自貿(mào)區(qū)外文翻譯--中國(guó)結(jié)構(gòu)性經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革上海自由貿(mào)易區(qū)的作用（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文7000漢字，4200英文單詞，2.3萬(wàn)英文字符</p><p>　　出處：Palmioli G, Heal A. Structural Economic Reform in China: The Role of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone[J]. Trade Insights, 2014.</p><p>　　Structural

2、Economic Reform in China:The Role of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone</p><p>　　GIOVANNI PALMIOLI* AND ADAM HEAL**</p><p>　　Highlights</p><p>　　This note reviews the emerging imbalances

3、 in the Chinese economy and the attendant need for structural reforms, including financial sector and services liberalization. The role that the recently launched Shanghai Free Trade Zone could play in accelerating these

4、 reforms is then considered, alongside an assessment of progress to date. Key findings:</p><p>　　China‘s dramatic economic growth has delivered impressive welfare gains. But the current growth model is now p

5、roducing severe structural imbalances in the economy putting future prospects at risk.</p><p>　　The Shanghai Free Trade Zone (SFTZ) was launched in September 2013 to provide a testing ground in which China‘s

6、 policymakers can experiment with economic reforms to be rolled out nationwide, paving the way for China‘s transition to a more efficient service- and consumption-driven economy.</p><p>　　The SFTZ will open

7、up many services sectors, including finance, to increased foreign investment. For the first time in China, a ?negative list‘ approach is being used: this specifies sectors in which foreign investment is prohibited or res

8、tricted—the default position being that it is otherwise allowed.</p><p>　　The SFTZ has also been seen as an important stepping stone towards the internationalization of the Renminbi (RMB).</p><p&g

9、t;　　The launch of the SFTZ generated considerable initial excitement among investors. However, despite the high level of attention given to the zone, so far commentators have been broadly disappointed and businesses repo

10、rt little change from the status quo.</p><p>　　The recent change of leadership in the SFTZ, as well as renewed commitments to reform from top leadership, indicate that new impetus may be attached to reforms

11、. Without bolder moves in this direction, the opportunity to pursue crucial economic adjustments via a timely managed process may be missed.</p><p>　　*Giovanni Palmioli is a Research Assistant in the Trade a

12、nd Investment Division, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (palmioli@un.org)</p><p>　　**Adam Heal is an Associate Economic Affairs Officer, Trade and Investment Divisio

13、n, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (heal@un.org)</p><p>　　Trade InsightsIssue No. 3</p><p>　　Introduction: the case for structural economic reform in Chi

14、na</p><p>　　China‘s remarkable economic performance over the last three decades has delivered impressive growth rates and lifted some 500 million citizens out of poverty over the past three decades (World Ba

15、nk, 2013). Despite the obvious successes of China‘s growth model, the Chinese government and outside observers share rising concerns that the economy is suffering from severe structural imbalances or vulnerabilities (IMF

16、, 2014). There is a risk that these problems, if not addressed, could reduce future g</p><p>　　Excessive investment: The share of investment in GDP rose from around 35% in 2000 to reach around 50% in 2013 (f

17、igure 1). This rate is notably higher than shares seen in other Asian economies, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, at similar stages of industrialization. Investment has been concentrated in infrastructure, real e

18、state, and export-oriented production capacity such as machinery and plants (The Economist, 2012). With rising total investment, rates of return have fallen and the ris</p><p>　　High levels of saving and low

19、 consumption rates: According to IMF data, urban household saving rates have risen from less than 20% in the mid-1990s to over 30% in 2011 (IMF, 2012). The rural household saving rate has risen over this period as well,

20、but to a lesser extent. These high savings rates are often attributed to the absence of a well-developed social safety net under which households are incentivized to undertake precautionary saving. The flipside of high-

21、savings and investment rates is</p><p>　　Figure 1. Composition of Chinese GDP (Expenditure Approach)</p><p>　　Source: CEIC Data</p><p>　　Trade InsightsIssue No. 3</p><p&

22、gt;　　Financial sector inefficiencies: A critical feature of the financial system has been the transfer of funds from savers to producers, namely large SOEs. This has been achieved through interest rate controls, state-co

23、ntrolled credit allocation, entry barriers and state ownership in the banking sector. China‘s financial sector is still overwhelmingly dominated by state-owned banks, five of which accounted for 44% of the banking indust

24、ry in terms of total assets in 2012. These banks have guaranteed </p><p>　　Export-dependence and currency undervaluation: China is the world‘s biggest trader and an integral part of global supply chains. The

25、 export sector is critical for employment and has been a major destination for investment, both foreign and domestic. However, export-dependence also makes China more vulnerable to external shocks. Export competitiveness

26、 has also been supported by low real wages and managing the value of the currency; while the RMB has been allowed to gradually appreciate over time </p><p>　　Low productivity and value-added in services: Whi

27、le China is dubbed the ?workshop of the world‘ because of its manufacturing prowess, the services sector is less developed. No doubt, China‘s services sector has been growing: in 1978 services accounted for about 23% of

28、China‘s GDP and 12% of China‘s labor force (ADB, 2011). By 2012 the former figure rose to 46% while the latter increased to around 37% (IMF, 2013). However, the sector‘s contribution to the domestic economy is lower than

29、 that of ot</p><p>　　Towards a new growth model: The role of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone</p><p>　　A strong consensus has emerged among Chinese policymakers that China‘s economic growth model is

30、 no longer sustainable and requires a structural transformation towards a service- oriented and consumption-driven economy (World Bank, 2013). Chinese policymakers are actively emphasizing the quality of economic growth

31、not just the quantity, and China‘s new President Xi Jinping has made the overhaul of the economy a top priority. During the Third Plenum in November 2013, the leaders of the Communist P</p><p>　　Trade Insigh

32、tsIssue No. 3</p><p>　　expected to play an important catalytic role in this transformation, especially in the areas of financial sector reform and RMB internationalization.</p><p>　　Overview of

33、 the SFTZ</p><p>　　On 29 September 2013 the Chinese government officially launched the China Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone (SFTZ). This was hailed as a significant step forward in China‘s process of economi

34、c liberalization, especially for financial services. The SFTZ is intended to follow earlier Free Trade Zones (?Special Economic Zones‘, henceforth ―FTZs‖) in China as a ?policy laboratory‘ in which experimentation with r

35、eforms can occur on a small scale before being rolled out to the wider economy.</p><p>　　Indeed, FTZs played a notable role at the vanguard of earlier rounds of economic reform and opening in China. Four Fre

36、e Trade Zones – three in Guangdong and one in Fujian province – were established during the first phase of the reform area, in 1980, in proximity to two strategic and dynamic export-oriented economies, namely Hong Kong,

37、China and Taiwan Province of China. These zones played a crucial role in China‘s economic opening to the rest of the world, especially in attracting foreign inves</p><p>　　In comparison with other earlier FT

38、Zs, the Shanghai FTZ is not intended to target export- oriented manufacturers but rather foreign investors in critical services industries. The financial measures introduced within the zone may have important implication

39、s for China‘s integration in international financial markets, especially the internationalization of the RMB. It is hoped to also transform government functions and bring trade and investment administration systems up to

40、 international standards.</p><p>　　Figure 2. Location of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone</p><p>　　Trade InsightsIssue No. 3</p><p>　　Opening to Services</p><p>　　China wi

41、ll not be able to transition to a more durable growth model without a strong, competitive services sector, including a well-functioning and developed financial sector. Not only are services an important driver of innovat

42、ion and higher-value added activities, but the availability of services (for instance logistics, marketing, design and communications) are essential inputs into higher-value added manufacturing.</p><p>　　For

43、eign investment in services can bring much needed expertise and enhance competition and innovation. At present though, China‘s services sectors are largely closed. For instance, the OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness In

44、dex which measures openness across sectors, shows China is considerably more closed than the average of the 40 countries surveyed (34 OECD countries plus Brazil, China, Russia, Indonesia, India, and South Africa). Restri

45、ctions on foreign entry account for the bulk of the restr</p><p>　　opening (Koch-Weser, 2014). In October 2013 China formally requested to join the Trade and Services Agreement (TISA) negotiations which ente

46、red their 6th round in February 2014. This is a plurilateral negotiation under the WTO to modernize and liberalize rules of services trade. However, China‘s commitment to this process is unclear.</p><p>　　Fi

47、gure 3. Services Trade Restrictiveness Index by sector and policy areas</p><p>　　A major focus of the SFTZ is further opening up of the services sector, especially in the following areas: financial services,

48、 shipping services, commercial services, professional services, cultural services, and social services (table 1).</p><p>　　One major innovation in the SFTZ is the adoption of a ―negative list‖ for liberaliza

49、tion (officially the ―Special Administrative Measures on the Entry of Foreign Investment into China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone‖). The list specifies in which sectors foreign investment is restricted and provides administ

50、rative guidelines and financial requirements (e.g. equity ratio,</p><p>　　Trade InsightsIssue No. 3</p><p>　　capital,businessscope)byinvestmentsector.Forsectorsincludedinthelist,

51、foreign investment will be subject to restrictions or prohibited. Any sector outside the list is now, in theory, fully open; foreign companies are now granted pre-establishment and are only required to go through an onli

52、ne record-filing procedure with the Shanghai PFTZ (Pilot Free Trade Zone) Administrative Commission in order to obtain a business license. The license can now be obtained within only four days with</p><p>　　

53、time-consuming administrative procedures. With the new system, all application materials will be submitted and handledbytheAuthorityforIndustryandCommerce(AIC).The approvalandfiling procedures are conducted t

54、hrough an inter-departmental circulation and all the various licenses and certificates (business license, enterprise code certificate, and tax registration certificate) will be issued altogether by AIC (China Briefing,

55、 March 2014).</p><p>　　Table 1: Summary of major reforms in selected service sectors</p><p>　　Trade InsightsIssue No. 3</p><p>　　Source: Ernst & Young (2013)</p><p&g

56、t;　　Companies outside the sectors on the list enjoy so-called Pre-Establishment National Treatment (PENT). This principle ensures that foreign companies receive the same treatment as their domestic counterparts do throug

57、hout the pre-establishment period of the business.</p><p>　　Further, in order to facilitate the administration of trade and investment, a simplified reporting procedure was introduced as of March 2014 whereb

58、y the companies in the zone need to issue an annual report as a public announcement instead of going through an annual inspection, which was previously the case. Companies are therefore required to provide certain inform

59、ation to an AIC online platform which will in turn make the information available to the public.</p><p>　　The previous ―Pre-Approval‖ requirement has therefore been leveled down to an ―Online Filing‖ and ―

60、After-Supervision‖ requirement. These measures were introduced to respond</p><p>　　tothe criticism that Beijing received for being excessively involved in the operations of private business

61、es, and to avoid time-consuming procedures that typically occurred under the previous Pre-Approval mechanism.</p><p>　　Financial Sector Reform and RMB Internationalization</p><p>　　To tackle fra

62、gilities in the financial system stemming from over-investment and related non- performing loans, as well as to promote more efficient use of capital, several reforms have been undertaken in recent years. These cover key

63、 areas such as interest rate liberalization, governance of state-owned banks, entry restrictions and controls for foreign investors. Despite this progress, the ―Chinese financial system remains repressed, unbalanced, cos

64、tly to maintain, and potentially unstable‖ (Wor</p><p>　　Similarly, with regards to internationalization, there have been some moves towards gradual capital account liberalization. Although most restrictions

65、 on FDI have been removed, portfolio investments have been relaxed only partially since 1994 and cross-border money transactions as well as financial derivatives are still under strict controls (Gallagher et al., 2014).

66、While ultimately capital account liberalization could improve the efficiency of the economy, it needs to be implemented in an appr</p><p>　　Trade InsightsIssue No. 3</p><p>　　Box 1: Progress to

67、wards Renminbi Internationalization</p><p>　　Internationalizing a currency generally means the encouragement of its use beyond the borders of the issuing country, not necessarily for transactions with the is

68、suing country‘s residents, but more importantly for transactions between non-residents outside the issuing country. In this regard the currency can be used as: (i) a store of value; (ii) a medium of exchange; and (iii) a

69、 unit of account (Kenen, 2009). At present the RMB is not fully internationalized and strict restrictions remain on bo</p><p>　　China could reap important benefits from the internationalization of the RMB. A

70、ccording to Deutsche Bank (2014), some of these would include:</p><p>　　lower financing and transaction costs for foreign companies operating in or buying from China thereby making it a more attractive busin

71、ess environment;</p><p>　　lower foreign exchange hedging costs for inward and outward investment;</p><p>　　greater ability for firms to hedge RMB exposure as the currency becomes more used in in

72、ternational trade; and</p><p>　　wideranddeeperuseoftheRMBfacilitatingcapitalaccount liberalizationand promoting integration in international financial markets.</p><p>　　RMB internat

73、ionalization alongside capital account opening also involves some costs and risks for financial stability to which policymakers are very sensitive. The ability of the central bank to influence domestic interest rates and

74、 money supply by open market operations would be more limited (CIFR, 2014). Further, greater international capital inflows or outflows could lead to greater volatility in the exchange rate with attendant consequences for

75、 asset prices and inflation (ADB, 2014).</p><p>　　To date, a number of important measures towards RMB gradual internationalization have been taken, with the launch of the SFTZ being another important milesto

76、ne. Some of such measures include:</p><p>　　Source: Deutsche Bank (2014) and ASIFMA (2014)</p><p>　　Trade InsightsIssue No. 3</p><p>　　The most transformative impacts of the SFTZ

77、are expected to be felt in the area of financial services reform. A number of major features of the zone include:</p><p>　　New trade accounts: Foreign companies and individuals working in the SFTZ are allowe

78、d to establish "free trade accounts" in the SFTZ. The accounts may be in RMB or foreign currencies and will be treated similarly to bank accounts outside China. The movement of funds between individual free tra

79、de accounts, and between these accounts, offshore accounts and non-resident bank accounts in China (but outside the FTZ), will not be subject to the existing restrictions on the movement of funds between Ch</p>&l

80、t;p>　　Currency exchange for investment and financing. Foreign investment projects will face simpler financial and foreign exchange regulations. The requirement for State Administration of Foreign Exchange registration

81、 for foreign exchange for FDI will be removed. Additionally, opportunities for Chinese individuals to buy foreign securities will be expanded and foreign individuals will have access to Chinese securities.</p><

82、;p>　　Cross border use of the RMB: Cross-border RMB settlement for current account items and direct investment will be expanded. Both domestic- and foreign-invested enterprises registered in the FTZ will be able to obt

83、ain RMB loans from overseas and to provide security and loans to overseas parties.</p><p>　　Cross-border direct investment transactions: Companies established in the FTZ can borrow offshore RMB of an amount

84、equal to their paid-in registered capital multiplied by a</p><p>　　―policy index‖ published by the Peoples Bank of China (Hogan Lovells, 2014).</p><p>　　Interest rate liberalization: Measures m

85、oving towards market-based interest rates will be introduced gradually. As a major step towards market-driven interest rates, the People‘s Bank of China announced to remove from June 27 the interest rate ceilings on fore

86、ign- currency deposits of less than US$ 3 million offered by banks across the whole city of Shanghai, an extension of a pilot scheme launched in March and confined to the SFTZ (Bloomberg, 2014).</p><p>　　Ass

87、essing the operation of the SFTZ: Progress to Date</p><p>　　The SFTZ generated considerable excitement in the business community upon its launch. Investors and experts have long awaited aggressive market-ori

88、ented measures by the Chinese government to restructure the economy and open up the financial sector to foreign investors. Initial figures confirmed the level of interest. By mid-February 2014, the zone attracted 434 for

89、eign-invested enterprises from 40 countries and its trade volume (imports and exports) accounted for 27% of Shanghai‘s total trade (W</p><p>　　Trade InsightsIssue No. 3</p><p>　　Table 2: The st

90、atus of reforms in the SFTZ</p><p>　　Source: Wall Street Journal (2014)</p><p>　　Despite the early rush of interest, there has been growing disillusionment with the SFTZ amongst the business com

91、munity (Financial Times, 2014a). For instance, interest rate liberalization and capital account opening have not yet been delivered (Financial Times, 2014b). Businesses operating in the zone have not reported substantial

92、 changes in operations, and despite the shift to the ?negative list‘ 139 sectors are still affected by restrictions. A lack of clarity on policy incentives (Reuters, 2</p><p>　　The Chinese leadership has als

93、o expressed frustration about the slow rate of progress and the de-facto head of the zone has been replaced (The Economist, 2014b). Responding to criticisms about the pace of change, some further steps have been taken to

94、 deepen the reform in the SFTZ. For instance:</p><p>　　In June 2014, the negative list was revised, reducing the number of restrictive measures to</p><p>　　139 from 190. The majority of the remo

95、vals and changes were in manufacturing, transportation, warehousing, and postal services, and to a lesser extent wholesale and retail. The new negative list, operating from July 1st 2014, includes 110 restrictive clauses

96、 and 29 prohibitive ones.</p><p>　　According to a circular released by China‘s State Council upon the zone‘s one year anniversary, more than 20 service sectors are expected to be opened to foreign investment

97、 in the near future. For example, further liberalization is expected in the shipping sector. According to the circular, for the first time foreign investors will be allowed to hold a 51% stake in joint-venture shipping a

98、gencies (South China Morning Post, 2014a).</p><p>　　Despite the cautious approach taken so far, the SFTZ model is likely to be extended to additional zones in different localities. In January 2014, Beijing g

99、ave preliminary approval for 12 new free trade zones. Zones are expected in Guangdong and Tianjin with the other locations still being determined (South China Morning Post, 2014b). It may take at least a year for any of