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1、ExecutiveCompensationBusinessPolicyChoicesatU.S.CommercialBanks1.IntroductionAsthefinancialcrisisof20082009unfoldedasgovernmentexpenditurestostabilizelargefinancialinstitutionsmountedpoliticianspolicymakersintheU.S.tooka

2、ctionstolimitthecompensationofexecutivesatthefirmsthatreceivedtaxpayersuppt.InMarch2009additionalcapitalinjectionsfromtheTroubledAssetReliefProgram(TARP)weremadecontingentonexecutivepaylimits.AlsoinMarchPresidentObamains

3、tructedtheTreasuryDepartmentto“pursueeverylegalavenue“toblockbonusesduetoexecutivesotherfinancialprofessionalsatAIG.2.ExecutiveCompensationAsmallbutgrowingnumberofstudieshaveexaminedtherelationshipbetweenbankrisktakingba

4、nkCEOpayperfmancepayrisksensitivities.Aclearpatternhasyettodevelopinthisliterature.ChenSteinerWhyte(2006)findthatoptionbasedcompensationwaspositivelyrelatedtomarketbasedriskmeasuresatU.S.banksduringthe1990s.ChengHongSche

5、inkman(2010)findpositiveassociationsbetweenresidualpay(i.e.theptionoftotalcompensationnotattributabletofirmsize)oftopbankexecutivesmarketmeasuresofrisksuchassystematicriskreturnvolatilitytailreturnevenaftercontrollingfin

6、siderownership.MinnickUnalYang(2009)studyacquisitionsmadebyU.S.bankingcompaniesbetween19912005findthatmergersaremelikelytobevalueenhancingpostacquisitionoperatingperfmancemelikelytobestrongwhenCEOshavehighpayperfmancecom

7、pensation.FahlenbrachStulz(2010)findnosystematicrelationshipbetweenCEOstockoptioncompensationU.S.bankingcompanyperfmanceduringthefinancialcrisisin2008butdofindanegativecrosssectionalrelationshipbetweenperfmanceCEOstockgr

8、antcompensation.3.modelOurfmaleconometricmodelinghasfourdistinctbutrelatedobjectives.TheinitialobjectiveistoestablishstatisticallinksbetweentherisktakingincentivesfacingbankCEOsthelevelofriskthatthesebanksactuallytakeThe

9、secondobjectiveistoestablishstatisticalevidencelinkingvegadeltatoriskybusinesspolicies(noninterestincomecommerciallendingmtgagebackedsecurities)inotherwdsestablishingthechannelsthroughwhichCEOincentivesaretransfmedintoma

10、rketrisk.ThethirdobjectiveistorevealwhethertheinterplayamongCEOincentivesbusinesspoliciesmarketriskinthedatanotintertempalreactionswithingivenfirms.FexampleapositivecoefficientonlnVegatinequation(3)wouldindicatethatCEOco

11、mpensationcontractscontaininghigherthanaveragevegas(relativetootherbanks)alsotendtocontainhigherthanaveragedeltas.Theinterpretationoflaggedrighthsidevariablesissimilarthoughintertempal.ApositivecoefficientonSystematicRis

12、kt1inequation(3)wouldindicatethatboardsatbanksthatexhibithigherthanaveragesystematicrisk(relativetootherbanks)tendtorespondwithCEOcontractscontaininghigherthanaveragedeltasinthenextperiod.5.SummaryDiscussionConclusionsTh

13、ehugelossessufferedbylargeU.S.financialinstitutionsthatcreatedinvestedinriskymtgagebackedsecurities—theequallyhugegovernmentequityinjectionsdebtguaranteesliquiditycreationaimedatkeepingthesefirmsafloatfinancialmarketsfun

14、ctioning—haveraisedtheireoftaxpayersthosewhorepresentthem.Publicofficialshaverespondedwithavarietyofschemestolimitclawbackthepayofthefinancialexecutiveswho“gotusintothismess.”Althoughasubstantialptionofthegovernmentloans

15、capitalinjectionshavebeenpaidbackwhilethemostextremeexpostfactosanctionsonemployeepaybonusesmaynotwithstlegalscrutinysomeoftheproposedinterventionshavebecomepermanentfixtures(e.g.FederalReserveprincipleson“riskappropriat

16、e”payincentivesDoddFrank“sayonpay”rules).Asaresultthisepisodehasincreasedthelikelihoodofamepermanentrolefgovernmentinmonitingdeterminingexecutivepayinpubliclytradedcompanies.Wedrawfourbroadconclusionsfromthesefindings.Fi

17、rstbankingexecutiveswereawaretoatleastsomeextentoftherisksassociatedwiththeirinvestmentsinprivateissuemtgagebackedsecurities.OurresultslinkinghighvegaCEOstoprivateMBSinvestments—especiallyatthesmallerbanksinourdata—runco

18、ntrarytotheclaimthatbanksweremisledbyoveroptimisticratingsonMBS.SimilarlyourresultslinkinghighvegaCEOstononinterestincomesuggestthatlargebankexecutiveshadbecomesometimeduringour19942006sampleperiodwellawareoftheincreased

19、risksassociatedwithtransactionsbankingbusinessstrategies.Secondbankingexecutivesrespondineconomicallymeaningfulwaystotheincentivespresentintheircompensationcontracts.ExecutiveCompensationBusinessPolicyChoicesatU.S.Commer

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