[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]外文翻譯--公司所有權(quán)、治理與避稅--互動(dòng)效應(yīng)（英文）

1、 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 164 ( 2014 ) 150 – 160 Available online at www.sciencedirect.com1877-0428 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC

2、BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the School of Accountancy, College of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia. doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.11.063 Sci

3、enceDirectInternational Conference on Accounting Studies 2014, ICAS 2014, 18-19 August 2014, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Corporate ownership, governance and tax avoidance: An interactive effects Hairul Azlan Annuar, Ibrahim

4、 Aramide Salihu*, Siti Normala Sheikh Obid Department of Accounting, International Islamic University Malaysia 50728 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Abstract Although tax avoidance practices are as old as taxes themselves, the wa

5、ys they are being perpetrated among corporate taxpayers have transmuted so sophisticated in recent times. This study thus proposes models for empirical investigations into the relationship between corporate ownership s

6、tructure and corporate tax avoidance in Malaysia. It was argued, based on cost/benefits consideration of tax avoidance, that family; foreign and government ownerships could be associated with corporate tax avoidance am

7、ong Malaysian listed companies. The study further proposes that strong governance mechanism could mitigate such association. Two econometrics dynamic panel data models are proposed for the investigation. Generalized Me

8、thod Moment (GMM) estimator is recommended as the estimation method. © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Peer-review under responsibility of the School of Accountancy, College of Business, Universiti Ut

9、ara Malaysia. Keywords: Corporate tax avoidance; ownership structure; corporate governance; developing economies; generalized method moment (GMM) 1. Introduction The issues of tax avoidance have been problems since the i

10、nception of tax legislations and are prevalent in every society where taxes are levied (Andreoni, Erard Uadiale, Fagbemi Verboon E-mail address: solihu2000@yahoo.com © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier L

11、td. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the School of Accountancy, College of Business, Universiti Utara

12、Malaysia.152 Hairul Azlan Annuar et al. / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 164 ( 2014 ) 150 – 160 were family-owned and a proportion of 28.3% of market capitalization is in the hand only 15 families. A

13、lso, Government Linked-Companies (GLCs) have an approximated 36% of the Bursa Malaysia market capitalization with 54% composite index (Khazanah, 2012). The country also witnessed an increase of 30% in the amount of fo

14、reign direct investments (FDIs) from $9.1 billion in 2010 to $11.9 billion in 2011 (MIDA, 2012). A preliminary investigation into the ownership structure of the top hundred companies listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2011furt

15、her revealed that 29% of the companies have both government and family ownerships and 19% have both government and foreign ownerships. The remaining parts of the paper are organised as follows: section 2.0 provides the

16、 literature review and thus covers issues like the benefits and costs of tax avoidance; corporate ownership and corporate tax avoidance; and corporate governance. Section 3.0 gives the proposed empirical method of the

17、paper which the sample source of data; modals specification and variables measurements; and the proposed estimation method. Section 4.0 presents the conclusion of the paper. 2. Literature review The fact that taxes are

18、 deductions from the cash flows available to a firm, and hence the dividends distributable to the shareholders, suggests that firm owners would strive to maximize their wealth through various tax avoidance practices. H

19、owever, such benefit of increased cash flows from tax avoidance practices is accomplished with certain non-tax costs. This demands the costs/benefits consideration of such practices and the choice of tax avoidance if t

20、he benefits outweigh the associated costs. Thus, the benefits and the associated costs with corporate tax avoidance are discussed here. Prior to this discussion, little insights are provided on the meaning and measures

21、of corporate tax avoidance to give proper ground for the discussion. 2.1 Meaning and measures of corporate tax avoidance The term corporate tax avoidance lacks universal definition as it might connote “different thing t

22、o different people” (Hanlon Salihu 2014). Here, we define corporate tax avoidance as a reduction in the explicit corporate tax liabilities. This definition is in line with Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) that describe tax

23、 avoidance “as a continuum of tax planning strategies where something like municipal bond investments are at one end (lower explicit tax, perfectly legal), then terms such as ‘noncompliance’, ‘evasion’, ‘a(chǎn)ggressiveness

24、’, and ‘sheltering’ would be closer to the other end of the continuum” (p. 137). Thus, the terms such as tax management; tax planning; tax sheltering; and tax aggressiveness are interchangeably used with tax avoidance

25、in the literature (see for instance: Chen et al. 2010; Lanis 2012; Minnick Tang residual book-tax gap and tax-effect book-tax gap. The second group has to do with those constructs that measure the proportional amount

26、 of taxes to business income. These include effective tax rates (this comes in several variants like accounting ETR; current ETR; cash ETR; long-run cash ETR; ETR differential; ratio of income tax expense to operating

27、cash flow; and ratio of cash taxes paid to operating cash flow). The third group involves other measures such as discretionary permanent differences (PERMIDIFF)/DTAX; unrecognized tax benefits (UTB); and tax shelter es