英文翻譯---基于統(tǒng)計(jì)研究的管理信息系統(tǒng)

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)外文翻譯</p><p>　外文譯文題目：基于統(tǒng)計(jì)研究的管理信息系統(tǒng)</p><p>　　Management of information systems: Insights from accounting research</p><p>　　Neale G. O’Connor Maris G. Martins

2、ons</p><p>　　Information & Management 43 (2006) 1014–1024</p><p>　　基于統(tǒng)計(jì)研究的管理信息系統(tǒng)</p><p>　　尼爾·歌納 瑪利絲·馬丁遜</p><p>　　信息管理 43 (2006) 1014–1024</p><

3、;p><b>　　摘 要</b></p><p>　　本文通過(guò)對(duì)統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)的洞察和申請(qǐng)建議來(lái)提高我們對(duì)信息系統(tǒng)管理方面的知識(shí)。成本—利潤(rùn)的模型被設(shè)計(jì)和應(yīng)用到我們所研究的四個(gè)領(lǐng)域當(dāng)中：拖欠費(fèi)用，外部采辦，決定技術(shù)支持和商業(yè)流程的再設(shè)計(jì)和改進(jìn)。我們證明會(huì)計(jì)文化對(duì)信息系統(tǒng)的管理有相當(dāng)大的學(xué)術(shù)貢獻(xiàn)。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵字：信息系統(tǒng)價(jià)值；信息技術(shù)(IT)管理；外部采辦；

4、拖欠費(fèi)用；決策支持系統(tǒng)；商業(yè)流程再設(shè)計(jì)；商務(wù)表現(xiàn)；表現(xiàn)度量</p><p><b>　　目 錄</b></p><p><b>　　摘 要II</b></p><p><b>　　1 緒論1</b></p><p>　　2 概念模型：核算成本—利潤(rùn)1</p>

5、<p>　　3 信息系統(tǒng)研究的四個(gè)領(lǐng)域3</p><p>　　3.1 管理信息系統(tǒng)的費(fèi)用3</p><p>　　3.2 費(fèi)用回收3</p><p>　　3.2.1 會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)原理4</p><p><b>　　3.3 外購(gòu)5</b></p><p>　　3.3.1 會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)原理6

6、</p><p>　　3.4 管理信息系統(tǒng)的好處7</p><p>　　3.5 決策支持系統(tǒng)7</p><p>　　3.5.1 會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)原理8</p><p><b>　　4 總結(jié)10</b></p><p><b>　　致謝10</b></p><

7、;p><b>　　1 緒論</b></p><p>　　信息系統(tǒng)的管理被廣泛用于各種層面。企業(yè)的決策層主要處理資源的分配。功能層次的信息系統(tǒng)決定什么地方和什么時(shí)候應(yīng)用信息技術(shù)，以及提出申請(qǐng)到底是制造還是購(gòu)買(mǎi)的問(wèn)題。制造一個(gè)內(nèi)部應(yīng)用的新型信息技術(shù)的決定將不可避免的導(dǎo)致一個(gè)管理計(jì)劃的開(kāi)始。</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)者和信息系統(tǒng)學(xué)者都考慮到與前面提到的決定有關(guān)的重要

8、問(wèn)題。例如，在由Kodak把信息系統(tǒng)管理訂約給IBM公司的路標(biāo)決定后，關(guān)于外購(gòu)和信息系統(tǒng)研究的穩(wěn)定潮流開(kāi)始出現(xiàn)。同樣地，會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)研究已經(jīng)檢測(cè)到最初的外購(gòu)決定。然而，信息系統(tǒng)文獻(xiàn)的再度審查意味著其它管理問(wèn)題已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)不足，尤其包括職位履行決定的問(wèn)題。我們直接審視這些不合理的地方，會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)原理應(yīng)用到四個(gè)科學(xué)領(lǐng)域：會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)原理和許多信息系統(tǒng)問(wèn)題有關(guān)，但最近的發(fā)展聚焦在決定和管理控制的問(wèn)題上。結(jié)果，我們展示了會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)原理怎樣能幫助信息系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行職業(yè)管理。(

9、1)IT工程難以認(rèn)識(shí)的方面：包括風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估，控制和調(diào)度；(2)和決策支持系統(tǒng)使用有關(guān)的情況(3)公司的權(quán)威和激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)。下一部分提出一個(gè)概念模型，這個(gè)框架強(qiáng)調(diào)信息系統(tǒng)和會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)研究之間的重疊部分，然后，我們分別評(píng)價(jià)前面提到的每個(gè)領(lǐng)域，概括信息系統(tǒng)文獻(xiàn)，（1）確定會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)原理是怎樣能夠擴(kuò)大主流知識(shí)，（2）鑒別深入研究的關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題。</p><p>　　2 概念模型：核算成本—利潤(rùn)</p><p>　　

10、通過(guò)更精確地把成本歸到確切的產(chǎn)品、服務(wù)和顧客中，會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)能大大提高決策制定的質(zhì)量。同樣地，通過(guò)更精確地把雇傭能力歸到組織結(jié)果，會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)能提高雇傭能力的動(dòng)機(jī)和目標(biāo)定位。所有這些努力增強(qiáng)信息系統(tǒng)的管理。它們的成功取決于測(cè)定的是什么以及怎樣很好地測(cè)定這些目標(biāo)。典型地，把這些測(cè)量翻譯成貨幣術(shù)語(yǔ)來(lái)評(píng)估成本和利潤(rùn)。</p><p>　　為了介紹和涉及信息系統(tǒng)管理的這四個(gè)領(lǐng)域，考慮如圖1所示IT應(yīng)用過(guò)程是非常有用的。一個(gè)組織必須決

11、定一個(gè)范圍來(lái)開(kāi)發(fā)和操縱它自己的信息系統(tǒng)。它可能決定外購(gòu)一些或所有的活動(dòng)。</p><p>　　圖1 信息技術(shù)申請(qǐng)流程</p><p>　　信息系統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益一般形成兩個(gè)形式：（1）通過(guò)流程改善來(lái)降低運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)費(fèi)（2）通過(guò)提供更精確和適時(shí)的信息給決策者來(lái)改善資源分配。IT應(yīng)用的潛在范圍由戰(zhàn)略水平提高到操縱水平。在圖2中的成本—利潤(rùn)模型表明兩個(gè)IT利潤(rùn)的一般類(lèi)型并且描述IT成本，包括：（1）最初開(kāi)發(fā)

12、和不間斷地維修費(fèi)用。強(qiáng)調(diào)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)原理的核心問(wèn)題，因?yàn)樗鼈兣︱?qū)動(dòng)信息系統(tǒng)設(shè)計(jì)的相關(guān)部分并且最終影響了這個(gè)設(shè)計(jì)的效率。</p><p>　　圖2 信息技術(shù)的成本—利潤(rùn)模型</p><p>　　3 信息系統(tǒng)研究的四個(gè)領(lǐng)域</p><p>　　3.1 管理信息系統(tǒng)的費(fèi)用</p><p>　　一個(gè)部門(mén)的關(guān)注點(diǎn)恢復(fù)操作和維護(hù)信息系統(tǒng)的費(fèi)用：“費(fèi)用回收”概

13、念。</p><p><b>　　3.2 費(fèi)用回收</b></p><p>　　一個(gè)費(fèi)用回收系統(tǒng)正常地花費(fèi)在成本核心或室內(nèi)信息系統(tǒng)服務(wù)的用戶(hù)部門(mén)有許多改變，例如，成本最小化，變動(dòng)價(jià)格，確定基于時(shí)間流逝的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)率，評(píng)估用于工作的信息系統(tǒng)部分，說(shuō)明在系統(tǒng)中工作優(yōu)先權(quán)和混合程度的時(shí)間調(diào)整因素。</p><p>　　這問(wèn)題變成：什么費(fèi)用回收系統(tǒng)對(duì)供應(yīng)商和

14、用戶(hù)之間是公平的？</p><p>　　在圖3中展示了許多協(xié)定。費(fèi)用回收幫助創(chuàng)造一個(gè)同用戶(hù)交流IT成本的有責(zé)任文化。然而，一個(gè)對(duì)公司策略起關(guān)鍵作用的激勵(lì)意志力的應(yīng)用的靈活途徑可能會(huì)減輕責(zé)任的要求。最終，費(fèi)用回收可能用于管理服務(wù)部門(mén)的供應(yīng)能力和非服務(wù)部門(mén)需求之間的相互依賴(lài)。例如，服務(wù)部門(mén)供應(yīng)能力將會(huì)影響信息系統(tǒng)服務(wù)費(fèi)用，這個(gè)費(fèi)用取決于非服務(wù)部門(mén)之間相互依賴(lài)中的反映變化。</p><p>　　

15、圖3 費(fèi)用回收模型的驅(qū)動(dòng)</p><p>　　費(fèi)用回收的驅(qū)動(dòng)程序在于（1）管理控制（2）IT的決策角色，（3）組織的測(cè)試成本和演示的能力。雖然費(fèi)用回收實(shí)踐沒(méi)有重要的改變，但是分配成本和教育用戶(hù)使用費(fèi)用回收信息的困難已經(jīng)增加。信息系統(tǒng)模型仍然強(qiáng)調(diào)公正、平等、負(fù)責(zé)和控制能力的問(wèn)題。</p><p>　　研究于20世紀(jì)80年代的費(fèi)用回收可能已經(jīng)限制了同今天的IT集中環(huán)境之間的關(guān)聯(lián)。傳統(tǒng)的信息系統(tǒng)

16、服務(wù)中心角色已經(jīng)隨著要求他們自己專(zhuān)家的部門(mén)而發(fā)生改變。雖然網(wǎng)絡(luò)工作和維修服務(wù)仍然保留著中心地位。IT資源的分配決定了在一些定位和操作方面的費(fèi)用困難，計(jì)算正成為一個(gè)免費(fèi)資源或商品。這個(gè)結(jié)果保守地說(shuō)明了IT費(fèi)用和多重應(yīng)用。為了確定這些發(fā)展，費(fèi)用輸出模型必須考慮信息系統(tǒng)預(yù)算來(lái)確定其過(guò)程。信息系統(tǒng)演示管理以及IT供應(yīng)商和用戶(hù)之間來(lái)闡明他們角色和責(zé)任的交流。</p><p>　　同樣地，新技術(shù)的采用包括用戶(hù)努力完成使用的表

17、面利益，實(shí)際上包括深層含義和不確定其真實(shí)費(fèi)用。隨著IT采用和更新以及增長(zhǎng)率出現(xiàn)，許多組織至少處理兩代IT。因?yàn)檫@增加了任何費(fèi)用回收系統(tǒng)的復(fù)雜性，成本—利潤(rùn)模型應(yīng)在費(fèi)用回收系統(tǒng)被設(shè)計(jì)之前鑒定這個(gè)費(fèi)用。</p><p>　　信息系統(tǒng)研究人員已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)說(shuō)明IT應(yīng)用的活躍性和分散特性很困難。他們也失敗地充分考慮了同信息系統(tǒng)服務(wù)有關(guān)的補(bǔ)充性和客觀性。</p><p>　　3.2.1 會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)觀點(diǎn)<

18、/p><p>　　兩個(gè)概念能指導(dǎo)設(shè)計(jì)和雇傭一個(gè)信息技術(shù)費(fèi)用回收系統(tǒng)：功能領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的內(nèi)在資源效用和成本分配過(guò)程的外在影響。公正地向IT服務(wù)用戶(hù)收費(fèi)是合理的，但付諸實(shí)踐相當(dāng)困難。一個(gè)部門(mén)的IT使用將會(huì)影響另一個(gè)部門(mén)。并最終影響到服務(wù)部門(mén)的能力。一個(gè)設(shè)計(jì)不好的費(fèi)用回收系統(tǒng)將會(huì)導(dǎo)致負(fù)面的外在性，費(fèi)用將會(huì)強(qiáng)征于沒(méi)有參與決定的個(gè)體。例如，Zimmerman提出了一個(gè)效應(yīng)：當(dāng)管理者過(guò)度消耗資源時(shí)，刺激效應(yīng)將會(huì)產(chǎn)生；當(dāng)收費(fèi)系統(tǒng)創(chuàng)立了一

19、個(gè)效應(yīng)克服用戶(hù)和供應(yīng)商之間不對(duì)稱(chēng)信息的相互監(jiān)視關(guān)系時(shí)，信息效應(yīng)產(chǎn)生了；集聚效應(yīng)包括稅款的延遲和配給其用戶(hù)的費(fèi)用。這些導(dǎo)致了對(duì)有限資源缺乏的費(fèi)用回收。</p><p>　　適應(yīng)性和責(zé)任性之間的協(xié)定也能阻止IT服務(wù)和資源的意志力使用。有三個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)方法可能幫助減輕這個(gè)問(wèn)題。</p><p>　　1)雖然根據(jù)一個(gè)用戶(hù)付款方式，償還IT投資成本是合理的，但是責(zé)任性和適應(yīng)性之間的平衡將會(huì)受到影響。知道

20、費(fèi)用回收增加用戶(hù)IT服務(wù)意識(shí)的水平有多低將是有用的。太少費(fèi)用回收導(dǎo)致沒(méi)有自我監(jiān)視和對(duì)消耗的資源的少量關(guān)注，但是太多的費(fèi)用回收將會(huì)阻止IT服務(wù)和資源的意志力使用。</p><p>　　2)一個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)原理知識(shí)，它對(duì)意志力活動(dòng)的需求將在某些領(lǐng)域被鼓舞，例如R&D。然而，這不會(huì)消減評(píng)估和控制資源的使用的必要，決定和估計(jì)重要的成功因素，這些因素表明組織是怎樣很好地完成它的目標(biāo)的。投入的資金和行為的控制是合適的，當(dāng)一

21、個(gè)組織的任務(wù)包括高度的技術(shù)不確定性或是有一個(gè)很難測(cè)定的輸出量。</p><p>　　3)因?yàn)橘M(fèi)用回收系統(tǒng)不是唯一的引導(dǎo)和控制信息系統(tǒng)用戶(hù)行為的方式，其它的方法也能被嘗試，包括把信息系統(tǒng)和用戶(hù)部門(mén)直接相關(guān)和刺激創(chuàng)新行為的激勵(lì)系統(tǒng)。帶有費(fèi)用分配的激勵(lì)系統(tǒng)型式的相互作用能夠影響利益性、生產(chǎn)性、創(chuàng)新性以及組織各部分之間的信息交換。</p><p>　　對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)測(cè)定和價(jià)值的強(qiáng)調(diào)增強(qiáng)了對(duì)戰(zhàn)略目的使用費(fèi)用

22、回收的重要性。更多的費(fèi)用回收的重要性。更多的費(fèi)用回收怎樣使用的知識(shí)能支持必需的IT應(yīng)用的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)。一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的挑戰(zhàn)就是理解和協(xié)調(diào)兩個(gè)確定矛盾觀點(diǎn)之間的分歧，它們是對(duì)費(fèi)用回收的需要和對(duì)它的批判。</p><p>　　前輩外購(gòu)費(fèi)用回收系統(tǒng)是不成功的嗎？一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和會(huì)計(jì)師建議應(yīng)該沒(méi)有費(fèi)用回收或至多有記在頁(yè)邊的成本價(jià)格。</p><p><b>　　3.3 外購(gòu)</b><

23、;/p><p>　　信息系統(tǒng)外購(gòu)決定是以它們的大小、復(fù)雜性、潛在的不可逆性為特征。這種外購(gòu)的利益包括由于一個(gè)販?zhǔn)降慕?jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模的成本，接近新技術(shù)和專(zhuān)門(mén)技術(shù)的可能性，戰(zhàn)略的適應(yīng)性，以及作廢的取消。復(fù)雜性以它的難以了解的特性、多樣性的賭金保管者和服務(wù)時(shí)間交付的需要為特征的。這些因素表明考慮許多評(píng)價(jià)服務(wù)的成功和可行性階段的必要性。此外，這起草合同階段要求非正式的創(chuàng)造一個(gè)半階段合作關(guān)系的管理形式。</p><

24、p>　　Eastman Kodak到IBM公司購(gòu)買(mǎi)電腦主機(jī)的決定被發(fā)現(xiàn)有一個(gè)積極的股票市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)。結(jié)果是很明顯的，成功的外購(gòu)結(jié)果包括知識(shí)的分享，有一個(gè)正式的評(píng)價(jià)過(guò)程，使用短期合同以及外購(gòu)關(guān)于選擇性基礎(chǔ)的IT。</p><p>　　信息系統(tǒng)研究人員一般應(yīng)用交流成本經(jīng)濟(jì)來(lái)解釋外購(gòu)價(jià)值，例如，作廢的取消，接近新技術(shù)，小販?zhǔn)降慕?jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模。然而這不充分說(shuō)明同信息系統(tǒng)外購(gòu)工程的管理和完成有關(guān)的費(fèi)用。由交易成本理論描述的顧客

25、和提供者之間的關(guān)系是非常簡(jiǎn)單的；因?yàn)椋海?）不同賭金保管者的期望，（2）六個(gè)外購(gòu)階段的存在：范圍、評(píng)價(jià)、磋商、過(guò)渡、中間階段、成熟階段。研究人員已經(jīng)檢測(cè)信息系統(tǒng)外購(gòu)決定和策略因素之間的關(guān)系。發(fā)現(xiàn)在信息質(zhì)量，信息系統(tǒng)提供質(zhì)量和費(fèi)用效力以及公司的戰(zhàn)略?xún)A向強(qiáng)烈暗示外購(gòu)決定是一個(gè)彌補(bǔ)資源短缺的方式。相比較，既不是成本因素也不是公司的經(jīng)濟(jì)情況被發(fā)現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重影響外購(gòu)決定。外購(gòu)在合同關(guān)系中就一般顧客矛盾的程度而發(fā)生變化，這個(gè)可用經(jīng)銷(xiāo)理論來(lái)解釋。用戶(hù)和供應(yīng)

26、商之間的不對(duì)稱(chēng)信息的發(fā)生是由于供應(yīng)商的專(zhuān)有技術(shù)和用戶(hù)沒(méi)有能力有效地監(jiān)控這個(gè)工程。在最近才有外購(gòu)的起草合同管理被研究，依賴(lài)和知識(shí)分享問(wèn)題已被提出。</p><p>　　同與外購(gòu)初始階段有關(guān)的市場(chǎng)決定相比，外購(gòu)合同的管理依靠心理合同和社會(huì)資本。目的就是使合作部門(mén)間的合作更加便利(見(jiàn)圖4)。這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)提供了管理開(kāi)始的整體理解，選擇是可利用的，并且是結(jié)果。三個(gè)理論可能用于做過(guò)程和結(jié)果的模型。信息系統(tǒng)—特性理論是必需的，由于

27、一些因素，這些因素限制和重定義管理選擇可利用性和管理選擇的影響。Is-Specific理論使嵌入式觀點(diǎn)的可行性降低。</p><p>　　圖4 外部采辦—較早研究的區(qū)域</p><p>　　3.3.1 會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)遠(yuǎn)景</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)研究者已經(jīng)決定共同努力理解不同控制和管理外購(gòu)的起草合同階段的協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制的效果?；谑袌?chǎng)、行政系統(tǒng)，信譽(yù)度，定義了三個(gè)內(nèi)部公司控制的

28、不同模式。Chatos和connor發(fā)現(xiàn)，在Vs-sino聯(lián)盟中，社會(huì)化和交際機(jī)制對(duì)知識(shí)和技術(shù)傳遞是關(guān)鍵的。這些機(jī)制同官僚主義和信賴(lài)控制模式有關(guān)。同樣地，團(tuán)體控制已經(jīng)被提出，因?yàn)楹献鲄f(xié)調(diào)很重要，例如，穿過(guò)傳統(tǒng)商業(yè)功能的邊界時(shí)期工作的使用。會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)測(cè)定提了有關(guān)每個(gè)部門(mén)活動(dòng)的正式信息，因此公正地保持每個(gè)部門(mén)；增強(qiáng)訂約部門(mén)之間聯(lián)系，并且引導(dǎo)知識(shí)和信息的分享。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)研究分支已經(jīng)檢測(cè)不同網(wǎng)絡(luò)工作形成的文

29、章，并且用這個(gè)去解釋不同控制類(lèi)型的價(jià)值；網(wǎng)絡(luò)工作的類(lèi)型被發(fā)現(xiàn)決定每個(gè)部門(mén)已有的信息，創(chuàng)造共同理解和穩(wěn)定的關(guān)系。</p><p>　　3.4 管理信息系統(tǒng)的好處</p><p>　　方便和影響擴(kuò)展到其它信息系統(tǒng)實(shí)踐領(lǐng)域決定的措施的提供：決定支持和過(guò)程改善。這些信息系統(tǒng)的類(lèi)型的計(jì)劃和發(fā)展已經(jīng)從有關(guān)IS成功工作中受益。</p><p>　　3.5 決策支持系統(tǒng)</p

30、><p>　　決策支持系統(tǒng)支持決定制定過(guò)程的一個(gè)或更多方面。IT能通過(guò)搜集、操縱、傳播數(shù)據(jù)和信息來(lái)支持決定制定。更好的決定，更精確和適時(shí)，可能導(dǎo)致決策支持系統(tǒng)技術(shù)的使用，如果他們的信息是精確的、完全的、可變的、相關(guān)的、簡(jiǎn)單的、可證實(shí)的、可接近的、安全的、可靠的、適時(shí)的、經(jīng)濟(jì)的。</p><p>　　這種在知識(shí)管理系統(tǒng)中的技術(shù)的完整性幾乎不取決于政治因素，例如，保護(hù)某一塊草皮。</p>

31、;<p>　　當(dāng)一個(gè)公司的能力是一個(gè)實(shí)施決策支持系統(tǒng)必要條件，對(duì)于決策支持系統(tǒng)成功遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)足夠了。決策支持系統(tǒng)實(shí)施取決于個(gè)人的志愿的行為。一個(gè)決策支持系統(tǒng)對(duì)于問(wèn)題的發(fā)現(xiàn)、問(wèn)題的解決、知識(shí)的發(fā)展是非常有用的（見(jiàn)圖5）。信息系統(tǒng)傳統(tǒng)地被視為幫助常規(guī)決定制定的靜態(tài)系統(tǒng)，不像能幫助組織學(xué)習(xí)的活躍的學(xué)習(xí)系統(tǒng)。以決定幫助通過(guò)決定過(guò)程，到?jīng)Q定制定效果的聯(lián)合的更完全的觀點(diǎn)已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生了決策支持系統(tǒng)演示取決于決策支持系統(tǒng)策略的模型，輪流取決于因素的

32、相互作用，例如，決策支持系統(tǒng)能力、任務(wù)、知覺(jué)努力、經(jīng)費(fèi)以及知覺(jué)精度。</p><p>　　研究已經(jīng)鑒別出關(guān)鍵因素，這些因素使能夠或抑制成功采用，例如信息系統(tǒng)接口技術(shù)，系統(tǒng)功能性以及用戶(hù)缺乏學(xué)習(xí)能力和學(xué)習(xí)新技能和規(guī)則的動(dòng)機(jī)。例如，一個(gè)41實(shí)施的例子的回顧鑒定出6個(gè)抵制領(lǐng)域并且提出了實(shí)施抵制和成功之間關(guān)系的概念性模型。</p><p><b>　　.</b></p&

33、gt;<p>　　圖5 決策支持系統(tǒng)的類(lèi)型學(xué)</p><p>　　3.5.1 會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)原理</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)研究人員已經(jīng)徹底地檢測(cè)了特殊決策支持系統(tǒng)的費(fèi)用和利益，例如基于花費(fèi)和多樣演示措施系統(tǒng)的活動(dòng)。表1表明他們的直接利潤(rùn)和間接利潤(rùn)的兩種不同的結(jié)果。</p><p>　　表1 決策支持系統(tǒng)的優(yōu)點(diǎn)</p><p>　　信息

34、技術(shù)的最現(xiàn)值的分析可以衡量學(xué)習(xí)的間接好處。這種間接的好處可能轉(zhuǎn)變成更加明確的回報(bào)就像他們幫助公司形成一種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)和革新才能。例如,允許更快應(yīng)對(duì)圣歌改變。對(duì)管理的挑戰(zhàn)是要衡量這些按照他們的到信息技術(shù)投資的曲折好處的連接好處。</p><p>　　把研究視作能使我們諒解肥沃的他信息系統(tǒng)的在雙向的中決定援助/好處：（1）從事有關(guān)會(huì)計(jì)工作的判決和決策（2）反饋一個(gè)決策支持系統(tǒng)所獲得的好處。</p><

35、p>　　首先，我們需要懂得被積蓄和研究連接的局限性和偏差，然后找回信息和他的決策中的使用。管理決斷中的不同被歸咎為人們認(rèn)知的機(jī)器，例如經(jīng)驗(yàn)和教育構(gòu)架和他們的個(gè)人特征，例如類(lèi)型的刺激任務(wù),反饋，選定壓力和可用的信息的數(shù)量和維數(shù)的時(shí)間。最近研究已經(jīng)檢查和多重表現(xiàn)度量信息的使用有關(guān)的認(rèn)識(shí)的傾向，例如平衡的記分卡。人們已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)管理是容易產(chǎn)生偏差的，例如把普通而不是唯一度量的重量和結(jié)果的影響安置的傾向。研究者已經(jīng)檢查從-左右機(jī)械裝置的效力，

36、例如負(fù)有責(zé)任,經(jīng)驗(yàn)和柜臺(tái)知識(shí)庫(kù)要求措施幫助管理估計(jì)信息技術(shù)好處。因此，韻律法就如花費(fèi)在訪問(wèn)和更新數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)方面能被用來(lái)決定程度的信息系統(tǒng)和它的分擔(dān)的信息的使用的時(shí)間和過(guò)程的接近程度，也是否這使用正發(fā)展。最近的一個(gè)在商業(yè)組織模型中對(duì)鉛-減慢指示的研究已經(jīng)強(qiáng)調(diào)包含速度和大小描繪各種各樣原因和影響連接的重要性。更好控制手段也是向組織的學(xué)習(xí)提供一反饋圈。</p><p><b>　　4 總結(jié)</b>&l

37、t;/p><p>　　我們已經(jīng)把統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)的觀點(diǎn)應(yīng)用于信息系統(tǒng)管理的四個(gè)領(lǐng)域：成本回收、外部采辦、決策支持系統(tǒng)和商業(yè)流程再造(再設(shè)計(jì))。表2總結(jié)了這個(gè)問(wèn)題，先前的文摘和會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)對(duì)這篇文章的研究有很大貢獻(xiàn)。</p><p>　　四個(gè)區(qū)域代表僅有的部分在會(huì)計(jì)和信息系統(tǒng)研究者之間重疊利益。自從他們的文學(xué)給了我們關(guān)于怎樣管理信息技術(shù)互補(bǔ)了解以來(lái)，為了推進(jìn)先行的信息系統(tǒng)管理獎(jiǎng)的學(xué)問(wèn),我們促使會(huì)計(jì)和信息系統(tǒng)研究

38、者把他們的知識(shí)湊在一起。</p><p><b>　　致謝</b></p><p>　　本文的更早期理論2004年被阿利斯斯普林斯在AFAANZ會(huì)議上提出，在2003年4月香港城市大學(xué)，作者因得到他們的建議和幫助而感謝Chee W.Chow和羅伯特Davison。</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b><

39、;/p><p>　　This paper advances our knowledge of information systems (IS) management by applying ideas and insights from accounting.An integrative cost–benefit framework is developed and applied to four areas of

40、research: chargeback, outsourcing, decisionsupport, and business process re-engineering and improvement. We show that the accounting literature contributes significantly to scholarship on the management of IS.</p>

41、<p>　　1 Introduction</p><p>　　Information systems (IS) are managed at various levels. Enterprise level decisions primarily deal mainly with allocation of resources. Functional level IS decisions includ

42、e where and when to apply IT, and whether the application should be made or bought. A decision to ‘‘make’’ a new IT application internally will inevitably lead to the initiation of a project that must then be managed. &l

43、t;/p><p>　　Important issues related to each of the aforementioned decisions have been considered by both IS and accounting scholars. For example, a steady stream of IS research on outsourcing began to emerge af

44、ter the landmark decision by Kodak to contract its IS management to IBM. Similarly, accounting research has examined the initial outsourcing decision. However, a review of the IS literature suggests that other management

45、 questions have been addressed inadequately,particularly those involving post-imp</p><p>　　The accounting perspective is relevant to many IS issues, but recent advances focus on decisions and management cont

46、rol issues after an IS has been implemented. As a result, we show how accounting insights can help the IS profession to manage: (i) the intangible aspects of IT projects, including risk assessment, control, and coordinat

47、ion; (ii) biases that are associated with DSS use, and (iii) the authority and incentive structure of the firm. The next section presents a conceptual framework, wh</p><p>　　Fig. 1. The process of informatio

48、n technology (IT) application.</p><p>　　2 Conceptualframework:accounting costs–benefits </p><p>　　By more accurately attributing costs to specific products, services and customers, accounting ca

49、n greatly improve the quality of information for decision-making. Similarly, by more accurately attributing employee effort to organizational outcomes, accounting can improve the motivation and goal alignment of employee

50、 efforts. Both of these efforts enhance the management of IS. Their success ultimately depends on what is measured (e.g., costs, activities, or processes) and how well these objects ar</p><p>　　To introduce

51、and relate the four areas of IS management, it is useful to consider the process of IT application as shown in Fig. 1. An organization must decide the extent to which it will develop and operate its own IS; it may decide

52、 to outsource some or all of the activities. </p><p>　　The economic benefits of IS generally take one of two forms: (i) the reduction of operational costs through process improvement (by automating, streamli

53、ning or re-engineering capital and labor intensive activities), and (ii) the improvement of resource allocation by providing more accurate and timely minformation to decision makers. The potential scope of IT application

54、s ranges from the strategic to the operational level. The cost–benefit framework in Fig. 2 shows these two general types of IT b</p><p>　　Fig. 2. Information technology (IT) cost–benefit framework.</p>

55、<p>　　3 Four areas of IS research </p><p>　　3.1. Managing the costs of information systems</p><p>　　A significant concern of an organization is to recover the costs of operating and maint

56、aining the IS: the ‘‘chargeback’’ issue.</p><p>　　3.2. Chargeback</p><p>　　A chargeback system normally bills cost centers or user departments for in-house IS services. There are several alterna

57、tives, such as cost minimization, flexible pricing (to resolve peak load problems), and setting standard rates based on the elapsed time, estimated fraction of the system used by the job, and a timeadjusting factor that

58、accounts for the job’s priority and mix in the system. </p><p>　　The question becomes: What chargeback system would be fair to both providers and users? </p><p>　　Several tradeoffs are shown in

59、Fig. 3. Chargeback helps to create a culture of accountability that communicates the cost of IT to users. However, the demand for accountability may have to be tempered by a flexible approach that encourages volitional u

60、se that is critical to a firm’s strategy. Finally, chargeback may be used to manage the interdependency between service department capacity and external (non-service) department demand; e.g., service department capacity

61、will influence IS service cos</p><p>　　Fig. 3. Drivers of chargeback design.</p><p>　　The drivers of chargeback have their roots in: (i) management control, (ii) the strategic role of IT, and (i

62、ii) the organization’s ability to measure costs and performance. Although chargeback practices have not changed significantly, the difficulties of both allocating costs and educating users about using chargeback informat

63、ion have increased. IS effectiveness models have yet to address issues of fairness, equity, responsibility and controllability. </p><p>　　Chargeback studies from the 1980s may have limited relevance in today

64、’s IT-intensive environment. The traditional IS service center role has changed as departments acquire their own specialists, though networking and maintenance services remain centralized. The dispersion of IT resources

65、makes determination of costs difficult—in some locations and operations, computing is becoming an almost free-resource or commodity. The consequences of this are (i) understated IT costs and (ii) duplicated effo</p>

66、;<p>　　Similarly, the adoption of new technology involves user effort to achieve the perceived benefits of use but involving steep learning curves and uncertainty about the real costs. As IT adoption and upgrades

67、take place at increasing rates, many organizations are dealing with at least two generations of IT. As this increases the complexity of any chargeback system, a cost–benefit framework should identify the costs before a c

68、hargeout system is designed.</p><p>　　IS researchers have found it difficult to account for the dynamic and dispersed nature of IT applications. They have also failed to fully consider the complementarities

69、and externalities that are associated with IS services.</p><p>　　3.2.1. Accounting perspectives</p><p>　　Two concepts provide guidance in designing and employing an IT chargeback system: interna

70、l costresource utilization within functional areas, and the effects of externalities in the cost allocation process. Fairness in charging users for IT services is reasonable, but putting this into practice can be difficu

71、lt. IT use by one department will influence that of another and ultimately affect service department capacity. A poorly designed chargeback system will result in negative externalities, where</p><p>　　The tr

72、adeoff between flexibility and accountability can also stifle volitional use of IT services and resources. There are three ways that accounting methods may aid in reducing this problem:</p><p>　　1.Although i

73、t is logical to recoup the cost of IT investment according to a user-pays formula, a balance may be struck between accountability and flexibility. It would be useful to know how lower levels of chargeback increase user a

74、wareness of IT services. Too little chargeback results in no selfmonitoring and little concern for the resources consumed but too much chargeback stifles the volitional use of the IT services and resources.</p>&l

75、t;p>　　2. An accounting perspective acknowledges the need for volitional activity to be encouraged in some areas, such as R&D. However, this does not eliminate the need to evaluate and control the use of a resourc

76、e, determining and assessing the critical success factors to indicate how well the organization achieves its objectives [24]. Input and behavioral controls are appropriate when an organizational task involves a high degr

77、ee of technological uncertainty or has outputs that are difficult to meas</p><p>　　3. Because chargeback systems are not the only way of guiding and controlling the actions of IS users, other methods could b

78、e tried, including incentive systems tailored to the IS and user departments to direct and motivate innovative behavior. The interaction of the type of incentive system with cost allocation can affect profitability, prod

79、uctivity, innovation, and the exchange of information between parts of organizations.</p><p>　　An emphasis on economic measurement and value highlights the importance of using chargebackfor strategic purpose

80、s. More knowledge of how the use of chargeback can support the strategic objectives of IT application is needed. A key challenge is to understand and reconcile the chasm between two sets of conflicting practical views: t

81、he need for chargeout, and criticism of it.</p><p>　　Is an unsuccessful chargeback system a precursor to outsourcing? Some economists and accountants have recommended that there should be either no chargebac

82、k or marginal cost pricing at the most.</p><p>　　3.3 Outsourcing</p><p>　　IS outsourcing decisions are characterized by their size, complexity, and potential irreversibility. The benefits of suc

83、h outsourcing include reduced costs due to a vendor’s economies of scale, possible access to new technology and expertise, strategic flexibility, and avoidance of obsolescence. The complexity is characterized by its inta

84、ngible nature, multiple stakeholders, and the need for delivery of the service over time. These factors show the need to consider several (including post-contra</p><p>　　Eastman Kodak’s decision to outsource

85、 its mainframe computers to IBM was found to have a positive stock market reaction. It later became obvious that successful outsourcing outcomes (such as quality processes and services) include sharing of knowledge, havi

86、ng a formal evaluation process, using shorter-term contracts, and outsourcing IT on a selective basis.</p><p>　　IS researchers have generally applied transaction cost economics such as the avoidance of obsol

87、escence, access to new technology, and vendor economies of scale to explain the value of outsourcing. However, this has inadequately accounted for the costs associated with the management and completion of IS outsourcing

88、 projects. The customer and supplier/stakeholder relationship portrayed by transactions cost theory s overly simplistic because of: (1) the expectations of different stakeholders and (2</p><p>　　quality, IS

89、support quality and IS cost effectiveness, and the strategic orientation of the firm strongly suggest that the outsourcing decision was a means of compensating for resource deficiencies. In contrast, neither cost conside

90、rations nor the firm’s financial performance were found to affect the outsourcing decision significantly.</p><p>　　Outsourcing varies in terms of the degree of perceived client conflict in contracting relati

91、ons, which can be explained with agency theory: information asymmetry between the user and the supplier occurs because of the supplier’s expertise and the inability of the user to monitor and control the project effectiv

92、ely. Only recently has the post-contract management of outsourcing been studied, with trust and knowledge sharing issues being addressed.</p><p>　　In contrast to the market decision that is associated with t

93、he initial stage of outsourcing, the governance of the outsourcing contract relies on the psychological contract and social capital. The aim is to facilitate cooperation between the contracting parties (see Fig. 4). This

94、 perspective provides a holistic understanding of the onset of governance, what choices are available, and the consequences. Three theories transactions costs, embeddedness, and knowledgebased) may be used to model the p

95、</p><p>　　Fig. 4. Outsourcing—areas of prior research.</p><p>　　3.3.1. Accounting perspective</p><p>　　Accounting researchers have made concerted efforts to understand the effective

96、ness of different control and coordination mechanisms in managing the postcontracting stages of outsourcing [37,4]. Three different patterns of inter-firm controls have been identified based on markets (arms length trans

97、actions), bureaucracies (formal rules and procedures), and trust (maintaining reputation) [38]. Chalos and O’Connor [5] found that socialization and communication mechanisms were critical for knowledge </p><p&

98、gt;　　Accounting measures provide formal information about each party’s actions, thereby keeping each party honest and strengthening the ties between the contracting parties and leading to open sharing of knowledge and in

99、formation.</p><p>　　Another stream of research has examined the contexts in which different networks are formed and used this to explain the value of the different types of controls [12]; the type of network

100、 was found to determine the information that each party has, creating common understandings and stable relationships.</p><p>　　3.4. Managing the benefits of IS</p><p>　　The provision of measures

101、 to facilitate and influence decisions extends to other areas of IS practice: decision support (at the management level) and process improvement (at the operational level). The planning and development of these types of