[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]防火設(shè)計(jì)外文翻譯--高層建筑的消防安全設(shè)計(jì)

1、7000 英文單詞， 英文單詞，3.8 萬(wàn)英文字符，中文 萬(wàn)英文字符，中文 11500 字文獻(xiàn)出處： 文獻(xiàn)出處：Cowlard A, Bittern A, Abecassis-Empis C, et al. Fire Safety Design for Tall Buildings [J]. Procedia Engineering, 2013, 62:169-181.Fire safety design for tall buildi

2、ngsAdam Cowlard, Adam Bittern, Cecilia Abecassis-Empis, José ToreroAbstractIn any subject area related to the provision of safety, failure is typically the most effective mechanism for evoking rapid reform and an in

3、trospective assessment of the accepted operating methods and standards within a professional body. In the realm of tall buildings the most notable failures in history, those of the WTC towers, widely accepted as fire ind

4、uced failures, have not to any significant extent affected the way they are designed with respect to fire safety. This is clearly reflected in the surge in numbers of Tall Buildings being constructed since 2001. The comb

5、ination of the magnitude and time-scale of the WTC investigation coupled with the absence of meaningful guidance resulting from it strongly hints at the outdatedness of current fire engineering practice as a discipline i

6、n the context of such advanced infrastructure. This is further reflected in the continual shift from prescriptive to performance based design in many parts of the world demonstrating an ever growing acceptance that these

7、 buildings are beyond the realm of applicability of prescriptive guidance. In order for true performance based engineering to occur however, specific performance goals need to be established for these structures. This wo

8、rk seeks to highlight the critical elements of a fire safety strategy for tall buildings and thus attempt to highlight some specific global performance objectives. A survey of tall building fire investigations is conduct

9、ed in order to assess the effectiveness of current designs in meeting these objectives, and the current state-of-the-art of fire safety design guidance for tall structures is also analysed on these terms. The correct def

10、inition of the design fire for open plan compartments is identified as the critical knowledge gap that must be addressed in order to achieve tall building performance objectives and to provide truly innovative, robust fi

11、re safety for these unique structures.Keywords: Tall Buildings; Fire safety strategies; Performance based design1. IntroductionThe number of tall buildings constructed is increasingly ever more rapidly (Fig. 1). They are

12、 evolving in height, construction materials, use, and compartmental composition. The evolution of height is staggering when it is considered that until January of 2010, the tallest completed building (Taipei 101) stood a

13、t 508 m, a mantle now held by the Burj Khalifa at 828 m. The increasing number of 600 m+ buildings being conceived has led to the recent coining of the term mega-tall. According to statistics from the Council on Tall Bui

14、ldings and Urban Habitat [1], 17 of the tallest 100 buildings in the world, as of the end of 2011, were completed within that year. The driving forces behind this progression are inevitably financial, political and envir

15、onmental, but it is modern technological developments, both structural and material, which have truly enabled the continued evolution of these buildings. The tall building of today is a completely different entity to tha

16、t of a decade ago with the propensity for change even greater in the immediate future. Advancements in structural engineering have arisen to make possible the increase in height, size and complexity, the reduction of cos

17、t and carbon footprint as well as architectural imagination and economic versatility of these buildings. In what is coming to be considered the era of the tall building, the recent explosion in numbers has caused a numbe

18、r of engineers and governmental performance objectives to enable a successful tall building fire safety strategy, and assesses failure statistics which provide an indication of our current ability to successfully enginee

19、r the principle issues identified.2. From prescription to performance: the tools of the fire safety engineerThe most successful investigations are those conducted in an atmosphere where all those involved have sufficient

20、 knowledge to make the most of the investigation and to transfer that new knowledge into the design process. Possibly the greatest leap forward in fire engineering knowledge came as a result of such a failure investigati

21、on [16]. In this instance however it was the extensive research carried out by both sides during World War II, specifically with the intention of the creation of failure. The extensive development of understanding of met

22、hods by which failure could be induced by fire meant that later, following a wide ranging international research collaboration, this could be translated into state-of-the-art design guidance [17]. This example is also ty

23、pical of how social responsibility associated to fire safety has historically been translated into codes and standards establishing prescriptive requirements for buildings.Prescriptive requirements induce safety factors

24、by constraining design output to pre-established bounds. A specific form has been studied, and its range of performance established. An acceptable performance objective is identified thus so is the extent to which the fo

25、rm can be changed whilst still achieving the performance objective. This methodology forms the bounds that are then implied by prescriptive rules. If a designer follows these rules, they will fall within the bounds and t

26、he safety of the design will be implicit. The implemented solution will inherently carry a significant safety factor because it has to be robust to the variations permitted within the bounds of the prescriptive rules. Th

27、e magnitude of this safety factor is however, never explicitly defined. Critically, this system is founded on the initial form identified for analysis; change the system drastically, and the safety factor can no longer b

28、e implied. There have been periods in which codes and standards had enough embedded knowledge that they could respond to all variants of innovation in construction. In these periods infrastructure can be comprehensively

29、classified into some group that is fully addressed by a specific set of rules. Few exceptions appear outside the codes and standards and require individualised solutions. The post WWII period was perhaps the most signifi

30、cant example of this. In periods of great urban or technological development, codes and standards do not envelop the evolution imposed by the drivers of the construction industry and performance based solutions are neces

31、sary.Performance based design allows practitioners to apply a rational engineering approach to provision of life safety and property protection goals. This is accomplished by identification of specific goals, functional

32、objectives and performance requirements [18]. An engineer is then given license to demonstrate the required performance using an acceptable solution, approved calculation method or performance based alternative design. A

33、chievement of the specified goals is thus defined explicitly. The WTC epitomised innovation and most of the technical solutions involved were evaluated using the most sophisticated engineering tools of the time; a time w

34、hen Fire Safety was still established in a purely prescriptive manner. In the aftermath of the WTC collapses, the Tall Buildings community turned towards the investigation to derive the necessary lessons that would enabl

35、e an adequate performance based analyses. Nevertheless, extracting requisite knowledge from a failure and conveying that knowledge into the design process requires a minimum level of understanding of what went wrong and