歷史學外文翻譯2

1、<p><b>　　中文6295字</b></p><p><b>　　畢業(yè)論文</b></p><p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　2010年5月</b></p><p>　題 目論抗戰(zhàn)時期國民黨的敵后游擊戰(zhàn)

2、</p><p>　學 生</p><p>　指導教師</p><p>　學 號</p><p>　年 級</p><p>　專 業(yè)歷史學</p><p>　系 別政史系</p><p>　　Deterioration I939-I945:

3、the Military</p><p>　　John K.Fairbank</p><p>　　After the fall of Wuhan and Canton in late October 1938, the character of the war and conditions in the Nationalist areas changed profoundly. The f

4、ighting progressively entered a stalemate. Especially after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Nationalist leaders anticipated that the Western Allies could defeat Japan without the necessity of furt

5、her Chinese sacrifices. After all, they had fought Japan alone for four and a half years already. They consequently devoted less atte</p><p>　　When the Nationalists did not capitulate following their defeat

6、at Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese leaders realized that they had misjudged the Chinese powers of resistance and that the imperial army would merely exhaust itself if it continued to pursue the elusive defenders into

7、 the hinterlands. They therefore adopted a new strategy, stressing political means to secure control of China. First, they would consolidate control of the areas overrun since July 1937. They now effectively controll<

8、/p><p>　　Second, the Japanese determined to wear down the Nationalists until they collapsed from ‘internal disintegration. They thus simultaneously tightened their economic blockade of the Nationalist areas and

9、 began a destructive air war. In the spring of 1939 they seized Nanchang in Kiangsi, cutting the important Chekiang-Hunan railway. In November they landed an amphibious force at Po-hai (Pakhoi) in western Kwangtung, and

10、advanced a hundred miles to take Nanning, the capital of Kwangsi. This was a da</p><p>　　The Japanese air raids struck indiscriminately at military and civilian targets. Their purpose was less to destroy mil

11、itary installations and factories than to demoralize the population. Virtually all cities in the Nationalist area, including Kweilin, Kunming and Sian, were hit. Chungking, however, suffered most severely. Bombed 268 tim

12、es during 1939—41, much of the city was gutted, and many thousands died (4,400 were killed in just the first two days of heavy raids in May 1939).</p><p>　　Yet neither the air raids nor the blockade broke th

13、e Chinese will to resist. Indeed, the perseverance of the Chungking population remained firm as long as the bombings continued, and wilted only after they ceased in late 1941. The blockade was less than a complete succes

14、s, in part because the Nationalists in July 1939 had legalized, and thereafter actively promoted, the trade in most goods from areas held by the Japanese. The Japanese were at a loss to stop this trade. They were incapab

15、le of gua</p><p>　　A momentous discussion by the Japanese cabinet in July 1940 also affected their operations in China. Perceiving that success in China would continue to elude them unless they obtained acce

16、ss to the rich natural resources of South-East Asia, and convinced that the Western powers were preoccupied with the war in Europe, the Japanese leaders agreed to broaden the scope of imperial expansion beyond the China

17、theatre. They hoped, although without conviction, that they could attain their goals in the </p><p>　　On the Chinese side, strategic and political considerations had persuaded the Nationalist leadership to w

18、age a war of attrition. Chiang Kai-shek claimed that the Japanese were spreading their resources of men and equipment too thin by advancing across the expanse of China.’ The longer our enemy struggles, the more he involv

19、es himself in difficulties; while the longer we struggle, the stronger and more determined we become. Chiang, like the Japanese, also wished to avoid decisive battles, because</p><p>　　The chief political pr

20、oblem that distracted the Nationalists’ attention from the Japanese was the growing friction with the Chinese Communists. After the New Fourth Army incident in January 1941 (seep. 665) the united front had virtually ceas

21、ed to exist. Influential Nationalist leaders —most notably the minister of war, Ho Ying-ch’in, and the party apparatchik, Ch’en Li-fu-at various times stridently advocated a final extermination campaign against the Commu

22、nists. Chiang Kai-shek resisted these </p><p>　　Although both Nationalists and Japanese after late 1938 were content to wage a war of attrition, fighting by no means abated completely. Occasionally the Japan

23、ese launched an offensive to attain limited objectives. In June 1940, for example, they seized the important Yangtze River port of I-ch’ang in order to staunch the flow of goods between the rice-bowl provinces of Central

24、 China and Chungking and to obtain an air base closer to the Nationalist area. In the summer of 1942, after General James</p><p>　　The Nationalist army during the latter half of the war numbered more than 35

25、00000 men. It was not, however, a united, national army, but a coalition of armies which differed in degrees of loyalty to the central government as well as in training, equipment, and military capabilities. At the heart

26、 of this heterogeneous assemblage was the ‘Central Army’ (Chung-yang-chun). In 1941, it comprised some thirty divisions (about 300000 men) out of a total of over 300 divisions in the entire Nationalist ar</p><

27、p>　　Most of the Nationalist forces, however, were direct descendants of warlord armies, commanded by men who had risen to prominence independently of the central government. Their loyalties were therefore conditional

28、and attenuated, and they were jealous and fearful of Chiang Kai-shek’s growing power. Lung Yun, governor of Yunnan, for example, resisted central government encroachments upon his provincial power, and provided a refuge

29、for intellectuals critical of the Chungking government. Governor Ye</p><p>　　The relationship between those non-Central Army commanders and the central government had been altered by the outbreak of war. Thr

30、oughout the Nanking decade, the power of provincial militarists had been waning. Crucial to Chiang’s growing power had been his control of a politically loyal and relatively proficient army. But the destruction of Chiang

31、’s best troops at Shanghai, including the bulk of his elite German-trained divisions, caused the military balance within the Nationalist forces to shi</p><p>　　Throughout the war, Chiang endeavoured to right

32、 the political and military balance between himself and the regional commanders by inserting KMT cadres into the provincial armies and by rebuilding his central forces with newly trained officers and modern equipment. Th

33、ese efforts excited the suspicions and animosity of the regional generals. They complained that the central government discriminated against them by sending their divisions into decimating combat with the Japanese while

34、Chiang held h</p><p>　　Domestic politics, in short, underlay Chiang’s conduct of the war, and he took advantage of it to enhance his central power. No modern state, of course - as Chiang’s supporters have ar

35、gued - could easily tolerate subversively independent attitudes among its military commanders. Yet the means that Chiang employed to enhance central government powers may not have been the most efficacious. In any event,

36、 the antipathies of the provincial militarists grew keener as the war progressed. In 1944, a coa</p><p>　　One of the deepest flaws in the Nationalist army, exacerbated during the war, was the poor quality of

37、 the officer corps. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, senior American officer in China after October 1944, characterized the Nationalist officers as ‘incapable, inept, untrained, petty…altogether inefficient. This was also ch

38、aracteristic of the non- Central Army senior commanders, most of whom had gained distinction and position as a result less of their military skills than of their shrewdness in fac</p><p>　　Some of the senior

39、 commanders, of course, transcended the system. Ch’en Ch’eng, Pai Ch’ung-hsi and Sun Li-jen, for example, stood above their peers as a result of their intelligence, incorruptibility and martial talents. Significantly, ho

40、wever, neither Pai Ch’ung-hsi nor Sun Li-jen were members of Chiang Kai-shek’s inner circle. Chiang used their talents but kept them on taut leash, because they were not Central Army men and displayed an untoward indepen

41、dence of mind. Ch’en Ch’eng, who was a tru</p><p>　　When the war began, lower-ranking officers were generally more competent than their superiors. Between 1929 and 1937, the Central Military Academy had annu

42、ally graduated an average of 3000 cadets, an about 2000 staff officers had received advanced training. The war however, cut deeply into the junior officer corps. Ten thousand of them had been killed in the fighting aroun

43、d Shanghai and Nanking at the very outset. These losses were never fully recouped, because officer training during the war de</p><p>　　That deterioration was most evident, however, at the lowest levels, amon

44、g the enlisted men. China’s wartime army was composed largely of conscripts. All males between eighteen and forty-five - with the exception of students, only sons, and hardship cases - were subject to the draft. Accordin

45、g to law, they were to be selected equitably by drawing lots. In fact, men with money or influence evaded the draft, while the poor and powerless of the nation were pressganged into the ranks. Frequently cons</p>

46、<p>　　Induction into military service was a horrible experience. Lacking vehicles for transport, the recruits often marched hundreds of miles to their assigned units - which were purposely remote from the recruits’

47、homes, in order to lessen the temptation to desert. Frequently the recruit were tied together with ropes around their necks. At night they might be stripped of their clothing to prevent them from sneaking way. For food t

48、hey received only small quantities of rice, since the conscripting offi</p><p>　　Conscripts who reached their units had survived what was probably the worst period of their military service. Yet their prospe

49、cts often remained bleak. In the Central Army units, food and clothing were generally adequate. But those so unfortunate as to be assigned to some of the provincial armies - such as those of Shensi and Kansu - were so mi

50、serable, John S. Service reported, ‘as to almost beggar description.</p><p>　　Shortage of food, not of weapons, was the paramount problem reducing the fighting efficiency of the Nationalist army. When Genera

51、l Wedemeyer first took up his duties as Chiang’s chief-of-staff in October 1944, he concerned himself primarily with problems of troop movements and disposition. Within a month, however, he realized that the soldiers wer

52、e too weak to march and were incapable of fighting effectively, largely because they were half-starved. According to army regulations, each soldier was</p><p>　　Primitive sanitary and medical practices simil

53、arly contributed to the enervation of the Nationalist army, and disease was therefore the soldiers’ constant companion. Malaria was the most widespread and debilitating affliction. Dysentery, the incidence of which great

54、ly increased during the war because of the deteriorating physical condition of the troops, was often ignored until cure was impossible. Then, able no longer even to eat, they soon died. Scabies, tropical skin ulcers, eye

55、 infections, t</p><p>　　During the fighting in the south-west in 1945, American observers found that the 13th Army was unable to hike even a short distance without men falling out wholesale and many dying fr

56、om utter Starvation. Another American officer, Colonel David D. Barrett, reported seeing Nationalist soldiers ‘topple over and die after marching less than a mile. A reporter for the highly regarded Ta-kung-pao (‘L’Impar

57、tial’) observed that’ where troops have passed, dead soldiers can be found by the roadside one af</p><p>　　There did exist an Army Medical Corps, but the medical treatment it provided was described by Dr Rob

58、ert Lim (Lin K’o-sheng), chairman of the Chinese Red Cross medical Relief Corps, as ‘pre-Nightingale. The formal structure of the medical corps—comprising first-aid teams, dressing stations, field hospitals and base hosp

59、itals—was unexceptionable, but it was undermined by inadequate and incompetent personnel, insufficient equipment and medicines, corruption and callousness.</p><p>　　There were only some 2000 reasonably quali

60、fied doctors serving in the entire army—a ratio at best of about one qualified doctor for every 1700 men, compared to about one doctor for every 150 men in the United States Army. An additional 28000 medical officers ser

61、ved in the corps, but most of these had received no formal training, and had simply been promoted from stretcher-bearers, to dressers, to ‘doctors’. The few really competent doctors tended to congregate in rear-area hosp

62、itals, out of reac</p><p>　　The Chinese soldier, ill fed, abused and scorned, inevitably lacked morale. This was indicated graphically by wholesale desertions. Most recruits, if they survived the march to th

63、eir assigned units, had few thoughts other than to escape. Many succeeded. The 18th Division of the 18th Army, for example, was regarded as one of the better units, yet during 1942, stationed in the rear and not engaged

64、in combat, 6000 of its 11,000 men disappeared due to death or desertion. Ambassador Gauss commented t</p><p>　　FROM:John K.Fairbank,The Cambridge History of China:Republican China,1912-1949[M],Cambridge: Cam

65、bridge University Press,1986.</p><p>　　1939—1945年的惡化：軍事</p><p><b>　　費正清</b></p><p>　　1938年10月下旬武漢和廣州失陷后，戰(zhàn)爭的特征和國民黨區(qū)域的狀況起了深刻的變化。戰(zhàn)事漸次進入一種僵持局面。尤其在1941年12月7日日本攻擊珍珠港后，國民黨領導人預料

66、西方盟國能夠打敗日本，無需中國作進一步的犧牲。畢竟他們已經單獨與日本打了四年半仗。因此，他們對與日本人作戰(zhàn)，不如對遏制共產黨人那么專心致志。共產黨人日益增強的勢力和地區(qū)性的控制，對戰(zhàn)后時期的國家統(tǒng)一和穩(wěn)定呈現了不祥之兆。但是，最重要的是重慶國民黨政府發(fā)現，它自己陷入了似乎不可逆轉的軍事、經濟、社會和政治的惡化過程。這種惡化，到1945年使它處于虛弱和萎靡不振的狀態(tài)。</p><p>　　國民黨人于1938年10月

67、在武漢戰(zhàn)敗后并未屈服。這時，日本的領導人認識到，他們對中國人的抵抗能力估計錯了，皇軍假如進入內地繼續(xù)追擊那些不可捉摸的防守者，只會把自己弄得精疲力竭。因此，他們采取了一種新戰(zhàn)略，著重以政治手段確保對中國的控制。首先，他們鞏固自1937年7月以來所占領的地區(qū)的控制。當時他們在華北和華中僅有效地控制大約10%的土地——基本上是主要城市以及主要鐵路和公路沿線地區(qū)。他們需要消滅許多小股的抵抗力量，并利用占領區(qū)的生產能力為本國經濟服務。</

68、p><p>　　其次，日本人決心拖垮國民黨人，直到他們因“內部分裂”而崩潰。因而，他們在加緊對國民黨區(qū)經濟封鎖的同時，開始了一場破壞性的空中戰(zhàn)爭。1939年春，他們奪取了江西的南昌，切斷了重要的浙江-湖南的鐵路。11月，他們以一支兩棲部隊在廣東西部的北海登陸，并挺進100英里攻取廣西省會南寧。這是對國民黨人的一次摧毀性的打擊，因為它切斷了通向河內的新鐵路線，而中國人當時正通過這條鐵路線取得足占他們極為需要的進口物資的

69、1/3。其后，1940年9月，日本人占領了法屬印度支那北部，封閉了河內與昆明間的重要鐵路線。此后，國民黨人依靠新開辟的勉強可以通行的滇緬路、香港（日本人于1941年12月占領）的空運和通往俄國的漫長的隊商卡車路，從外部世界取得供給。</p><p>　　日本人不加區(qū)別地空襲軍事的和居民的目標。與破壞軍事設施和工廠相比，他們的目的更重在使民眾在精神上垮掉。實際上在國民黨區(qū)的所有城市，包括桂林、昆明和西安，都遭到了空

70、襲。然而，重慶遭受空襲最為嚴重。1939—1941年轟炸了268次，城市大部毀壞，成千上萬的人死亡。僅1939年5月大轟炸的頭兩天，就有4400人死于非命。</p><p>　　但是，中國人的抵抗意志既非空襲，亦非封鎖所能摧毀。確實，重慶民眾不屈不撓的意志，在轟炸持續(xù)期間一直是堅定的，只是到1941年晚些時候轟炸停止后才有所衰退。封鎖未完全收效，部分是因為國民黨人在1939年7月已經使從日本占領區(qū)運來多數貨物的交

71、易合法化，后來又對這種交易積極促進。日本人無法停止這種貿易。他們不可能在中國占領區(qū)與未占領區(qū)間二千多英里邊界的每一英尺，哪怕是每一英里都加以監(jiān)視。許多日本人也在這種貿易中主動勾結。因此，戰(zhàn)爭時期國民黨中國輸入品中，相當大而又無法確定的一部分是通過這種所謂走私交易進來的。</p><p>　　1940年7月，日本內閣的一場重大爭論也影響了他們在中國的活動。日本領導人發(fā)覺，除非他們獲得東南亞的豐富自然資源，在中國取勝

72、將依然無望，而且他們確信西方列強全神貫注于歐洲的戰(zhàn)爭，他們商定把帝國擴張的范圍擴大到中國戰(zhàn)場以外去。他們希望——雖然不是確信——通過外交途徑，他們能夠在南方達到他們的目標。這一決定不可避免地改變了對華戰(zhàn)爭的特征，也導致了在一年稍多一點的時間內進攻珍珠港。</p><p>　　在中國方面，戰(zhàn)略和政治上的考慮已經使國民黨領導人相信要打一場消耗戰(zhàn)。蔣介石宣稱，日本人在中國遼闊的地域推進，把他們的人力資源和裝備攤得太開了

73、?！拔覀兊臄橙舜虻臅r間越長，它陷入的困難也就越多；我們打得越久，我們就更堅強，更有決心?！毕袢毡救艘粯樱Y也希望避免決戰(zhàn)，因為他預料西方盟國最終會被拖入反對日本的斗爭。開始，他只期待盟國的物質援助和對日本的經濟制裁。但是，在珍珠港事件（這個消息在重慶受到興高采烈的歡迎）后，他期待英國，特別期待擁有巨大技術資源的美國，會承擔打敗日本的主要責任。到 1943年，美國駐華大使克拉倫斯·E.高思評論說：“中國人使自己相信，他們太疲憊，

74、過于精疲力竭；裝備也太差，不能出更大的力了，尤其是在無需再如此努力的時候；而且他們可以保持他們所有的抗日的東西，坐下來歇口氣，并把注意力集中于規(guī)劃中國戰(zhàn)后的政治和經濟問題?！?lt;/p><p>　　把國民黨的注意力從日本人那里引開的主要政治問題，是與中國共產黨人不斷增長的磨擦。1941年1月新四軍事變（見第12章）后，統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線實際上已不復存在。有影響的國民黨領袖們——最著名的有軍政部長何應欽和黨務工作者陳立夫——多

75、次刺耳地鼓吹發(fā)動一場根絕赤禍的運動。蔣介石頂住了這些壓力，主要是因為他害怕盟國將停止對國民黨軍隊的援助，如果它公開卷入內戰(zhàn)的話。然而，自1939年年中起，他就調動他的許多最精銳的部隊——不同的時候在15萬至50萬人之間——去封鎖共產黨人在西北的根據地。</p><p>　　雖然國民黨人與日本人雙方從1938年后期起都甘愿打一場消耗戰(zhàn)，但這并不意味著戰(zhàn)斗已全面減少。日本人偶爾也發(fā)動一場攻勢以達到有限目標。例如，19

76、40年6月，他們攫取了重要的長江口岸宜昌，以阻斷華中糧倉各省與重慶之間的貨物流通，以及取得一個更靠近國民黨地區(qū)的空軍基地。1942年夏，在詹姆士·杜立德將軍轟炸東京后，日本人以10萬軍隊攻入浙江和江西，搗毀可能在將來用以對其本土島嶼進行轟炸的空軍基地。他們也定期向國民黨戰(zhàn)線發(fā)起進攻，相比之下，他們較少占領新的土地，而較多蹂躪農村，掠奪或毀壞新近的收獲，阻止國民黨人積聚具有潛在危險的精選的部隊，或者在實戰(zhàn)中訓練新兵。在所謂相持的

77、這幾年內遭受的傷亡——特別是早期——是重大的。中國人承認死亡人數1940年為34萬，1941年為14.5萬，1942年為8.8萬，1943年為4.3萬。但是從1939年到1944 年初，戰(zhàn)線并無重大變動。敵對雙方之間的戰(zhàn)略平衡，在將近六年中變化甚微。</p><p>　　在戰(zhàn)爭后半期，國民黨軍隊人數在350萬以上。但是，它不是一支統(tǒng)一的國家軍隊，而是對中央政府忠誠程度不同，訓練、裝備和作戰(zhàn)能力各異的軍隊聯合體。這

78、個參差不齊的集合體的中心是“中央軍”。1941年，在全部國民黨軍隊三百多個師的總數之中，中央軍約有30個師近50萬人。在戰(zhàn)爭進行過程中，蔣擴充了這支武裝，以至到戰(zhàn)爭結束時，中央軍約有65萬人。在1937年，中央軍的軍官是中央軍官學校的畢業(yè)生，這是有代表性的。他們學習過現代軍事技術——30年代時常由德國教官傳授。政治灌輸在他們的訓練中顯得很重要；軍官們高度效忠于蔣介石。</p><p>　　然而，大多數國民黨武裝是

79、軍閥部隊的直接衍生物，由不受中央政府節(jié)制的名聲顯赫的人物指揮。因此，他們的忠誠是有條件的，淡薄的。他們妒忌和害怕蔣介石的日益增長的權力。例如，云南省政府主席龍云抵制中央政府對他的省內權力的侵犯，并為批評重慶政府的知識分子提供一個避難所。華北第二戰(zhàn)區(qū)司令長官、軍事委員會副委員長、山西省政府主席閻錫山，像一位擁有自主權的總督那樣統(tǒng)治著他的故鄉(xiāng)山西。他阻止中央軍進入他的戰(zhàn)區(qū)，并保有自己的政黨（民主革命同志會）以對抗國民黨。確實，從1941年起

80、，閻甚至與日本人保持密切而和好的關系。其他具有省籍淵源的將軍們，如李宗仁（廣西）、薛岳（廣東）、于學忠（滿洲）和傅作義（綏遠），均已失去他們特殊的地方性根據地，但仍對那些寧愿效忠他們，而不愿效忠蔣介石的軍隊保持著指揮權。</p><p>　　那些非中央軍的指揮官與中央政府之間的關系，因戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)而起了變化。在南京十多年中，地方軍閥的權力已經衰微。蔣的權力日益增長，最關緊要的是他已控制一支政治上忠實并且比較熟練的軍隊

81、。但蔣的最好的軍隊，包括他那由德國教官訓練的精銳師大部在上海潰滅，造成了國民黨軍隊內部的軍事天平向非中央軍的指揮官們傾斜。蔣的政治權威相應減弱。</p><p>　　在整個戰(zhàn)爭期間，蔣通過在各省部隊中安插國民黨干部，用新近訓練的軍官和現代裝備重建中央武裝力量等手段，竭力矯正他本人與地區(qū)指揮官之間在政治和軍事上的平衡。這些努力激起了地方將軍們的猜疑和敵意。他們抱怨中央政府歧視他們，把他們的師送去與日本人進行毀滅性的

82、戰(zhàn)斗，而蔣卻安然保存自己的部隊。他們因補給品分配不公而憤怒，因為蔣把從美國得到的武器彈藥，包括根據租借法從美國得到的裝備，大部分分配給他自己的部隊，而不給不大可靠的地方部隊。</p><p>　　簡言之，國內政治支撐著蔣對戰(zhàn)爭的指揮，而蔣則借此增強他的中央權力。當然，如蔣的支持者們所申辯的那樣，沒有哪個現代國家能夠輕易容忍它的軍事指揮官們起著破壞作用的獨立態(tài)度。不過，蔣所采用的增強其中央政府權力的手段，本來就不可

83、能是最有效的。不管怎么說，各省軍閥們的不滿隨著戰(zhàn)爭的進展而越來越激烈。在1944年，主要的地方軍閥結成了一個聯盟，實際上陰謀推翻蔣的政府。當時許多非中央軍的指揮官干脆叛逃到日本人那邊。這些叛逃的將軍1941年有12個，1942年有15個，1943年是高峰的一年，有42人叛逃。50多萬軍隊跟隨這些叛逃的將軍離去，而日本人則利用這些偽軍去保衛(wèi)其占領的地區(qū)，以對抗共產黨游擊隊。</p><p>　　國民黨軍隊最嚴重的缺

84、點之一是軍官團的素質差，這個缺點在戰(zhàn)爭期間加劇了。美國在華高級軍官艾伯特·C.魏德邁將軍，在1944年10月后把國民黨的軍官們描述為“無能，愚蠢，缺乏訓練，偏狹……全然不稱職”。這也是非中央軍高級指揮官們的特色。他們中間大多數人獲得榮譽和地位，并不是由于他們軍事技能嫻熟，而是由于他們在派系斗爭中的機敏和及時轉輸忠誠。不過，即使是畢業(yè)于中央軍官學校的高級軍官們，也非常缺乏軍事領導所需要的素質。他們中的大多數人是20年代黃埔軍校前

85、四期的畢業(yè)生，那時訓練是初步的，而且只持續(xù)幾個月。在他們因對蔣介石效忠而被提升到師和軍的指揮官時，他們對軍事科學技術的理解往往是狹隘而過時的。在30年代，這些高級軍官本來可以趁機在參謀學院里受先進的德式訓練。然而，那時他們已經有這樣高的軍階，以致他們認為再去當學生會有失尊嚴。</p><p>　　當然，也有些高級指揮官超越這種體制。例如，陳誠、白崇禧和孫立人，由于他們智慧，廉潔，具有軍事才能而出類拔萃。但是，值得

86、注意的是，白崇禧也好，孫立人也好，都不是蔣介石核心集團成員。蔣使用他們的才干，但把他們緊緊地拴住，因為他們不是中央軍的人，并表現出了一種倔強的獨立精神。蔣的一個親信陳誠，由于在與自負而平庸的軍政部長何應欽派系紛爭中的失敗，戰(zhàn)爭期間大都在政治風云之中度過。</p><p>　　戰(zhàn)爭開始時，總的說來下級軍官比他們的上級更能勝任。1929—1937年間，中央軍官學校平均每年有3000名學員畢業(yè)，并且有大約2000名參謀

87、接受過高等訓練。但是，戰(zhàn)爭深深地斫傷了下級軍官團。他們中有一萬人在最早的上海和南京周圍的戰(zhàn)斗中就犧牲了。這些損失絕不會完全得到補償，因為戰(zhàn)爭期間由于降低入學要求以及縮短學習課程。軍官訓練大大地退化了。確實，在一個正規(guī)的步兵營里，軍校畢業(yè)的軍官所占的百分比，從 1937年的80%降到1945年的20%。由于好的軍隊莫過于有一批好的下級軍官，這些數字為戰(zhàn)爭期間國民黨軍隊的退化提供了一個粗略的指標。</p><p>　

88、　然而，退化在最下層，在應征入伍者中間最為明顯。戰(zhàn)時中國軍隊大部由征兵組成。所有男子，凡在18—45歲之間——除去學生、獨生子和嚴重疾患者——均得服從征召。按照法令，他們以抽簽的方式公平地被挑選。事實上，有錢有勢的人逃避征召，而無錢無勢的國民被強征入伍。征兵的軍官們往往甚至連抽簽的手續(xù)都不顧。有些農民簡直是在田里勞作的時候被抓去的；另有一些則是被捕去的，那些不能買通路子出來的人于是就被編入軍隊。</p><p>

89、　　服兵役是一種可怕的經歷。沒有運輸車輛，新兵常常行軍數百英里到他們被指定的部隊——有意遠離新兵家鄉(xiāng)，以減少開小差的誘惑。新兵常常被用繩索套在他們的頸子上縛到一起。夜里，他們可能被剝光衣服，以防他們私逃。就食物而言，他們只得到少量的米，因為征兵的軍官們?yōu)榱艘患核嚼?，慣?！翱丝邸苯o養(yǎng)。就水來說，新兵可能不得不從路邊的泥水坑里飲水——這是引起腹瀉的一個普通原因。疾病很快在應征新兵隊中流行開來。然而，他們得不到醫(yī)療，因為新兵在加入他們被指定的

90、部隊前，不被視為軍隊的一部分。八年戰(zhàn)爭期間，這類死于途中的新兵可能大大超過100萬。</p><p>　　抵達部隊的新兵們經受住了也許是他們服兵役的最壞時期，但他們的前景往往仍是黯淡的。在中央軍里，食物和服裝一般是充足的。但是，那些不幸被派遣到某些地方部隊——諸如陜西和甘肅的部隊——的人命運極為悲慘，謝偉思報道說：“幾乎像乞丐一般”。</p><p>　　造成國民黨軍隊戰(zhàn)斗效能減弱的首要問

91、題并非武器短缺，而是食物短缺。1944年10月，魏德邁將軍最初擔任蔣的參謀長職務時，他主要關心部隊的調動和部署問題。但是，不到一個月，他了解到士兵因太虛弱而不能行軍，并且不可能有效地打仗，原因多半在于他們是半饑餓的。按照部隊規(guī)章，每個士兵發(fā)給每天24盎司米，一份鹽；每月一份全薪，如果全花在食物上，一個月可以買一磅豬肉。一個中國士兵靠這些配額可以很好地維持生活。可是，事實上他真正得到的僅僅是分配給他的食物和錢的一部分，因為長官們習以為常地

92、為自己“克扣”很大一部分。結果是大多數國民黨士兵營養(yǎng)不足。一位美國專家1944年廣泛地檢查了不同種類部隊的1200名士兵，他發(fā)現57%的人表現出營養(yǎng)不良。這顯著地影響了他們發(fā)揮士兵職能的能力。</p><p>　　原始的衛(wèi)生和醫(yī)療同樣削弱了國民黨軍隊，于是疾病成了士兵經常的伴侶。瘧疾是一種最為流行并使人衰竭的病痛。戰(zhàn)爭期間，由于軍隊的體質狀況惡化，痢疾發(fā)生率大為增加，這種疾病常被忽視，終至無法醫(yī)治。最后，患者甚至

93、不能進食，不久死去。疥瘡、熱帶皮膚潰瘍、眼感染、結核病和花柳病也很普遍。</p><p>　　1945年在西南作戰(zhàn)時，美國觀察家發(fā)現第十三軍甚至不能步行一小段距離，“一大批掉隊，而有許多人因極端饑餓而瀕于死亡”。另外一位美國軍官包瑞德上校報道說，看到國民黨士兵們“行軍不到一英里，就搖搖晃晃倒下來死了”。受到高度重視的《大公報》的一位記者說：“軍隊開過以后，在路旁能發(fā)現死亡的士兵，一個接著一個”。國民黨軍隊中受到特

94、別照顧的，或由美國訓練的部隊——如青年軍和在印度訓練的中國遠征軍——不間斷地得到良好的給養(yǎng)和裝備；但他們是例外。</p><p>　　確有一個軍醫(yī)團，但它所提供的醫(yī)療被中國紅十字醫(yī)療濟難總會會長羅伯特·利姆（林可勝）形容為“前南丁格爾的”。醫(yī)療隊的正規(guī)機構——包括急救隊、包扎所、野戰(zhàn)醫(yī)院和后方醫(yī)院——是無懈可擊的，但因供不應求、人員不合格、設備和藥品不足、腐敗和麻木不仁，不能很好發(fā)揮作用。</p&

95、gt;<p>　　在全部軍隊中，大約只有2000名大體合格的醫(yī)生服務，其比率充其量大約為1700人有一名合格醫(yī)生，相比之下，美軍中大約每150人就有一名醫(yī)生。另有28000名軍醫(yī)在醫(yī)療部隊服務，但這些人大多沒有受過正規(guī)訓練，并且純粹是從擔架員到包扎員，到“醫(yī)生”這樣提升的。極少數真正勝任的醫(yī)生，集中在前線重傷士兵所不能到達的后方醫(yī)院服務。因為擔架隊常常人員不足，以及醫(yī)療運輸工具稀少，在戰(zhàn)斗中受傷——即便是輕傷——往往也是致

96、命的。一名受傷士兵即便受到初步治療，可能也要等上一天。然后他才需要轉到包扎所和后方醫(yī)院。1938年羅茲·法默看到過被運送到后方的傷員，他評論道：“遍體壞疽，蛆蟲在傷口上蠕動。”經這樣的治療，即使是輕傷員也會迅速感染，而多數傷情，如胃部受傷或喪失一肢，往往致命。在戰(zhàn)時中國很少看到跛子。</p><p>　　中國士兵給養(yǎng)差，受凌辱和嘲弄，不可避免地缺乏士氣。集體開小差鮮明地反映了這一點。大多數新兵，即使在到

97、指定部隊的行軍中幸存下來，除了逃跑，也別無想法。許多人成功了。例如，第十八軍第十八師被視為一支較好的部隊，1942年還駐在后方未參加戰(zhàn)斗，卻由于死亡或開小差，它的1.1萬人中有6千人失蹤了。高思大使評論道：這些統(tǒng)計數字并非例外，類似的減員率在所有軍區(qū)普遍存在。即使胡宗南的精銳部隊——因為他們被用于遏制北面的共產黨軍隊，他們屬于訓練、給養(yǎng)和裝備最好的部隊——據說1943年需要補充的比率為一個1萬人的師每月600人。官方的統(tǒng)計導致這樣的結論