在運用中存在的問題。</p><p>　　EVA起源于剩余收益或經(jīng)濟利潤的思想，并不是新概念。公司為其所有者創(chuàng)造財富，只有當(dāng)盈余超過總投資的資本成本時才會產(chǎn)生剩余收益。那么，什么是新的？EVA創(chuàng)造性地給出了模型方法。EVA方法是斯特恩斯圖爾特財務(wù)顧問公司首先提出的，經(jīng)其這20年來的大力推廣，現(xiàn)已成為美國資本市場和企業(yè)富有競爭力的資本運作績效評價指

47、標。</p><p>　　從技術(shù)上說，EVA是在稅后凈營業(yè)利潤基礎(chǔ)上考慮資本成本后的剩余收入。但是，這僅僅是看到了它冰山的一角，在接下來的幾節(jié)，論述了EVA作為衡量整體性能和管理理念的工具，有助于提高資源生產(chǎn)率。</p><p>　　EVA中的資本不是指賬面資本，它所指的資本是近似在持續(xù)經(jīng)營業(yè)務(wù)活動中投資的所有現(xiàn)金的賬面價值，資本本質(zhì)上是一個公司的凈資產(chǎn)（總資產(chǎn)減去非息流動負債總額），但有

48、幾個調(diào)整事項：</p><p>　　減去有價證券和在建工程；</p><p>　　凈資產(chǎn)的廠房及設(shè)備項目中添加非資本化租賃的現(xiàn)值；</p><p>　　若干股本儲量相當(dāng)于增加資產(chǎn)：</p><p>　　應(yīng)收款項中加回壞賬準備金；</p><p><b>　　后進先出儲備存貨；</b></p&

49、gt;<p>　　商譽累計攤銷加回商譽；</p><p>　　研發(fā)費用的資本化，將受益期超過一個會計期間的費用重新資本化，并按一定的受益期限攤銷，一般將其定位5年（或選擇在經(jīng)濟生活中的一個近似產(chǎn)品的研發(fā)費用攤銷期間）。</p><p>　　企業(yè)可以通過激勵管理層，從而實現(xiàn)公司價值的最大化。首先要正確地衡量企業(yè)價值，其次要制定管理層薪酬激勵機制、鼓勵其創(chuàng)造價值。兩者是相互依存的

50、，它們相輔相成。因此，本文從兩個方面探討了EVA的概念，EVA作為績效指標和EVA作為企業(yè)理念。我們將研究，EVA作為績效指標，評估它是否能比傳統(tǒng)指標更有效地向投資者傳達信息。換句話說，基于EVA的信息是否能讓投資者更好的做出決策。EVA的考核作為企業(yè)理念，我們打算將其實施到各個層次的管理決策進程中，以鼓勵管理人員進行價值提升活動，當(dāng)股東與管理層的利益一致時，體現(xiàn)EVA的有效性。這涉及到兩個方面，一個是管理人員薪酬與EVA掛鉤，二是評估

51、每天從實際行動中產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟增加值。最終的結(jié)果應(yīng)該是公司在資本市場的價值提升。當(dāng)EVA作為一種管理理念時，其結(jié)果是提高生產(chǎn)力，重點關(guān)注于資本回報率和資金成本。然而，作為預(yù)期經(jīng)營期間很長的公司，以激勵短期市場的長期性能夠提高EVA的補償，但不會使公司價值最大化。</p><p>　　然而，隨著EVA的發(fā)展，公司專注的重點是經(jīng)濟剩余，提高價值增值。當(dāng)然，要做到這一點可以通過其他措施，但EVA在溝通聯(lián)系上的基本原則非常簡

52、單，即超過資金成本的盈余能提升公司價值，使其成為一個優(yōu)于其他評價指標和控制技術(shù)的管理技術(shù)。我們將研究這種看法的適當(dāng)性。</p><p><b>　　EVA的績效評價</b></p><p>　　EVA的支持者認為，EVA相比其他評價指標更具優(yōu)越性：</p><p>　　1. 它更接近企業(yè)真實的現(xiàn)金流量。</p><p>

53、　　2. 它更易于計算和理解。</p><p>　　3. 它與該公司的市場價值具有較高的相關(guān)性。</p><p>　　4. 其在雇員補償中的應(yīng)用使得管理層利益與股東利益趨于一致，從而最大限度地減少不正常的管理行為。</p><p>　　最后的兩個優(yōu)點被視為前兩者的反射。EVA真正代表了業(yè)務(wù)實體的現(xiàn)金流量，并易于計算和理解，它與市場估值密切相關(guān)，并作為一種激勵措施盡量

54、減少不正常的管理行為。換句話說，EVA為優(yōu)秀績效指標的證據(jù)，是EVA能將管理層的利益與股東的利益統(tǒng)一起來，減少他們之間的沖突。</p><p>　　EVA作為一個業(yè)績衡量標準，其有效性與其他衡量指標不同。管理人員和股票分析師常用的指標有純收入、剩余收入、凈資產(chǎn)收益率、資產(chǎn)收益率及經(jīng)營利潤率。這些衡量指標通常用于內(nèi)部員工的績效評價、獎金計算和投資決策，外部的證券分析師用以確定公司的業(yè)績和成長性。進行投資決策的管理人

55、員將這些凈現(xiàn)值（NPV），內(nèi)部收益率，投資回收期和回報率的估值模型運用于內(nèi)部和外部。前者是考慮過去和現(xiàn)在的表現(xiàn)來對未來業(yè)績進行預(yù)測，而后者更具前瞻性的將貼現(xiàn)的預(yù)計未來現(xiàn)金流與一個給定的投資金額相比較以確定其可行性。</p><p>　　EVA是一種性能優(yōu)越的衡量指標？</p><p>　　首先，讓我們來看看EVA對比與傳統(tǒng)的投資回報率、凈資產(chǎn)收益率和資產(chǎn)收益率等這些會計指標。使用這些指標的

56、最重大的弊端是會計利潤測量中存在的固有局限性。按照現(xiàn)行的會計慣例，資產(chǎn)負債表中的資產(chǎn)核算使用歷史成本法，收入和支出（不包括折舊）在損益賬戶中確認。因此，會計回報率不能反映真實的投資報酬，其評價結(jié)果往往會有些許的偏頗。失真的情況基本上是由于大多數(shù)企業(yè)用歷史成本法計算他們的資產(chǎn)和使用直線折舊法計提折舊（ESA Malkelainen，1998）。但并不是指在任何時間點的資產(chǎn)組合，如果資產(chǎn)組合的價值接近重置資產(chǎn)價值，那么這種計量失真不會太大。

57、在大多數(shù)情況下，無論是資產(chǎn)是舊的或相對較新的，在任何時間點一個企業(yè)擁有這樣的資產(chǎn)組合的概率是極小的。這就排除了這些會計核算辦法對公司的真實表現(xiàn)會得出任何有意義的結(jié)論。</p><p>　　其他重要的會計核算辦法的弊端是他們忽視了股權(quán)成本，只考慮借貸成本。因此，它忽略了項目所固有的風(fēng)險和回報率是否是與相關(guān)資產(chǎn)的風(fēng)險相匹配。這可能會導(dǎo)致決策者選擇更有吸引力的回報率的項目，但其是不利于增加公司價值的，因為他們的資金成本

58、高于基準收益率。另一方面決策者根據(jù)會計核算辦法選擇項目，以回報率為決策依據(jù)，而忽略該項目的資本成本可能比回報率高。選擇的項目提供的回報率高于最低回報率（資本成本）時股東的財富才會增加。因此，使用的凈資產(chǎn)收益率、資產(chǎn)報酬率或類似的會計指標作為評價決策指標，會導(dǎo)致項目的收益大于零但當(dāng)所得的利潤不足以補償權(quán)益成本時企業(yè)不但未給公司帶來價值，反而毀滅了股東價值。繼續(xù)使用這些指標做決策評價會使回報率低于基準收益率，使企業(yè)價值下降。</p&g

59、t;<p>　　EVA的支持者表示，因為以上缺陷，基于會計基礎(chǔ)的指標不能創(chuàng)造價值。提升企業(yè)價值和賺取利潤是兩個不同的概念，甚至可能是相互矛盾的，因為短期的業(yè)績表現(xiàn)可能會提高公司的長期健康發(fā)展的成本。管理層改善目前的盈利可能是短期性的，而任何價值提升的活動應(yīng)著眼于公司的長期福祉。避免使用全權(quán)成本來提高目前的業(yè)績，同時避免破壞公司價值。（Damodaran 1998, David Young 1999）。</p>

60、<p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　EVA的概念是基于良好的經(jīng)濟原則，即僅當(dāng)企業(yè)能夠產(chǎn)生超過其資本成本的盈余時才會使企業(yè)價值增加，因此它是建立在深厚的理論基礎(chǔ)之上的。然而，它的計算存在重大的主觀性，這降低了其信息價值。此外，它不能提供比傳統(tǒng)會計指標如投資回報率更合理的決策信息。印度的公司正在使用EVA作為衡量業(yè)績指標來提高生產(chǎn)力，這將導(dǎo)致股東財富增加。但是，隨意